Operational experience and safety research

The design shall take due accoirrrt of relevant operational experience that has been gained in operating plants and of the resrrlts of relevarrt research programmes. 

---

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND SAFETY RESEARCH SAFETY ASSESSMENT... 

Proven engineering practices (3.6-3.8) Operational experience and safety research (3.9) Safety assessment (3.10-3.12)... 

The requirements for management of safety (Section 3 in Ref [1]) address the issues which relate to proven engineering practice, operating experience and safety research. 

General technical principles Proven engineering practices Quality assurance Human factors Safety assessment and verification Radiation protection Operating experience and safety research ... 

TUTNOV, A., 1998. "Calculated Research into Thermal Mechanics of Fuel Assemblies of WWER-1000 core ( Substantiation of the Safety of Generalized Core)" Workshop on PWR and WWER-1000 Fuel Assembly Bow. Rez / Prague 17-19 February 1998. AFANASYEV, A.A., "Comparison of WWER-1000 and PWR Core with Fuel Assembly Bow Operational Experience and Problems". Problems of a Atom Science and Engineering. Series Radiation Damaging Physics and Radiation materials science, issue 2 68 Kharkov 1998. 

The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) has been formed, consisting of nuclear plant operators over the entire world who have pledged to assist each other in the achievement of safe operations (25). There are four centers from which this international program is adrninistered one in the United States in Atlanta, Georgia, operated by INPO one in Paris operated by Electricitir de Prance one in Moscow operated by the Ministry of Nuclear Power and one in Tokyo operated by the Central Research Institute for the Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI). Through this mechanism, teams of operators from the U.S., Western Europe, and Asia visit CIS plants to share safety experience and know-how, and similarly, plant personnel from Russian and Eastern European nuclear units visit European, Asian, and U.S. plants. 

Pilot plants are often more hazardous than process plants, even though they are smaller ia size, for many reasons. These iaclude a tendency to relax standard safety review procedures based on the small scale, exceptionally qualified personnel iavolved, and the experimental nature of the research operations the lack of estabhshed operational practice and experience lack of information regarding new materials or processes and lack of effective automatic iatedocks due to the frequendy changing nature of pilot-plant operations, the desire for wide latitude in operating conditions, and the lack of hill-time maintenance personnel. 

The Standards draw upon information derived from extensive research and development work by scientific and engineering organisations, at national and international levels, on the health effects of radiation and techniques for the safe design and operation of radiation sources and upon experience in many countries in the use of radiation and nuclear techniques. The United Nations Scientific Committee of the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), a body set up by the United Nations in 1955, compiles, assesses and disseminates information on the health effects of radiation and on levels of radiation exposure due to different sources this information was taken into account in developing the Standards. Purely scientific considerations, however, are only part of the basis for decisions on protection and safety, and the Standards implicitly encourage decision-makers to make value judgements about the relative importance of risks of different kinds and about the balancing of risks and benefits. 

Jan Hayes has twenty-five years experience in safety and risk management. Her current activities cover academia, consnlting, and regulation. She holds a Senior Research Fellow appointment at the Anstralian National University where she is Program Leader for the social science research activities of the Energy Pipelines Co-operative Research Centre. Dr. Hayes is a member of the Advisory Board of the Australian National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority. 

In depth defensive measures should be incorporated into the design and operating procedures for radiation sources to compensate for potential failures in protection and safety measures. Protection and safety should be ensured by sound management and good engineering, quality assurance, training and qualification of personnel, comprehensive safety assessments and attention to lessons learned from experience and research. 

Initial startup testing procedures have been prepared and implemented to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and processes will perform as intended. Initial testing includes, as appropriate, bench tests and proof tests prior to installation, mockup tests, pre-operational tests, post-maintenance tests, post-modification tests, and operational startup tests. Safety-related items are subject to the quality-assurance requirements of SNL/NM Research Reactor and Experimental Programs (RREP) Quality Assurance Program Plan (SNL 1998a), as implemented by the facility Project/Experiment Quality Plan (PEQP). Testing inciudes those initial tests mandated by applicable Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) surveiilance requirements (see Chapter 5.0, "Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements") and Operational Readiness Review (ORR) requirements (see DOE O 425.1 and DOE-STD-3006-93). 

The cornerstone of a sound program for prudent laboratory practices is a process designed to comprehensively review the operations and potential hazards associated with each experiment over its life cycle. This review should take place before any work is conducted. The diverse nature of research and development activities makes it advisable to have such a process in place as part of the scientific method of experimentation. In laboratories where this preliminary survey is routinely practiced, it has proved to be useful in both the maintenance of safe laboratory operations and the minimization of chemical exposure and waste generation. Because of the diversity of types of researchers and laboratory work, such processes— both formal and informal—can help individuals associated with new, modified, or unfamiliar experiments or procedures to plan and work safely, responsibly, and productively. By first evaluating the work area, materials, equipment, and procedures in depth, hidden hazards may be identified and addressed. The pre-experiment review process can also help to ensure that every experiment and laboratory operation complies with all applicable laws, regulations, and other policies. Moreover, by addressing all relevant health, safety, and environmental issues when an experiment is first conceived, further research, scale-up, or development based on it can be made safer and more effective. 

Develop SOPs relevant to safety and health considerations to be followed when laboratory work involves the use of hazardous chemicals. This is especially the case if your lab operations include the routine use of select carcinogens, reproductive toxins, and substances of acute toxicity. SOPs can function as stand-alone documents or supplemental information included as part of research notebooks, experiment documentation, or research proposals. The key idea with laboratories having SOPs is to ensure a process is in place so that an experiment is well thought out and includes and addresses relevant health and safety issues. 

---