Safety analysis checklist

The RP 14C also provides standard reasons allowing the elimination of certain devices when the process component is considered as part of an overall system. Figure 14-3 shows the Safety Analysis Checklist (SAC) for a pressure vessel. Each safety device is identified by the SAT (with the exception of gas make-up system ) is listed. It must either be installed or it can be eliminated if one of the reasons listed is valid. 

SAFETY ANALYSIS CHECKLIST (SACH RESSURE VESSELS... 

The approach used to identify hazards will depend on the application being considered. For certain simple processes where there is extensive operating experience of a standard design, such as simple off-shore wellhead towers, it may be sufficient to use industry developed check lists (for example, the safety analysis checklists in ISO 10418 and API RP 14C). Where the design is more complex or a new process is being considered, a more structured approach may be necessary (for example, lEC 60300-3-9 1995). 

DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports (DOE 1994a), Paragraph 8b(3)(n), as amplified by Attachment 1, Paragraph 4f(3)(d)14, of the order (Topic 14) requires a systematic inquiry into or evaluation of human factors for the facility. DOE Memorandum, Safety Analysis Report Guidance - Human Factors, DOE/DP-625 (DOE 1992), indicates that the use of the Human Factors Safety Analysis checklist will satisfy the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23 concerning human factors for existing facilities. 

As stated in DOE-STD-3009-94, in order to meet the human-factors safety requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, a systematic inquiry into human factors must be performed. An effective method for accomplishing this for existing facilities is through the application of the Human Factors Safety Analysis checklists found in reference DOE 1992. 

Create a Safety Analysis Checklist (SAC) that lists all recommended safety devices and that shows conditions under which particular safety devices may be excluded. 

Methods for performing hazard analysis and risk assessment include safety review, checklists, Dow Fire and Explosion Index, what-if analysis, hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis, and event tree analysis. Other methods are also available, but those given are used most often. 

The first task, hazard identification, is crucial in process system safety analysis, because the effectiveness of the other two tasks depends on it. The traditional methods for identifying hazards during the 1960 s (including process reviews , codes of practice , checklists , and safety audit ) were no longer considered adequate in the 1970 s. There was a need for a technique which could anticipate hazardous problems, particularly in areas of novelty and new technology where past experience was limited. 

Criteria for job selection, breaking job into steps, identifying hazards, procedures to eliminate hazards, self-reference guides, new worker training, equipment safety maintenance checklists, and accident analysis. 

The techniques used to complete PHAs inelude What-iF analyses. Explosive Safety Checklist Analyses, General Industry Checklist analyses and FMEA analyses. The information from Preliminary Hazards Analyses, previous Final Safety Analysis Report analyses. Fire Hazards Analyses, and other... 

Potential external events were identified by reviewing previous Safety Analysis Reports of similar DOE facilities (Restrepo 1995) and the recommended list of external events used to evaluate commercial nuclear power plant risks (NRC 1983). In addition, an attempt was made to identify any other potential external-initiating event unique to the site that had not been considered in previous studies. It is important to note that operational accidents (e.g., criticality, internal fires) occurring inside the HCF and assodated radioactive material storage facilities are not considered in this screening process. These types of "internal initiating events are identified separately using preliminary hazard checklists (see Appendix 3A). 

Workplace safety analysis — Similar to a job safety analysis, a workplace safety analysis involves a careful review of each area of the workplace, including the office, dock, yard, and shop. It should involve a review of lighting, floors, aisle-ways, noise levels, storage areas, and overall compliance with OSHA standards. Again, an audit checklist is an important item to have before starting the analysis. 

You might ask why an SOP is needed if the worker has already been trained to do the job or task. As you may remember from the previous chapter, a job safety analysis usually keys in on those particular jobs that pose the greatest risk of injury or death. These are high-risk types of work activities and definitely merit the development and use of an SOP. There are times when an SOP, or step-by-step checklist, is useful, including the following ... 

FIGURE 24.3 PPE hazard analysis checklist. (Source Courtesy of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.)... 

Stages Safety Review Checklist Relative Ranking Preliminary Hazard Analysis What-if Checklist HAZOP FMEA Cause- Consequence Analysis Human Reliability Analysis Fault Tree Event Tree... 

Conducting Risk Analysis—Assessment Formats 6.5.1 Safety Strategy Checklist... 

In the process safety industry, the what-if and use of safety checklists are reaUy two separate tools. Now, with the advent of OSHA 1910.119, the two tools are more commonly merged into one. This does not mean that you cannot apply them separately if you so choose. Both are accepted safety analysis tools for OSHA compliance. In this section, however, the two will be combined. 

However, it shonld NOT be the primary safety analysis tool. The problem with checklists is that it is only as good as the checklist itself and is not open ended enongh to be comprehensive. 

Checklists Analysis Analysis Analysis Safety Analysis... 

Analysis Hazard Analysis Analysis HAZOP Checklists Analysis Analysis Analysis Safety Analysis 3 (/)... 

Note As for aU checklists, it is impossible to be aU inclusive. This list should be viewed as a starting point. As you gain more experience, you may wish to add to this list and keep it for future reference. And as the book says many times, a checklist is not a substitute for a safety analysis. What it is good for is helping you to make sure that you are including a long list of potential hazards. By definition, it is nonexhaustive. 

HAZOP and wAat-iJ/safety checklists, two of the most common safety methods in the chemical industry, are explained. Sample process problems, which engineers face every day at work, are shown. Other safety tools, such as fault tree analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, human factors safety analysis, and software safety, are explained. Examples of the use of these tools are also presented. 

Functional safety assessment checklists, truth tables, failure analysis, common-cause (or common-mode) failure analysis, reliability block diagrams... 

Process Hazards Analysis. Analysis of processes for unrecogni2ed or inadequately controUed ha2ards (see Hazard analysis and risk assessment) is required by OSHA (36). The principal methods of analysis, in an approximate ascending order of intensity, are what-if checklist failure modes and effects ha2ard and operabiHty (HAZOP) and fault-tree analysis. Other complementary methods include human error prediction and cost/benefit analysis. The HAZOP method is the most popular as of 1995 because it can be used to identify ha2ards, pinpoint their causes and consequences, and disclose the need for protective systems. Fault-tree analysis is the method to be used if a quantitative evaluation of operational safety is needed to justify the implementation of process improvements. 

Included in OSH As JHA Booklet, 3071, is a good description of a process hazard analysis (PHA) [1]. This is being used in the Process Safety Management (PSM) program (29 CER 1910.119) to understand how hazards exist. There are some good methods listed in the manual that can be used to conduct a JHA. As you review each method you can determine which one may be useful for your operation. The typical method chosen is the checklist. 

What-If/Checklist analysis identifies hazards, possible accidents, qualitatively evaluates tlie consequences and determines the adequacy of safety levels. It is described in CCPS (1 )92 ). 

The results of a What-If/Checklist analysis are documented like the results of a What-lf analysis as a table of accident scenarios, consequences, safety levels, and action items. The results may also include a completed checklist or a narrative. The PrHA team may also document the completion of the checklist to illustrate its completeness. The PSM rule requires detailed... 

This analysis forms the basis of a widely used industry consensus standard, American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practice 14C, Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Systems for Ofi- i orc Production Platforms (RP14C), which contains a procedure tor dcicnniniiig required process safety devices and shutdowns. The procedures ilescribed here can be used to develop checklists for devices not covered by RP14C or to modify the consensus checklists presented in RP14C in areas of the world where RPI4C is not mandated. 

The purpose of a what-if/checklist analysis is to identify hazards, consider the types of accidents that can occur in a process or activity, evaluate in a qualitative manner the consequences of these accidents, and determine whether the safety levels against these potential accident scenarios appear adequate. The what-if/checklist analysis is described in detail in Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS, 1992). 

Figure 10-2 A typical process safety checklist. A list of this type is frequently used before a more complete analysis. Adapted from Henry E. Webb, What To Do When Disaster Strikes, in Safe and Efficient Plant Operation and Maintenance, Richard Greene, ed. (New York McGraw-Hill, 1980).

The first step in the procedure is to conceptually divide the process into separate process units. A process unit is a single pump, a reactor, or a storage tank. A large process results in hundreds of individual units. It is not practical to apply the fire and explosion index to all these units. The usual approach is to select only the units that experience shows to have the highest likelihood of a hazard. A process safety checklist or hazards survey is frequently used to select the most hazardous units for further analysis. 

Both qualitative and quantitative evaluation techniques may be used to consider the risk associated with a facility. The level and magnitude of these reviews should be commensurate with the risk that the facility represents. High value, critical facilities or employee vulnerability may warrant high review levels. While unmanned "off-the-shelf, low hazard facilities may suffice with only a checklist review. Specialized studies are performed when in-depth analysis is needed to determine the cost benefit of a safety feature or to fully demonstrate the intended safety feature has the capability to fully meet prescribed safety requirements. 

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