Safety case management system

Managing safety related requirements Developing a safety case Managing system change Safety testing and chnical evaluation Monitoring the system in live operation Assessing personnel competency... 

The management of projects developing safety-critical systems poses particular challenges, as do the delivery of systems safety in IT service organisations, and the preparation of safety cases for systems of systems. These important topics are brought together in the second session of the Symposium. 

The safety case approach makes the system owner/manager responsible for proving that their activities are safe - and continue to remain so. Every system owner/ manager is thus required to undertake a formal assessment of the safety of their facility and develop a report which documented the hazards, safeguards, safety and management systems, and emergency response plans for the system/facility throughout its life cycle. 

The book begins with a discussion of the theories of error causation and then goes on to describe the various ways in which data can be collected, analyzed, and used to reduce the potential for error. Case studies are used to teach the methodology of error reduction in specific industry operations. Finally, the book concludes with a plan for a plant error reduction program and a discussion of how human factors principles impact on the process safety management system. 

The protocol developed in Chapter 5, which was applied on accidents as shown in Chapter 6, is applied on three cases in the Dutch chemical process industry. First, the cases are selected according the criteria stated in Chapter 5. Secondly, the developed protocol of analysis is applied on these selected cases, to identify why and how it is still possible that accidents may occur despite precursors and several existing safety barriers. Thirdly, the results from the analysis are further elaborated on, indicating the problems in current safety management systems, allowing accidents to occur. 

In the previous Chapter it was shown that the developed protocol for analysis identified the ineffective control elements causing the precursors prior to accidents. However, due to the lack of detailed accident information the conclusions were limited. To perform the analysis, using the developed 7-stage protocol pro-actively (before any accident occurs), cases have to be selected on which the analysis can be performed and from which reliable and generic conclusions about safety indicators and the performance of current safety management systems can be obtained. The next sub-Section will discuss the selection criteria to select suitable cases. 

From each case study the number of initial ineffective control elements and the latent conditions leading to these ineffective control elements will be discussed. Moreover, the individual affected safety barriers will be combined, to find the possible alignment of affected safety barriers. These findings will indicate possible weaknesses of the current safety management system. Finally, all three case studies will be compared to derive some conclusions regarding both differences and similarities between the three cases. 

If they are incorporated in, say, management systems of quality assurance and occupational safety and environmental protection on a corporate level, guiding principles assume an important function for orientation, especially in the case of persistent knowledge inadequacies about the effects of substances. 

Advanced Railway Safety Case Production Tool of Railway Research Centre (http //www.railway.bham.ac.uk/advanced.htm)—the research addressed the requirements for a Safety Case Automated Production Tool (SCAPT) environment integrating systems engineering processes and tools, modeling, risk management and domain knowledge. 

Set A the seven old cases all concerned local sites with which we had had extensive direct contacts in the period of 1985-1990, either in the form of contract research projects or by supervising students working in those plants. The insights in their safety management systems in general and in their NMMS projects in particular were updated in 1991. 

Safety Series No. 79 Design of Radioactive Waste Management Systems at Nuclear Power Plants (1986). Safety Series No. 90 The Application of the Principles for Limiting Releases of Radioactive Effluents in the Case of the Mining and Milling of Radioactive Ores (1989). 

In the case of a BMS for an electric vehicle, the tasks of the safety-management system are ... 

The reporting of adverse incidents should not be relied upon as a sole means of identifying and managing potential hazards. However, the real-world performance of systems is important in assessing the effectiveness of controls and the on-going validity of the safety case. 

Where extension of use is conducted as part of a controlled roll out it should be subject to the usual change management procedures which will have been established in the in SMS. Essentially a set of safety activities will need to take place on the product to determine whether the new operating environment introduces any new hazards and the safety case updated accordingly. The analysis will need to be able to justify operating the system outside of the intended purpose and set out the evidence to support the claim that the risk remains acceptable. 

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