Types of Safety Management Systems

Finally note that an SMS is not the same as a safety case. The SMS sets out the processes and methodologies that an organisation will harness in pursuit of building a safety case. In other words the safety case is one of the outputs of applying the SMS to a particular HIT solution or component. Whilst the SMS will define acceptability criteria it will say nothing about whether the risk profile for a specific system is tolerable. 

SMSs typically fall into two categories prescriptive and goal-based systems. 

The prescriptive system is the simplest to understand and centres on inspection. With this methodology, one defines, adopts or inherits a series of binary criteria or requirements often set out as a checklist. The criteria are applied to the target product or service and, if all requirements are met, the product is deemed safe . If any requirement is not met steps are taken to address the specific problem and once dealt with the box is ticked. The criteria may be broad or specific and, in some cases, may be prescribed by a regulatory authority, commercial contract or procurement rule. 

This approach is simple - or maybe simplistic. Whilst the developers of the safety criteria need to be experts, those applying the criteria need not be. An entire assessment can sometimes be undertaken in a matter of minutes. As long as the information is available to make an assessment against the criteria, one need not question the rationality or validity of the process itself. The clear danger is that the risk management becomes nothing more than a tick-box exercise with little regard for the big picture. 

A similar but opposite assumption is also in play with the prescriptive approach. The presence of a criterion may imply that the characteristic in question is the only means by which the system can be rendered safe . Continuing the HL7 example above, there is the assumption that the use of any other communication standard would be intrinsically associated with intolerable risk. Clearly this logic does not follow. A system may use a perfectly reliable vendor-specific message format, one that the manufacturer has utilised for many years and has a great deal of operational experience with. Indeed a change in technology to meet the requirements of the 

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After reviewing many types of safety management systems and comparing their elements side by side, it is evident that six basic core principles are the vital link to developing and sustaining a safety culture. 

Two types of safety management systems are available— government-related as both mandated and voluntary, and voluntary systems developed by nationally and internationally recognized standards agencies and professional societies. 

Discuss types of safety management system assessments. 

Discuss the types of safety management systems assessments. 

SEMS and SEMP are not the only types of Safety Management Systems. Offshore facilities in other parts of the world, for example, develop through the use of safety cases. This chapter describes the structure of a typical safety case. Related topics, such as levels of acceptable risk, are also discussed. 

One method for complying with OSHA mandates and one type of safety management system is to become an OSHA Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) member. Refer to Table 13.3 for a summary of what it takes to certify under the VPP process. Refer to Figure 13.4 for a flow diagram of the OSHA Voluntary Protection Program. This diagram summarizes the information as listed in Table 13.3 and help you to apply for and successful obtain VPP status. 

Risk Management This first chapter provides an overview ot satety management in the offshore oii and gas industry. Trends within the industry are discussed, aiong with an assessment ot the impact of the Deepwater Horizon incident. A description of the different types of safety— occupationai, process and technicai —is provided, aiong with a description of Safety Management Systems. 

Accident modelling, consequence evaluation and assessments of probabilities. Here platform design and operational modes serve as important input. Probability assessments are based on generic accident statistics, averaging over different types of platform design, barrier types and safety management systems. 

Basic division in a process safety management system that correlates to the type of work that must be done (e.g., management of change [MOC]). 

Process safety metrics are critical indicators for evaluating a process safety management system s performance. Tracking the number of process safety incidents is one common measure of performance, but merely tracking the number of incidents after the fact is insufficient to understand the system failure that allowed the incident to occur and what can be done to prevent a recurrence. More than one metric and more than one type of metric are needed to monitor performance of a process safety management system. A comprehensive process safety management system should contain a variety of different metrics that monitor different dimensions of the system and the performance of all critical elements. 

The occupational safety and health community uses various names to describe systematic approaches to reducing injuries and illnesses in the workplace. Consensus and international standards use the term Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems OSHA currently uses the term Injury and Illness Prevention Programs and others use Safety and Health Programs to describe these types of systems. Regardless of the title, they all systematically address workplace safety and health hazards on an ongoing basis to reduce the extent and severity of work-related injuries and illnesses. 

While discussing her frustration with the newly recruited smelter manager, he told her about the National Occupational Safety Association s (NOSA) Five-Star Safety and Health Management System (the Five-Star Safety System), which he had encountered at a copper refinery in South Africa. He told her that it was a proactive type of safety system that he thought she would love to be a part of. 

Tripod Delta An integrated system of safety management which assesses general failure types, such as maintenance and design problems, and their potential impact on safety. 

How can you achieve these things Whether you are a motor carrier safety veteran or a rookie new to the transport safety arena, this manual will help you develop, implement, and maintain a total and comprehensive safety management system for your operation — regardless of type, size, or function. 

These types of hazards could have been avoided if good process safety management systems were in place, including consideration of reactive chemistry issues, handling and storage of individual reactive chemicals, and proper understanding of the process operations. 

On July 25, 2005, the American National Standards Institute approved the Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems Standard, designated as ANSUAIHA Z10-2005. Thus, for the first time in the United States, a national consensus standard was issued for safety and health management systems applicable to organizations of all sizes and types. 

The type and amount of formal documentation necessary to effectively manage an Occupational Health and Safety Management system should be commensurate with... 

If your disciplinary system is to work and be accepted by all employees, you must make sure that all employees understand that the disciplinary system applies equally to everyone and is consistently applied. This includes subjecting managers and supervisors to the same type of safety rules and disciplinary procedures [2]. 

Pick up almost any safety literature today and you will see an article discussing behavior-based safety. Each author has a different opinion on the use of behavior-based safety and how to implement the process. Nowhere will you find a discussion of integrating the process into the existing management system. In many cases, as the behavior-based process is presented, the process stands out like a sore thumb. Since there is such an emphasis on behavior-based safety, many managers think that this will solve all safety issues. It is important to remember that no matter how it is presented, the behavior-based process is only one element of your management system and should not stand alone. For example, there are still hazard recognition techniques, employee participation, and other types of efforts that must be used to identify hazards. You must remember that behavior-based safety does not catch all of the hazards since it focuses only on employees habits (at-risk behaviors). The JHA is the one method that can be used to help find and correct other hazards outside of behavior. Refer to Chapter 15. 

Most safety arguments eontain a set of assertions about processes and the eompe-tence of people with safety management responsibilities. The evidenee to support this type of argument comes fi om safety assessment/audit. A review takes place, independently of the day to day ineumbent, of the effectiveness and efficiency of the safety management system. It is an inherent feature of most systems that they are developed and improved within the scope of experience of a discrete set of professionals, and that it is easy for the working practices to have weaknesses which are difficult for the embedded staff to detect. 

In the previous chapter, it was established that in industry, plant hazards can cause harm to property (plant—machinery, asset), people, or the environment. So, it is important to develop some means of analyzing these and come up with a solution. Unfortunately, it is not as straightforward as it sounds. There are plenty of plant hazard analysis (PHA) techniques and each of them has certain strengths and weaknesses. Also each specific plant and associated hazard has specific requirements to be matched so that hazard analysis will be effective. In this chapter, various hazards (in generic terms) will be examined to judge their importance, conditions, quality, etc. so that out of so many techniques available for PHA it is possible to select which one is better (not the best because that needs to be done by experts specifically for the concerned plant) suited for the type of plant. So, discussion will be more toward evaluation of PHA techniques. Some PHA is more suited for process safety management (PSM) and is sometimes more applicable for internal fault effects [e.g., hazard and operability study (HAZOP)]. In contrast, hazard identification (HAZID) is applicable for other plants, especially for the identification of external effects and maj or incidents. HAZID is also covered in this chapter. As a continuation of the same discussion, it will be better to look at various aspects of risk analysis with preliminary ideas already developed in the previous chapter. In risk analysis risk assessment, control measures for safety management systems (SMSs) will be discussed to complete the topic. 

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