Checklists analysis

A checklist analysis is used to verify the status of a system. This analysis method is described in detail in Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS, 1992). 

The checklist analysis method is versatile, easy to use and can be applied at any stage in the life of a process. It is primarily used to indicate compliance with standards and practices. It is also a cost-effective way to identify common and customarily recognized hazards. 

Checklists also provide a common basis for management review of assessments. Many organizations use standard checklists to control the development of a process or an entire project from initial design through decommissioning. The completed checklist must be approved by all relevant staff members and managers before a project can move from one stage to the next. 

This description is taken from Hummer, John J., et al., 1992. 

A checklist analysis uses a written list of items or procedures to verify the status of a system. Checklists may vary widely in level of detail, depending on the process being analyzed. 

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Small operations, although covered by the PSM rule, may use simplified methodologies and still meet the criteria. Businesses with similar processes and equipment may pool resources and prepare a generic checklist analysis used by all members to meet the PSM rule. 

A checklist analysis (CCPS, 1992) verifies the status of a system. It is versatile, easy and applicable at any life-cycle stage of a process. It is primarily used to show compliance with standards and practices by cost-effectively identifying hazards, chlorine Tar> <- liccklists provide commonality for management K.-, icw of hazard assessments. It may be used for controlling a proces.s from development to decommissioning. Approvals by appropriate authorities Cl i( V each stage of a project. 

What-If/Checklist analysis identifies hazards, possible accidents, qualitatively evaluates tlie consequences and determines the adequacy of safety levels. It is described in CCPS (1 )92 ). 

The PrHA team leader assembles a qualified team to perform a What-lf/Checklist analysis. If the process is large, the team is divided into subteams according to functions, physical areas, or tasks similarly to the discussion in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. 

The results of a What-If/Checklist analysis are documented like the results of a What-lf analysis as a table of accident scenarios, consequences, safety levels, and action items. The results may also include a completed checklist or a narrative. The PrHA team may also document the completion of the checklist to illustrate its completeness. The PSM rule requires detailed... 

Combining the What-If and Checklist analysis methods uses their positive features while compensating for their separate shortcomings, For example, a checklist is hascti on generic process experience and may i.i c incomplete insights into the design,... 

What-If/Checklist Analysis of Dock 8 HF Supply System.85... 

The most common hazards control technique is a checklist. The checklist is prepared by experienced personnel who are familiar with the design, construction and operation of similar facilities. Checklists are relatively easy to use and provide a guide to the evaluator of items to be considered in evaluating hazards. API RP 14J has examples of two checklists which can be used to evaluate facilities of different complexity. Because production facilities are very similar and have been the subject of many hazard analyses, a checklist analysis to assure compliance with standard practice is recommended for most production facilities. The actual procedure by which the checklist is considered and the manner in which the evaluation is documented to assure compliance varies from case-to-case. 

A traditional checklist analysis uses a list of specific items to identify known types of hazards, design deficiencies, and potential accident scenarios associated with common process equipment and operations. The method can be used to evaluate materials, equipment, or procedures. Checklists are most often used to evaluate a specific design with which a company or industry has a significant amount of experience, but they can also be used at earlier stages of development for entirely new processes to identify and eliminate hazards that have been recognized through operation and evaluation of similar systems. To be most useful, checklists should be tailored specifically for an individual facility, process, or product. 

Performing a checklist analysis requires access to engineering design procedures and operating practices manuals and must be performed by a team with appropriate expertise. An experienced manager or staff engineer should review the results and direct follow-up actions. 

A checklist analysis made prior to construction is usually performed during a PrHA team meeting. It focuses on review of the process drawings, completion of the checklist, and discussion of the deficiencies. 

An estimate of the time required to perform a PrHA using the checklist analysis method is given in Table 4.4. 

Table 4.4. Approximate Checklist Analysis Time Requirements...

Table 4.6. Checklist Analysis of Cooling Water Chlorination System...

The purpose of a what-if/checklist analysis is to identify hazards, consider the types of accidents that can occur in a process or activity, evaluate in a qualitative manner the consequences of these accidents, and determine whether the safety levels against these potential accident scenarios appear adequate. The what-if/checklist analysis is described in detail in Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS, 1992). 

The what-if/checklist analysis method combines the creative, brainstorming features of the what-if analysis with the systematic features of the checklist analysis. The PrHA team uses the what-if analysis method to brainstorm the types of accidents that can occur within a process. Then the team uses one or more checklists to help fill in any gaps. Finally, the team members suggest ways for reducing the risk of operating the process. The what-if analysis encourages the PrHA team to consider potential accident events and consequences that are beyond the experience of the authors of a good checklist and, thus, are not covered on the checklist. Conversely, the checklist lends a systematic nature to the what-if analysis. 

Normally, a what-if/checklist analysis is used to examine the potential consequences of accident scenarios at a more general level than some of the more detailed PrHA methods. It can be used for any type of process at virtually any stage in its life cycle. However, this method is generally used to analyze the more common hazards that exist in a process. 

For the checklist portion of the analysis, the PrHA team leader obtains or develops an appropriate checklist for the team to use. This list need not be as detailed as those used for a standard checklist analysis. Rather than focusing on a specific list of design or operating features, the checklist used here should focus on general hazardous characteristics of the process. 

Combining the what-if and checklist analysis methods emphasizes their main positive features (i.e., the creativity of what-if analysis and the experience-based thoroughness of a checklist analysis) while at the same time compensating for their shortcomings when used separately. 

The number of individuals needed depends upon the complexity of the process and, to some extent, the stage at which the process is being evaluated. Normally, a PrHA using this method requires fewer people and shorter meetings than does a more structured method such as a HAZOP study. Estimates of the time needed to perform a PrHA using the what-if/ checklist analysis method are shown in Table 4.11. 

Table 4.12. What-If/Checklist Analysis of Dock 8 HF Supply System LINE/VESSEL Dock 8 HF Supply System DATE December 22, 1992 PAGE of...

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