Hazard: checklist

Knowlton, E. Creative Checklist Hazard and Operability Studies", Chemical Manufacturers Association, Process Safety Management Workshop, Arlington, Virginia 1985... 

A what-if/checklist hazard analysis technique combines the creative, brainstorming aspects of the what-if method wiA the systematic approach of the... 

For locations qualifying for program levels 1 and 2, those with lesser exposure, ERA will accept hazard reviews done by qualifled personnel using suitable checklists. Hazard reviews must be documented and show that problems have been addressed. In its literature, ERA comments on the desirability of using the What-If hazard identification and analysis process. ERA also proposes the use of more involved analytical techniques if findings suggest that may be desirable. 

A number of other analytical tools such, as what if, checklist, hazard and operability study (HAZOP), failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), or fault-tree analysis can be used to determine possible process breakdowns. You then can design prevention/controls for the hkely causes of these unwanted events. 

Cal-OSHA Hazard Assessment Checklist (Hazard Assessment Checklist, n.d.)... 

Checklists. A checklist is simply a detailed Hst of safety considerations. The purpose of this Hst is to provide a reminder to safety issues such as chemical reactivity, fire and explosion hazards, toxicity, and so forth. This type of checklist is used to determine hazards, and differs from a procedure checklist which is used to ensure that the correct procedure is followed. 

The hazards checklist usually has three columns next to each item on the Hst. Items can number in the hundreds or even the thousands. The first check is marked if the issue has been considered and complete. The second check is marked if additional consideration or work is required, and the last check is marked if the item does not apply. An example of a detailed checklist can be found in the Hterature (2). 

Hazardous Waste Reduction Checklist and Assessment Manualfor the Metal FinishingJndusty, California Department of Health Services, Alternative Technology Division, Toxic Substances Control Program, Sacramento, Calif., 1990. 

An example of a checklist is provided in Table 4 as a typical item-by-item check for use after a final site has been selected. This example is based on an evaluation for hazards (3). 

Process Hazards Analysis. Analysis of processes for unrecogni2ed or inadequately controUed ha2ards (see Hazard analysis and risk assessment) is required by OSHA (36). The principal methods of analysis, in an approximate ascending order of intensity, are what-if checklist failure modes and effects ha2ard and operabiHty (HAZOP) and fault-tree analysis. Other complementary methods include human error prediction and cost/benefit analysis. The HAZOP method is the most popular as of 1995 because it can be used to identify ha2ards, pinpoint their causes and consequences, and disclose the need for protective systems. Fault-tree analysis is the method to be used if a quantitative evaluation of operational safety is needed to justify the implementation of process improvements. 

As the project progresses, more information is available therefore, the review technique used can be different at each stage of the project. The use of various hazard evaluation techniques, such as checklist analyses, relative rankings, what-if analyses, ana hazard and operabil-... 

The cost of performing the hazard identification step depends on the size of the problem and the specific techniques used. Techniques such as brainstorming, what-if analyses, or checklists tend to be less expensive than other more structured methods. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analyses and failure modes and effects analyses (FMEAs) involve many people and tend to be more expensive. But, you can have greater confidence in the exhaustiveness of HAZOP and FMEA techniques—their rigorous approach helps ensure completeness. However, no technique can guarantee that all hazards or potential accidents have been identified. Figure 8 is an example of the hazards identified in a HAZOP study. Hazard identification can require from 10% to 25% of the total effort in a QRA study. 

Table 15.18 Basic safety audit checklist for loading/unloading non-pressurised hazardous liquids tankers or tank containers...

The next sections of the checklist are based on the structure of the Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis, and include ... 

The What if..method, the checklist, and HAZOP are well-publicized hazard identification tools. CCPS (1992) presents guidance on the use of these tools. 

The Rohm and Haas Major Accident Prevention Program (Ren-shaw, 1990 Berger and Lantzy, 1996 Hendershot, 1991a) is based on potential accident consequence analysis and uses checklists based on inherently safer design principles to identify ways to eliminate or reduce hazards. 

The following checklist contains a number of questions which can aid in identifying inherently safer process options. The list is adapted from CCPS (1993a). Other checklists, particularly the extensive checklist in Appendix B of the Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 2nd Edition with Worked Examjzles (CCPS, 1992) contain many questions which are related to inherent safety. 

Included in OSH As JHA Booklet, 3071, is a good description of a process hazard analysis (PHA) [1]. This is being used in the Process Safety Management (PSM) program (29 CER 1910.119) to understand how hazards exist. There are some good methods listed in the manual that can be used to conduct a JHA. As you review each method you can determine which one may be useful for your operation. The typical method chosen is the checklist. 

The what if/checklist is a broadly based hazard assessment technique that combines the creative thinking of a selected team of specialists with the methodical focus of a prepared checklist. The result is a comprehensive hazard analysis that is useful in training operating personnel on the hazards of the particular operation. 

Hazardous waste operations often include tasks and activities that are conducted on a periodic basis, are of very short duration, are transient in nature, or otherwise pose little hazard. Developing a brief HASP template (e.g., fill in the blank ), a permit, or a checklist system that includes essential HAZWOPER-type information may suffice for these types of operations. 

At Site I, the prime contractor s SSAHP required daily site inspections, the documentation of safety and health deficiencies, and the abatement of deficiencies. Records of site deficiencies, however, were kept intermittently, and hazard abatement was not documented. The subcontractor s SSAHP did not address site inspections and hazard abatement, but its TSCA permit application included requirements for site inspections. Inspection documentation, however, was not available on site, and the site manager was unaware of these written requirements. The site manager did, however, indicate that he conducted site inspections using a mental checklist and that he conducted inspections of remediation equipment before each use. 

Wlien a contractor/subcontractor is hired to perform work in a potentially hazardous area on one of your facilities or that of a client, the project manager shall provide the contractor/subcontractor a copy of the contractor site safety rules checklist for completion. The form and any other rules specific to that site must be signed, dated, and returned prior to any work being performed at a particular site. An executed copy will be made a part of the project file. 

A checklist analysis (CCPS, 1992) verifies the status of a system. It is versatile, easy and applicable at any life-cycle stage of a process. It is primarily used to show compliance with standards and practices by cost-effectively identifying hazards, chlorine Tar> <- liccklists provide commonality for management K.-, icw of hazard assessments. It may be used for controlling a proces.s from development to decommissioning. Approvals by appropriate authorities Cl i( V each stage of a project. 

Qualitative results of checklist analyses vary, but generally the analysis produces the answers yes, no, not applicable, or needs more information. The checklist is included in the PrHA report to summarize the noted deficiencies. Understanding these deficiencies leads to sa fety improvement alternatives for consideration, and to identified hazards with suggested actions. I igtires 3.3,1-4 and 3.3.1-5 present checklist analyses of the Dock 8 HF Supply and the Cooling tower chlorination respectively. 

Table 3.3.1-3 Simplified Process Hazards Analysis Checklist ...

The hazards associated with the process may noi, be in generic information, Checklists idcnlify iiazards but not the accident scenarios that lead to the hazards. 

What-If/Checklist analysis identifies hazards, possible accidents, qualitatively evaluates tlie consequences and determines the adequacy of safety levels. It is described in CCPS (1 )92 ). 

Hazard Identification, the main sources of ammonia that could release are identified and the initiating events (IE) that can cause accidents leading to the release of ammonia are determined. Three methods used for IE identification were Master Logic Diagram, checklists, and HAZOP... 

The most common hazards control technique is a checklist. The checklist is prepared by experienced personnel who are familiar with the design, construction and operation of similar facilities. Checklists are relatively easy to use and provide a guide to the evaluator of items to be considered in evaluating hazards. API RP 14J has examples of two checklists which can be used to evaluate facilities of different complexity. Because production facilities are very similar and have been the subject of many hazard analyses, a checklist analysis to assure compliance with standard practice is recommended for most production facilities. The actual procedure by which the checklist is considered and the manner in which the evaluation is documented to assure compliance varies from case-to-case. 

Move set point to measured value Action Action Omitted Set point left at original value System may operate at wrong set point. Process hazard may occur (Moderate) Noticeable change of value of variable may occur at step 1.2 Introduce check in checklist... 

Hazard assessment findings are similar to audits, in that they are periodic measures. Hazard assessments might include Hazard and Operability (HA-ZOP) studies, What-If/Checklists, Fault Tree Analyses, or other techniques. The results of these studies will indicate what types of hazards exist and whether or not these hazards are sufficiently controlled. 

Hazard or event identification provides information on situations or chemicals and their releases tliat can potentially hanii tlie emaromiient, life, or property. Inforniation that is required to identify hazards includes chemical identities, quantilics and location of chemicals in question, chemical properties such as boiling points, ignition temperatures, and to.xicily to hmnans. There arc sci cral nictliods used to identify hazards. The methods that will be discussed later in tliis Part w ill include tlie process checklist and tlie hazard mid operability study (HA20P). 

Hazard identification provides information on situations or chemicals tliat can potentially liann tlie environment, life, or property. Tlie processes described are process checklist, event tree, hazard and operability study. 

A system checklist is useful to identify compliance problems and also tliose areas of die system diat require furdier hazard evaluation. The niediod is easy to use and can be applied to any component of a given system such as equipment, instrunientation, materials, and procedures. Tliis mediod, which produces qualitative results, must be prepared by an engineer dioroughly experienced with die system once die checklist is prepared, however, it can be used by engineers or managers who may have less tecluiical experience widi die system. ... 

The review looks for major risk situations. General housekeeping and personnel attitude arc not the objectives, although tliey can be significant indicators of where to look for real problems or places where meaningful improvements are needed. Various hazard evaluation teclmiques, such as checklists (see previous Section), what-if questions (see Section 15.5), and raw materitil evaluations, can be also used during tlie review. 

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