Checklists safety problems

There are various types of analyses that are used for a process hazard analysis (PHA) of the equipment design and test procedures, including the effects of human error. Qualitative methods include checklists, What-If, and Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. Quantitative methods include Event Trees, Fault Trees, and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA). All of these methods require rigorous documentation and implementation to ensure that all potential safety problems are identified and the associated recommendations are addressed. The review should also consider what personal protective equipment (PPE) is needed to protect workers from injuries. 

Some Road Safety Auditors use checklists describing some of the potential safety issues, but care should be taken not to be restricted by items on the checklists. A checklist should not be used as a substitute for Road Safety Engineering experience. It is sometimes the interaction between design elements that can lead to safety problems and not one element in isolation, for example a junction on a bend on a downhill section. 

In case any of these scenarios develop. Road Safety Auditors are advised to maintain good records of their Road Safety Audit process, including any checklists used during the process, and to spell out precisely what information has been used for Road Safety Audit purposes. In the case of receiving an Exception Report on a problem at an early stage of the Road Safety Audit, Road Safety Auditors are advised to repeat the road safety problem at subsequent stages. 

Checklists have been developed by various companies for their specific processes. These lists can include hundreds of items [1,9]. Checklists are very specific and focused they do not typically lead to the identification of safety problems that have never been encountered. Therefore, checklists (which are... 

With regard to evaluating these factors, it is recommended that structured checklists be used, such as those provided by the HFAM method described in Chapter 2. These checklists provide an explicit link between the direct causal factors and management policies. Figure 2.12 shows how these checklists could be used to investigate possible procedures deficiencies, and the policies that led to the deficiencies, as part of the incident investigation. Similar checklists can be used to investigate possible culture problems (e.g., inappropriate trade-offs between safety and production) that could have been implicated in an accident. 

The first task, hazard identification, is crucial in process system safety analysis, because the effectiveness of the other two tasks depends on it. The traditional methods for identifying hazards during the 1960 s (including process reviews , codes of practice , checklists , and safety audit ) were no longer considered adequate in the 1970 s. There was a need for a technique which could anticipate hazardous problems, particularly in areas of novelty and new technology where past experience was limited. 

Traditionally risks are analyzed by risk types, i.e. separated into environmental risks, safety and security risks, financial risks, etc. Risk analyses based on risk types are suitable for SMEs if the problem area has already been identified. In Finland a risk management toolkit for SMEs has been developed containing checklists for different risk types (Mikkonen, Uusitalo 2005). This toolkit covers a wide range of risks and it offers tools and information about the different risk types. 

Officers at both vessels do regard procedures and check lists as valuable for safety reasons within certain limits. Procedures and checklists are also seen as problematic as there are too many of them, too detailed and too standardized. The crew experience that less standardization and a possibility to accommodate procedures and checklist in accordance to the ship specific simation would improve safety more. Problems with completing checklists and following procedures are... 

Two other problems have arisen during the local adaptation of the checklist by NHS Trusts The NPSA s patient safety alert stated that This checklist contains the core content but can be adapted locally or for specific specialties through usual clinical governance procedures (NPSA 2009). The statement aimed to support local adaptation so that it could be widely applied to different surgical domains. In practice, local adaptation has sometimes resulted in important safety checks being removed. For example, checking consent prior... 

Checklists are provided in HD 19/03 and in the IHT Safety Audit Guidelines. The common problems highlighted in Chapter 5 could be used as the basis for producing checklists. 

To determine whether it is appropriate to conduct an assessment of safety culture, it is necessary for the investigator to be able to determine the signs that there may be such a problem. It is possible to cross-reference the elements of safety culture to causes in a standard RCA approach, and to turn these cross-references into a checklist for use by the investigator. This provides a direct link for the investigator from the analysis technique with which they are working to safety culture assessment, indicating the areas of safety culture that are likely to require most attention. 

Lack of initial involvement Although the safety behaviour checklists were circulated to managers for comment, it was only some time later that it was pointed out that the inclusion of mandatory items, such as the removal of all jewellery, caused problems. Non-compliance with these well-established items was a disciplinary offence. Inclusion of behavioural items of this type on a checklist conflicted with the no discipline promise given with the checklist. Such items were subsequently removed. 

Data collection Originally the data were collected on pro-forma sheets and returned to a central point. Eventually a computer program was written which enabled the observers to enter their results directly on to the shop-floor terminals of the site s computer. Thus the calculations and results could be generated quickly and accurately. Access to the information was improved and a data bank of past phases led to an improvement in checklist generation and feedback. For example, it was possible to identify specific items on a checklist in terms of most safe and least safe behaviour. In this way, by discussions and problem solving sessions, the workforce could concentrate their efforts on the behaviours in most need of safety improvement. These were produced as bar charts and displayed, in colour, beside the feedback charts (see Figure 4.2). 

Add information from your completed checklists to injury information, employee information, and process and equipment information to build a foundation to help yon determine what problems exist. Then, as you use the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSH A) standards in your problem-solving process, it will be easier for yon to determine the actions needed to solve these problems. 

However, it shonld NOT be the primary safety analysis tool. The problem with checklists is that it is only as good as the checklist itself and is not open ended enongh to be comprehensive. 

HAZOP and wAat-iJ/safety checklists, two of the most common safety methods in the chemical industry, are explained. Sample process problems, which engineers face every day at work, are shown. Other safety tools, such as fault tree analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, human factors safety analysis, and software safety, are explained. Examples of the use of these tools are also presented. 

Many companies have adopted an observation-based behavioral safety process to improve compliance with safety procedures, but simply implementing the basic elements of a behavioral safety process does not always work. Companies can encounter problems in getting employees to conduct needed observations, in getting employees to effectively provide feedback to other employees, and in employees filling out observation checklists informally without conducting actual observations. These problems may indicate an overemphasis on the reporting process and inadequate attention to the values required to implement safety improvements successfully. 

Steering committee members How to implement and maintain the behavioral safety process How to use the guidelines provided by the design team to Refine observation checklists Conduct the area kickoff meeting Initiate observations and provide feedback Train others to conduct observations and provide feedback Initiate a recognition program in support of the process. How to evaluate and problem solve the process... 

Phase 2. Follow-up Inspection. After reviewing the self-inspection checklists for a specific group or facility, CCHASP schedules a follow-up inspection of the area. Problems identified in the self-inspection process (phase 1) establish the basis for an in-depth inspection of the laboratory or facility. The CCHASP inspector uses the same checklists used in the self-inspection phase to verify compliance with environment, health and safety requirements and to point out problems that may have been overlooked. An important part of this inspection program s success lies in the inspector s ability to offer immediate solutions to identified problems. The... 

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