Safety management systems risk acceptance

The Systemic Safety Management System (SSMS) model is intended to maintain risk within an acceptable range in any organization s operations. The model is proposed as a structure for an effective safety management system. It may be argued that if all the sub-systems and connections are present and working effectively, the probability of a failure should be less than otherwise. Table 1 lists the fundamental characteristics of the SSMS model. 

The facility system safety risk assessment process works such that if the initial risk assessment produces a RAC of 1 or 2, some type of control must be applied. After this control is applied, a second risk assessment or controlled RAC is determined. First, the control rating code is evaluated to ensure that the CRC rules have been met and then to ensure that the controlled RAC is 3 or 4. If the CRC rules are met and the controlled RAC is 3 or 4, the corrective action is taken and the risk has been reduced to an acceptable level. However, if the CRC rules have not been met and/or the RAC remains at 1 or 2, other controls must be applied and the reassessment cycle is repeated. If other controls are not available, then risk acceptance decisions must be made by the appropriate level of management, and risk acceptance decisions must be documented (Fig. 11-4). 

When safety management systems are most effective, there is a commitment to ascertaining the facts about hazards and risks, regardless of any unpleasantness that may arise during the discovery process, and taking actions to achieve acceptable risk levels. 

Management has to decide if the calculated level of risk is acceptable, and, if it is not, what actions need to be taken to reduce it. Some Safety Management Systems—in particular many Safety Cases—are built around the concept of a numerical value for an ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) value, as already discussed. If the risk lies above or below the predetermined ALARP value then corrective actions must be taken. 

Other Safety Management Systems (including SEMP and SEMS) do not discuss acceptable risk per se, nor do they provide numerical values for acceptable risk. Instead they are largely driven by the acceptable levels of risk that are implicit in industry standards from bodies such as the API (American Petroleum Institute) and the ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers). 

BS OHSAS 18001 2007. Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems— Requirements, a British Standards Institution pubhcation. In the 2007 revision, requirements for risk assessments are more explicit. The guidehnes now say The organization shall estabhsh, implement and maintain a procedure(s) for the ongoing hazard identification, risk assessment, and determination of necessary controls. Significantly, the term tolerable risk was replaced by acceptable risk. ... 

A revision of ANSI/AIHA ZlO-2012, the Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems standard, was issued in 2012. It contains the following citations with respect to acceptable risk. 

Replacing the term tolerable risk with acceptable risk in BS OHS AS 18001 by an organization as influential as the British Standards Institution is noteworthy. In some parts of the world, because of requirements in contract bid situations, companies are required to show that their safety management systems are certified. BS OHSAS 18001 is often the base of such certification. This modification made by the British Standards Institution indicates that the goal to be achieved is acceptable risk levels. 

SEMS and SEMP are not the only types of Safety Management Systems. Offshore facilities in other parts of the world, for example, develop through the use of safety cases. This chapter describes the structure of a typical safety case. Related topics, such as levels of acceptable risk, are also discussed. 

Use of an accepted safety management system can provide the structure for an overall assessment. As example, the American Nationals Standards Institute s ZlO-2012, Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, a voluntary standard states The organization shall establish a process to set documented objectives, quantified where practicable, based on issues that offer the greatest opportunity for Occupational Health and Safety Management System improvement and risk reduction. ... 

But, there may also be a down side for behaviorists if the Krause premise is broadly accepted. Some safety professionals may rationalize that if the concentration should properly be on improving the interrelationship between people, equipment, materials, and the work environment, why are behaviorists needed at all They may conclude that operational efficiency requires that such interrelationships be approached directly through the means available in good safety management, rather than through a costly employee observation system. Obtaiiung the knowledge of the workers to help identify hazards and risks would continue to be an important part of those endeavors. 

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