Radioactive Material Storage

Fire in a HCF associated radioactive material storage area releasing radioactive material from the stored inventory Fire RS-1, MS-1... 

Radioactive Material Storage Area Fire Unmitigated Release <0.01/yr 44 mrem... 

The Building 6580 basement HCF-support areas in Zone 3 consist of all areas not part of Zones 1, 2A, or 2, including Rooms 100A, 101,102,104,105 and 106. A small machine shop, a manipulator training station, an operations center, and non-radioactive material storage occupy these areas. Room 108 will eventually be used for preparing waste for off-s ite shipment, although that capability does not currently exist and is not described in this SAR. 

Radioactive material storage in B6596 (Chapel and East High Bay), B6597 (south high bay), and in the monorail storage holes. 

This section describes the hazard identification and evaluation process performed for the SNL HOF and for the HOF associated radioactive material storage areas. The purpose of this information is to present a comprehensive evaluation of potential process-related, natural phenomena and external hazards that could possibly affect the public, workers, collocated workers, and the environment due to single or multiple failures or incidents. Consideration is given to all phases of isotope production operation of the HCF, including the activities, materials, facilities, and equipment of the production process. 

Hazard analysis results are summarized and displayed. A final hazard classification of the SNL HCF and the radioactive material storage areas, consistent with DOE-STD-1027-92, is also presented (DOE 1992b). Finally, a limited set of bounding hazards is Identified for further development using quantitative, deterministic techniques In Section 3.4, "Accident Analysis."... 

The hazard analysis is performed to 1) identify and evaluate potential acddents 2) identify bounding accident scenarios that require further quantitative development and 3) verify the initial hazard classification assigned to the HCF and associated radioactive material storage areas. 

Each monorail radioactive material storage hole outside and adjacent to Building 6580 3... 

Building 6596 east high bay and chapel radioactive material storage locations 3... 

Building 6597 high bay radioactive material storage location 3... 

Based on the hazard evaluation, no additional design and operational safety improvements are required for the SNL HCF or the HCF associated radioactive material storage areas. 

For accidental releases, the HC3 radioactive material storage areas are administratively controlled to total radioactive inventories in each location to less than HC2 thresholds. Thus, by the definition of these thresholds in DOE-STD-1027-92, accidents in the radioactive material storage facilities would have the potential for only localized consequences. Also in accordance with the definition of the DOE-STD-1027-92 thresholds, accidental releases from the HCF have the potential only for significant on-site consequences. Thus, no release with the potential to cause significant environmental insult exists. 

As indicated in Table 3.3-6, the risk to the public and the environment from the internal isotope production and radioactive material storage accidents was assessed to be minor or very minor, and the application of a graded approach to the accident analyses is appropriate. Since no unique accidents are assessed to be of high risk, representative accidents are chosen to bound a number of similar accidente and form as complete a set of bounding conditions as possible to represent the accident risk to the public and the environment. Accidents from the hazard evaluation with the greatest potentiai consequences to the public are emphasized in the DBA selection process. 

Fire in a radioactive material storage area Design Basis Earthquake... 

This internally initiated DBA is a potential fire in a radioactive material storage area that is associated with the HCF. Limited quantities of combustible material are present in some of the radioactive material storage areas. Additionally, ignition sources, primarily electrical, also exist and are active in some of the radioactive materiai storage areas. Thus, the potential exists for a fire in some of the radioactive materiai storage areas. 

The radioactive material storage areas and the material in storage were examined for potential ignition sources and combustible materiai. 

Radioactive materiai in the radioactive material storage areas is mostly in solid form but can be in a liquid or resin form with appropriate spill control pallets. The radioactive material stored is mostly activated equipment, irradiated experiments, residue from water purification systems (radioactive resin), and other associated materials that are being stored for possible reuse or eventual disposal as waste. 

It should be noted that the consequences of this internally initiated fire, involving all of the radioactive material in a radioactive material storage area, are the same or greater than a fire in a radioactive material storage area caused by external events. 

Since there are multiple radioactive material storage areas, the issue of facility segmentation should be addressed. According to DOE-STD-1027-92, Attachment 1, The concept of independent facility segments should be applied where facility features preclude bringing material together or causing harmful interaction from a common severe phenomenon. Thus, a... 

The radioactive material storage limitation for radioactive material storage areas was used to develop the source term for an airborne release. Each radioactive material storage area may store radioactive material in excess of the HC3 threshold but less than the HC2 threshold of DOE-STD-1027-92, Change 1 (DOE, 1992). Therefore, HC2 quantities of radioactive material are the most that must be considered for a fire DBA source term. Thus, the HC2 quantities of radioactive material were used as a conservative bound to the source term. The actual inventory and isotope mix of radioactive material in a radioactive material storage area will change from time to time as new material is stored and old material is removed. 

The dose consequence to the public at the 3000 meters is calculated to be 44 mrem, which is well below the evaluation guideline of 25 rem CEDE. Since the 44 mrem dose represents a conservative upper bound on the dose from a radioactive material storage area fire, it can be concluded that all such fires would meet the evaluation guideline. 

Based on DOE-STD-1027 criteria and methodology, a dose consequence at 3000 m. of 44 mrem is calculated for unmitigated release of the entire maximum inventory associated with each radioactive material storage area (RMSA). The likelihood of a release of the RMSA inventory was not assessed in the DBE analysis. If the inventories of all RMSAs were released... 

Fire in a HCF Radioactive Material Storage Area Frequency Bin lil-iV, 10-2>Fk10" (Uniikely)-10" >F 10- (Very Unlikely) 44 mrem unmitigated YES... 

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