SAFETI software

The SPINLINE 3 software of each digital unit is developed by using a set of tools and procedures dedicated to nuelear safety software developments. The software tools are based on a System and Software Development Enviroiunent (SSDE) named CLARISSE, whieh allows developing a complex multi-unit proeessing system. CLARISSE is standardised and is delivered as an independent software paekage. It provides the software tools a libraries needed to perform SPINLINE 3 configuration and the applieation software development. 

The safety characteristics of the SP1NL1NE3 solution and the stringent and proven safety software development process applied by the Nuclear department of the Schneider Electric company have made acceptable the principle of a design based on redundant identical processing units for this project. In addition, because of the possible consequences in case of the NIS not performing its protection fonction on demand, the licensing authority has required an FMEA oriented toward the SCCF risk as part of the safety case. 

Modularization of the safety software for its reuse and effective execution of V V... 

EFFECTS 8. 2009. TNO Safety Software, TNO Industrial and External Safety, Utrecht. 

The validation of the SRECS application safety software shall be carried out in accordance with a prepared plan. 

The SRCF under test or analysis, with specific references to the requirements specified dining the SRECS appHcation safety software vaHdation planning. 

Security of data has become an important consideration. With the expanded use of the Internet, unauthorized individuals may gain access to private and confidential information found in safety software and applications. It is illegal to make some personal information available. Examples are human resource information, medical information, and other data that may link to accident and injury or illness cases. One kind of security involves keeping secure data and information on computers that do not link to other applications. Another kind of security involves encryption techniques for secure data and information. When data and applications reside in other locations, the communicafion interfaces must be secure along with the remote computer systems themselves. 

That environmental, safety, and health risks and impacts associated with work processes can be minimized while maximizing the reliability and performance of work products. To establish QA process requirements to be implemented under a QAP for the control of suspect/counterfeit items (S/Cls), safety issue corrective actions, and safety software. 

The implementation of the safety policy is supported by several internal trainings which can be accessed by every employee, cort rising system safety, software quality management with focus on software safety, reliability engineering and a special training programme called the Safety Certificate. 

This part of the problem involves prediction of software integrity from the character of the methods used in a single phase of a safety software life-cycle presented in a standard such as IEC61508-3. There is some previous work that is relevant to this problem as summarised briefly in section 3. Die network structure in Figure 3 is proposed. 

In the proposed BBN, as a general principle, we model the rigour of application of any method (its effectiveness), in terms of two subsidiary concepts the inherent power to do the job ( power of build/verification method i nodes) and the intensity of its application ( intensity at which build/verification method i was applied nodes). The multiple node notation presented in Figure 3 indicates that every phase of the IEC61508 safety software development lifecycle has one or more build and verification methods, the precise number of nodes depends on -... 

Figure 3 - Generic BBN Flat structure for one phase of the safety software development lifecycle.

This view is more conq)lex than previous process-based attempts to capture software reliability using BBNs. It takes the view that a phase is associated with a set of processes (e.g. a requirements specification), and these processes are subject to active updating for the duration of the project due to work in later phases. This approach allows us to capture intricate influences between phases . The generic BBN structure shown in Figure 4 presents a sub-net for each phase of the safety software life-cycle and a net for interaction among phases. The interaction net aggregates integrity estimates from multiple phases. 

In each phase of the safety software development life cycle, there is a verification exercise that aims to find errors introduced in the development process. This verification exercise, or process, aims to find errors that are relevant to particular phase at which is being applied. The verification process of a particular phase can clearly also find errors made in previous phases of the safety software life cycle. 

Figure 4 - Generic BBN Multi-Levelled structure for several phases of the safety software...

Figure 5 - Reliability estimation for phase I of the safety software lifecycle.

Figure 6- Bayesian belief network model of three phases of the safety software life-cycle.

NOTE 2 Adequate independence means that neither the failure of any non-safety functions nor the programming access to the non-safety software functions is capable of causing a dangerous failure of the safety instrumented... 

Martyn Thomas, an acknowledged authority on safety related computer systems, quoted in New Scientist suggested the possibility that the London Ambulance system was never identified as being safety-critical E.Geake, Did ambulance chiefs Specify Safety Software , New Scientist,... 

PureSafety, a leading provider of workforce health and safety software, has ranked for the fourth consecutive year on Deloitte s Technology Fast 500 hst of the fastest growing technology, media, telecommunications, life sciences and clean technology companies in North America. 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 2004. NASA Safety Software Guidebook. 

Keywords Safety, software reliability, fault tolerance, failure dependency, software diversity, difficulty function. 

Fig. 4.79 Safety-related dataflow of safety software in addition to application software...

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