Safety related process

This section provides guidance for creating the element of a chemical reactivity hazard management system that will ensure the capture and retention of safety-related process knowledge and documentation. The components of this element are ... 

The SIS logic solver is a PLC, which is specifically designed for safety applications. It is type approved to comply with the lEC 61508 series up to SIL 3. It has input and output interfaces for safety-related process signals and communication with other safety PLC s. It also has interfaces for signals and oommunioation which are not safety-related. The system consists of ... 

We hope this chapter encourages the battery community to pursue more fundamental work into safety testing as well as understanding of safety-related processes in lithium-ion batteries. Work is needed to develop more sophisticated models, to measure material properties that contribute to enhanced safety, to develop improved methods of calorimetry, and to develop new safety technologies that will help assure safety of lithium-ion batteries. With greater visibility of the issues, perhaps this field will be taken up in graduate schools as an important topic that should yield rich problems and productive theses. 

ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004-1 introduced the concept that safety functions are identified during the hazard and risk analysis and allocated to protection layers. When the safety function is allocated to the safety instrumented system, the function becomes a safety instrumented function. The SIF is designed to mitigate a specified safety-related process risk using sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s). At this time, SIF is a process industry sector specific term. 

In this paper, we have presented a novel approach to reduce cost and time during the tool certification process. We have shown that by modeling the family of tool qualification processes via a safety-oriented process line, it is possible to identify reusable process elements and thus speed up the re-certification process when tools are expected to be used in different domains. We have also shown that these reusable process elements are reflected in the process-based arguments and thus not only qualification data (evidence) has the potential to be reused but also process-based sub-arguments. The main attention in this paper was given to the verification tools, however the approach can be extended to other tool categories as well as other kinds of safety-related processes. Due to space reasons, we also focused on process-related tasks and work products. As extensively discussed in [24], reuse also embraces all the other crucial process elements (namely, roles, work products, and guidance). 

In this paper we show that it is possible to attack PROFIsafe and change the safety-related process data without any of the safety measures in the protocol detecting the attack. As a countermeasure to network security attacks, the concept of security modules in combination with PROFIsafe will reduce the risk of security attacks, and is in line with the security concept defense-in-depth. 

It is possible, however, that some people will participate for the reward. Thus, it is crucial to consider carefully what specific behavior is most desirable in a safety-related process. The NORPAC employees believed the preeminent feature of interpersonal coaching is the one-on-one feedback discussion. Thus, they linked the reward to this phase of their behavioral safety coaching process. 

Nuclear power has achieved an excellent safety record. Exceptions are the accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and at Chernobyl in 1986. In the United States, safety can be attributed in part to the strict regulation provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which reviews proposed reactor designs, processes appHcations forUcenses to constmct and operate plants, and provides surveillance of all safety-related activities of a utiUty. The utiUties seek continued improvement in capabiUty, use procedures extensively, and analy2e any plant incidents for their root causes. Similar programs intended to ensure reactor safety are in place in other countries. 

Some studies have shown that a HAZOP study will result in recommendations that are 40 percent safety-related and 60 percent operability-related. HAZOP is far more than a safety tool a good HAZOP study also results in improved operability of the process or plant, which can mean greater profitability. 

Investigations of incidents associated with tolling projects have identified that appropriate selection of a toller based upon proper equipment and expertise is important in reducing the likelihood of future process safety related incidents and environmental releases. It is likewise important to review toller safety, health, and environmental practices (current and past) in the selection process. This review can identify those practices that would need to be modified to be acceptable. Eliminating less qualified candidate firms at an early stage is a best practice. 

Trade Secrets When a toll involves proprietary information, a system must exist to ensure that employees have the process safety related knowledge needed to meet the intent of the process safety management system. 

A key part of the CANDU 9 design program was the review by the AECB that explored and resolved issues during design. PSA in the design process ensures that safety related requirements are addressed early to reduce retrofits as well as its role in safety assessment and licensing. 

These can be achieved through reduced downtime, consolidating safety-related activities, improving operations information, facilitating process design improvements, minimizing exposure to liability, and improving customer satisfaction. 

A related limitation of the model program approach is that these "transplants" rarely take full advantage of opportunities to link PSM into other company systems, for example, using existing human resources systems to manage process safety-related training. 

Where regulations related to process safety exist, they must be understood and PSM system design must be consistent with them. For example, some countries may require that operators participate in hazard analyses and incident investigations. Where there are no process safety-related regulations, you have complete flexibility in system design. 

I have incorporated my 27+ years of broad industrial consulting in process design, project management, and industrial safety relating to fires and explosions as may be appUcable. 

The design sketched above is an elaborate version of the so-called Kellogg Advanced Ammonia Process (KAAP) in which iron-based catalysts are used in the first bed, and ruthenium-based catalysts, which bind nitrogen more weakly, are used in the second, third and fourth beds [T.A. Czuppon, S.A. Knez, R.W. Schneider and G. Woroberts, Ammonia Plant Safety Relat. Pacil. 34 (1994) 236]. 

Edwards, D.W. Lawrence, D. (1993) Assessingthe Inherent Safety ofChemical Process Routes Is There a Relation between Plant Costs and Inherent Safety Transactions of the Institute ofChemical Engineers, 71(B), 252-258. 

Water has several anomalous features (e.g., density, being the only nontoxic and liquid "hydride" of the non-metals, melting point varying with pressure, etc.). Of direct importance for the aqueous biphasic process are the physiological (entries 2 and 4 of Table 5.1), economic (1,3,6,9), ecological/safety-related (2,3,4,9), process engineering (1,6,7,9,10,11,12), and chemical and physical properties (1,5,6,8,11,13) of water. The different properties interact and complement each other. Thus water, whose high... 

There is also a certain amount of statistical information available on the failures of process system components. Arulanantham and Lees (1981) have studied pressure vessel and fired heater failures in process plants such as olefins plants. They define failure as a condition in which a crack, leak or other defect has developed in the equipment to the extent that repair or replacement is required, a definition which includes some of the potentially dangerous as well as all catastrophic failures. The failure rates of equipment are related to some extent to the safety of process items. If a piece of equipment has a long history of failures, it may cause safety problems in the future. Therefore it would be better to consider another equipment instead. It should be remembered that all reliability or failure information does not express safety directly, since all failures are not dangerous and not all accidents are due to failures of equipment. 

Safety aspects are considered in two phases (Fig. 11). In the rule based synthesis some safety related rules are applied in process concept selections. These include rules such as separate corrosive or hazardous components first or avoid using chemically incompatible substances in the same process. ... 

All safety related matters, such as the selection of raw materials, are not considered in the synthesis phase but are given by the user. Also the generation of universal synthesis rules considering safety is not easy. Therefore it is important to analyze the alternative designs by inherent safety indices which describe e.g. flammability, toxicity, process conditions. 

To obtain an answer to the research questions posed, pro-active safety indicators used in today s chemical process industry were analysed and the deviations upon which they are based were compared with deviations present in the accident trajectories of 70 recent accidents. By comparing these two sets of deviations, it was observed that although re-occurring deviations with no direct perceived safety related consequences were present in the majority of accident trajectories they were nevertheless not addressed by the commonly used pro-active safety indicators. These so-called indirect perceived safety related deviations may therefore be more important indications of a possible accident than was thought previously. 

In this sub-Section a concise overview will be presented of safety indicators commonly used in current chemical process industry. Safety Indicators in this Chapter are restricted to the safety related risk indicators present in an organization. The Sis defined here are present in the chemical process industry in the form of operational data, and in the form of results from (safety) tools. In both cases the Sis aim to indicate the safety status, or risks, Marono (Marono et al., 1998). To retrieve the risk coverage area of commonly used Sis, both the tools, as well as the data they are based on have to be known. The relations between data, tools, and indicators are depicted graphically in Figure 10. 

In the previous Chapter it was shown that most accidents are preceded by deviations in the operational process, e.g. Heinrich (Heinrich, 1959), Turner (Turner, 1978), Leplat (Leplat, 1987), Reason (Reason, 1997), etc. Additionally, it was shown that a specific class of deviations is present which is not covered by current pro-active safety indicators. These deviations are characterised by a high likelihood and low perceived safety related consequences and were defined as precursors and re-occur in the operational process of the organization prior to an accident. In order to find these deviations in a real life operation and to eventually find their underlying causes, the concepts of re-occurring deviation and operational process have to be explained in more detail. The various definitions and concepts derived in this Chapter are necessary to understand the next Chapters, which shows how they are applied in practice. 

From this data, the problems/deviations in the operational process are selected (this means collecting not only directly safety related data). Subsequently, precursors are derived from these individual problems and deviations, according to the precursor criteria. From the previous Chapter and the refinements in this Chapter, the following criteria were retrieved to identify a precursor ... 

Please note that, some of the identified precursors (re-occurring deviations) are manifestly affected safety barriers. That is to say the precursor itself is a safety barrier and malfunctions repeatedly e.g. the pressure relief valve defect (number 4 in Table 16). Moreover, the precursor may be a process control measure (often tripping of a pressure relief (safety) valve). The presence of these kinds of precursors illustrates what is stated in Chapter 3, that if actors in the operational process don t perceive a deviation as possessing direct safety related consequences, they permit these deviations to exist in the operational process. 

A process or a facility satisfies the single fault tolerance principle when it has been designed or equipped in such a way that a single fault does not lead to the occurrence of the undesired event. This applies also to safety-related systems. 

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