Management systems safety

In order to reduce the number and severity of major events companies need to develop and implement a Safety Management System, or SMS. The details of an SMS vary from company to company and agency to agency, but they all tend to have broadly the same structure and content. In the United States, the agency responsible for offshore safety, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), issued its Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) rule. The management elements of SEMS are shown in Table 1.2. 

Given that the development, implementation, and maintenance of Safety Management Systems are expensive and time consuming, it is important to establish that they are providing value, and that safety is improving. 

The section on Industry Trends (see below) shows that, over the last 15 years or so, occupational safety trends have been very impressive. But SMSs are more concerned with the control of catastrophic events, such as those described in Chapter 2. Given that such events happen only rarely, it is difficult to develop trend lines in the same manner. 

However, it is probably fair to say that most professionals in the oflshore oil and gas industry accept that the management of catastrophic events has improved, but not nearly as dramatically as it has for occupational safety. The reason for this cautious response may be that an SMS program by itself is not enough—it is a necessary but not sufficient condition. To be effective, the SMS has to affect the culture of the oiganization, and the way people behave and act. The effectiveness of the program also depends on the leadership and decisiveness of the company management, as discussed in Chapter 8. 

The conclusion that can be drawn is that, if the catastrophic events are to be controlled, an SMS provides a necessary fotmdation. However, it is just a fotmdation—it also has to be implemented and it requires forceful leadership. 

At the DGCA Conference, ICAO reiterated the fact that the term safety management conveys the notion that the management of safety is a business process that should be considered at the same level and along the same lines as any other business process. The safety management systems approach, as proposed, would not only be reactive to some triggering event such as an incident or reportable event, but it would also involve a proactive process of ongoing and routine collection and 

The UK government enquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster in the North Sea in 1988 has had a significant impact on working practices and equipment and has helped to improve offshore safety around the world. One result has been the development of a Safety Management System (SMS) which is a method of integrating work practices, and is a form of quality management system. Major oil companies have each developed their own specific SMS, to suit local environments and modes of operation, but the SMS typically addresses the following areas (recommended by the Cullen Enquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster)  

It is important that the SMS is not a stand-alone system, but that it is integrated into the working methods of a company. Some of the above elements of an SMS will be discussed. 

Aud/f/ng the operation of a system may be done by an external audit team composed of qualified people from within or outside the operating company. However, involvement 

Design procedures are developed with the intention of improving the safety of equipment. Tools used in this step are hazard and operability studies and quantitative risk analysis (ORA). The following scheme may be used  

In the first step, a screening process will be applied to separate the major potential hazards these will be addressed in more detail. QRA techniques are used to evaluate the extent of the risk arising from hazards with the potential to cause major accidents, based on the prediction of the likelihood and magnitude of the event. This assessment will be based on engineering judgement and statistics of previous performance. Where necessary, risk reduction measures will be applied until the level of risk is acceptable. This of course is an emotive subject, since it implies placing a value on human life. 

But as Hollnagel (2014 6) then goes on to state, this definition is very clever... but it introduces the small problem of howto count or even notice or detect a non-event, and this is where safety becomes challenged within safety management systems - how to manage something that is not actually happening  

there are certainly no shortages of suggestions of how to do this, and what a safety management system should contain in order to achieve it. Many textbooks and consultancies can provide checklists and pro-formas to create a coherent safety management system, yet such a formulaic approach can be seen as a little incoherent for the management of something that doesn t actually happen, within the context of a messy, inconsistent, and constantly changing social reality. 

This has inevitably led to various challenges and conflicts between safety as it can be managed theoretically through a safety management system, and how safety works in practice for example around the complexities of change within the site environment and how best to position the management of such a changing space 

A final, yet fundamental point to be made with regard to safety management systems is that their all-encompassing nature often means that safety can easily become cluttered with inspections, rules, objectives and methods for measurement. Yet when we look beyond their titles, within the Health and Safety Executive s safety management guidance, swift prioritisation is made of the ideas of hazard, harm and risk something that often forms only a part of safety management systems. 

Indeed within the Health and Safety Executive (2015b 7) guidance for the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015, the first of the key elements to securing construction health and safety is  

The requirements of both PSM and SEMP are, from a practical standpoint, identical and thus, SEMP can easily be applied to onshore facilities as well as offshore facilities. The basic concepts of SEMP are as follows  

Safety and environmental information is needed to provide a basis for implementation of further program components such as operating procedures and hazards analysis. Specific guidelines as to what information is needed are contained in API RP 141. 

This subject is addressed in the previous section of this chapter. Specific guidelines for performing hazards analysis are contained in API RP 14J. 

The management program should include written facility operating procedures. These procedures should provide ample instruction for sound operation and be consistent with the safety and environmental information, Procedures should be reviewed and updated periodically to reflect current process operating practices. Procedures provide the means for education of new employees about the process and provide education to all employees on new equipment and practices. 

A disproportional amount of accidents occur during construction and major maintenance activities. Safe work practices are written with this in mind and, as a minimum, should cover the following  

Gonna change my way of thinking, make myself a different set of rules. 

Gonna put my good foot forward and stop being influeneed by fools. 

Management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organization. 

A change of fortune hurts a wise man no more than a ehange of the moon. 

To achieve this goal, the engineering organization must incorporate system safety into the system life cycle. Many times, this is precisely where engineers have failed. 

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Investigating Chemical Process Incidents Auditing Process Safety Management Systems Making Acute Risk Decisions... 

Guidelinesfor Technical Management of Chemical Process Safety Center for Chemical Process Safety, New York, 1989 Guidelines for Auditing Process Safety Management Systems Center for Chemical Process Safety, New York, 1993. 

The key steps in the audit process are outlined according to preaudit ac tivities, audit activities, and postaudit activities in Fig. 26-12. These activities are described in detail in Guidelines for Auditing Process Safety Management Systems (CCSP, 1993) and will be only briefly discussed in this sec tion. 

The next process step evaluates the process safety management systems to determine if they are adequate to achieve the desired results, and if they are used as intended. This evaluation is highly subjective on the auditors part. This step sets the stage for the rest of the audit, guiding the auditor s information gathering and focusing attention on critical areas. 

It is incumbent upon the toller to develop and follow internal management systems as appropriate to support business needs, production needs, process safety, environmental responsibility, and worker health. The selection process should have considered whether or not satisfactory systems are in place. Nevertheless, the contract or auxiliary documents may be the vehicle used to help ensure that the system reviewed is the system actually used for completing the toll in question. Within the process safety management system, the management of change and training elements are essential subsystems. 

Trade Secrets When a toll involves proprietary information, a system must exist to ensure that employees have the process safety related knowledge needed to meet the intent of the process safety management system. 

Guidelines for Evaluating the Consequences of Vapour Cloud Explosions, Elash Eires, and BLEVEs (1994) Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management Systems (1994)... 

Implementing an inherent safety review process is one mechanism companies can use to institutionalize inherent safety. The review process should integrate well with company systems for process safety management, new product development, and project execution. Safety, health, and environmental considerations in the new product or process development effort can be strengthened via the introduction of the inherent safety review. Companies may also build inherently safer design concepts into their existing process safety management system and process hazard reviews. 

The audit team, through its systematic analysis, should document areas that require corrective action as well as where the process safety management system is effective. This provides a record of the audit procedures and findings and serves as a baseline of operation data for future audits. It will assist in determining changes or trends in future audits. 

This book addresses the design, development, and installation of process safety management systems, but does not address subsequent operation and maintenance of those systems. The book s goal is to help you put together a workable, effective program and put it in place within your com pany or plant. 

By year-end 1995 we will have implemented a fully integrated process safety management system throughout our worldwide operations. 

Develop a plan. Based on established goals and current status, the teams will develop detailed plans for implementing a process safety management system, including projections of time and staffpwer requirements and other resource needs. When completed, these plans will be our blueprint for PSM implementation, subject to refinement based on experience. 

Develop specific process safety management systems. Working within the pian, the task groups will develop specific systems and procedures for implementing PSM. The Division A team will focus on its own operations, while (name s) group will direct its efforts toward the other divisions. 

The CCPS model describes process safety management systems in terms of 12 elements and 68 components. The elements and components appear as Table 1.1 on pages 2 and 3 of this book. 

This model is unique in its description of what constitutes a management system, and its effort to address the planning, organizing, implementing, and control aspects of process safety management systems. 

A variety of other descriptions for process safety management systems have been published since 1988. Among these are frameworks published by the... 

The Task Force s mission is to design a state-of-the-art process safety management system that will support all of Company X s varied business operations, and to install it at a pilot site to be determined. The team will maintain ongoing communication with Division C s Facility Managers Council, which has accepted responsibility for focusing on the division s process safety management systems. 

DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS... 

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