Hazards identifying

Industrial hygiene potential hazards identified, baseline monitoring needs fulfilled, any special equipment obtained, PPE hazards assessments in progress... 

The cost of performing the hazard identification step depends on the size of the problem and the specific techniques used. Techniques such as brainstorming, what-if analyses, or checklists tend to be less expensive than other more structured methods. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analyses and failure modes and effects analyses (FMEAs) involve many people and tend to be more expensive. But, you can have greater confidence in the exhaustiveness of HAZOP and FMEA techniques—their rigorous approach helps ensure completeness. However, no technique can guarantee that all hazards or potential accidents have been identified. Figure 8 is an example of the hazards identified in a HAZOP study. Hazard identification can require from 10% to 25% of the total effort in a QRA study. 

Hazard identifieation and risk assessment and risk eontrol. 

Whilst the hazards identified, and the principles and practice for the control of risks are universal, i.e. they are independent of location, in order to assist quick-reference an appendix of relevant contemporaneous UK legislation has been added as a guide together with a much-expanded Bibliography in Chapter 19. Finally, for convenience of use, the Index has been enlarged. 

The design and operation of a proeess plant form an integral part of safety and systematie proeedures and should be employed to identify hazards and operability and, where neeessary, should be quantified. During die design of a new plant, die hazard identifieation proeedure is repeated at intervals. This is first performed on the pilot plant before the full-seale version as the design progresses. Potential hazards whose signifieanee ean be assessed with the help of experiments are often revealed by this study. 

The preparation of a matrix and the subsequent evaluation of the hazards identified can lead to a qualitative judgment of process risk and to the identification of available pathways to reduce that risk. Software is available to assist in making and maintaining interactionlike matrices. One example is a database shell called CHEMPAT (AIChE, 1995). When CHEMPAT is customized by the user, a compatibility chart is produced based on user-supplied chemical information. 

Before work aetivity begins, all employees required to partieipate in a medieal surveillanee program for hazardous waste aetivities should undergo a baseline medieal examination (a physieal exam). This exam should be based on speeifie hazards identified during the preliminary hazard assessment. Periodie follow-up exams are required at the disere-tion of the attending physieian. Typieally, these follow-ups are eompleted annually, however, they ean be adjusted to more often or less often dependent on the exposure [1]. 

The use of proper PPE is an integral part of many jobs when dealing with hazardous waste. OSHA standard 1910.132 of 1998 requires an assessment be eondueted to determine the appropriate PPE for eyes, faee, head, and extremities whenever hazards eneountered are eapable of eausing injury or impairment in the funetion of any part of the body through absorption, inhalation, or physieal eontaet. Aeeording to the PPE standard, it is the employer s responsibility to determine if hazards are present (or likely to be present). If the employer determines that hazards are present, the employer should ehoose the types of PPE that will proteet affeeted employees from the hazards identified in the hazard assessment [1]. 

Nonroutine work eondueted in proeess areas must be eontrolled by the employer in a eonsistent manner. The hazards identified involving the work to be aeeomplished must be eommunieated to those doing the work and to those operating personnel whose work eould aflfeet the safety of the proeess. A work authorization notiee or permit must follow a proeedure that deseribes the steps the maintenanee supervisor, eontraetor representative, or other person needs to follow to obtain the neeessary elearanee to start the job. The work authorization proeedures must referenee and eoordinate, as applieable, loekout/tagout proeedures, line breaking proeedures, eonfined spaee entry proeedures, and hot work authorizations. This proeedure also must provide elear steps to follow onee the job is eompleted to provide elosure for those who need to know the job is now eompleted and that equipment ean be returned to normal. 

Is PPE selected based on an evaluation of performance characteristics of the PPE relative to requirements and limitations of the site, task-specific conditions and duration, and hazards and potential hazards identified ... 

Selected to protect employees for hazards identified during site characterization and analysis ... 

The Center for Chemical Process Safety s projects fall into a number of general topic areas that comprise a comprehensive program. These topic areas include identification of hazards and analysis of risks, prevention and mitigation of the hazards identified, and better definition of areas affected by a release of hazardous materials. This book is the latest in the series dealing with hazard identification and risk analysis. 

Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (CPQRA Guidelines) builds on the earlier work to show the engineer how to make quantitative estimates of the risk of the hazards identified. The quantitative estimates can identify the major contributors to risk. They can also help to define the most effective ways to a safer process by indicating relative risk reduction from proposed alternate process safeguards and measures. 

Next, die mediod requires a determinatioa of die plant limits (i.e., die areas of the plant diat will be evaluated). Some hazards identified may be considered for on-site impacts. An experienced team of principal engineers, a HAZOP chairperson, and an external HAZOP e.xpert is die recommended makeup of the fouiidadon for die team. Other experts from other disciplines, such as instrumentation and process control, may be periodically called on to identify and evaluate deviations from normal operations. 

Implementation of corrective actions is the responsibility of management. In assigning corrective actions, management may consult with the PrHA team to assure full understanding of the hazards identified in the PrHA before corrective actions are taken. 

Last, but not least, safety is considered in terms of the analysis of the risks associated with potential hazards identified by detailed consideration of the proposed process flowsheet. Safety is the number one concern for chemical engineers and the reader should not confuse the fact that it is the focus of the final chapter in this book with its order of importance. However, in order to carry out a hazard study and risk assessment, one must understand the concepts on which a process flowsheet is developed, and these are covered in the preceding chapters. The procedure describe in Chapter 10 is recognised as best practice in the process industry sector. 

Develop practical recommendations to eliminate or control the hazards identified. 

Hazards identified are classified as blast, fragment, and fireball. Description of each of these hazards is essential to design of a shield. Each of these hazards poses a special problem to the designer and requires consideration not only in terms of its own features, but also in terms of combined effects of all hazards acting together. 

Premises 3 and 4 (above) imply that the design or operating modifications of a process leading to the elimination or containment of hazards (identified by the inductive approach) can be generated deductively from the knowledge of the plant and its operating conditions. 

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