Specific Process Safety Management Systems

Develop specific process safety management systems. Working within the pian, the task groups will develop specific systems and procedures for implementing PSM. The Division A team will focus on its own operations, while (name s) group will direct its efforts toward the other divisions. 

DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS... 

The book begins with a discussion of the theories of error causation and then goes on to describe the various ways in which data can be collected, analyzed, and used to reduce the potential for error. Case studies are used to teach the methodology of error reduction in specific industry operations. Finally, the book concludes with a plan for a plant error reduction program and a discussion of how human factors principles impact on the process safety management system. 

History of previous incidents. Frequent incidents, especially serious ones, indicate a breakdown in process safety management systems. They also indicate that the facility may be more likely to have additional incidents, unless the underlying causes have been determined and specific actions have been implemented to prevent their reoccurrence. 

Collecting the correct information to monitor and understand performance of the process safety management system, and its separate elements, can provide an unbiased and comprehensive view of system performance. This will alert the appropriate personnel to weaknesses in the process safety system. A companywide versus a site-specific approach to process safety auditing, evaluation, and improvement not only deals with better prioritization of identified improvement work but potentially provides better auditing and evaluation against those conditions that one site may accept as normal/acceptable over time. 

Periodic management review is a specific risk-based process safety (RBPS) element Providing regular checkups on the health of process safety management systems—including the metrics—will identify and correct any current or incipient deficiencies before they are revealed by an audit or incident. Such management reviews also demonstrate management interest and commitment to process safety and the metrics that describe the system. 

The EPA standard is more specific in its requiranent for a Process Safety Management system [2,68.15] ... 

The specific PSM systems that are finalized for installation will act as the core of your company s overall system for process safety management. For this reason, it s wise to approach their development in a manner that s consistent with your company s practices, to minimize the need for reconstructing detailed text to conform to company standards. 

Secondary prevention and mitigation, by themselves, are unable to eliminate the risk of serious or catastrophic chemical accidents, although improved process safety management can reduce their probability and severity. Most chemical production involves transformation processes, which are inherently complex and tightly coupled. Normal accidents are an unavoidable risk of systems with these characteristics [11]. However, the risk of serious, or catastrophic, consequences need not be. Specific industries use many different processes. In many cases, alternative chemical processes exist which completely or almost completely eliminate the use of highly toxic, volatile, or flammable chemicals [12]. 

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce you to process safety management, including the background that led to specific public laws, definitions applicable to this unique area, and requirements for process safety management, both in the United States and in Canada. This is a fascinating new area for both the safety or system safety professional and the process industry practitioner. 

In the previous chapter, it was established that in industry, plant hazards can cause harm to property (plant—machinery, asset), people, or the environment. So, it is important to develop some means of analyzing these and come up with a solution. Unfortunately, it is not as straightforward as it sounds. There are plenty of plant hazard analysis (PHA) techniques and each of them has certain strengths and weaknesses. Also each specific plant and associated hazard has specific requirements to be matched so that hazard analysis will be effective. In this chapter, various hazards (in generic terms) will be examined to judge their importance, conditions, quality, etc. so that out of so many techniques available for PHA it is possible to select which one is better (not the best because that needs to be done by experts specifically for the concerned plant) suited for the type of plant. So, discussion will be more toward evaluation of PHA techniques. Some PHA is more suited for process safety management (PSM) and is sometimes more applicable for internal fault effects [e.g., hazard and operability study (HAZOP)]. In contrast, hazard identification (HAZID) is applicable for other plants, especially for the identification of external effects and maj or incidents. HAZID is also covered in this chapter. As a continuation of the same discussion, it will be better to look at various aspects of risk analysis with preliminary ideas already developed in the previous chapter. In risk analysis risk assessment, control measures for safety management systems (SMSs) will be discussed to complete the topic. 

The following steps use the PDCA process and show how it is used to devise a structure for use in developing a safety management system. By having a specific process, a structure is provided from which a map can be developed for the organization to follow. In addition, the PDCA provides a dynamic format that reflects how the process is not static and is in continual... 

A member of the central safety committee should be designated to guide and administer the JHA process. This person would use cross-functional ad hoc teams to develop and maintain diversity and expertise for development of a portfolio of JHAs. The JHA ad hoc teams would develop specific JHAs based on the risk assessment list developed using the risk guidance card. They would draw on experience and expertise of employees and supervisors in the department or area where the job resides. Refer to Chapter 8, Getting Your Employees Involved in the Safety Management System . 

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