Safety performance definitions

Failure occurs when the component ceases to perform its required function. In the case of catastrophic failure, such as the rupture of a pipe or electrical breakdown of an insulator, this is obvious, but in many cases there is no such clear end of life. For example, is the end point when a small amount of environmental stress cracking has occurred, or when cracks have reached 5 mm in length Broadly, the definition of end point is that a property has reached a level at which safety, performance or market acceptance dictate that the component or product can no longer be used. 

There is a definite relationship between safety performance and orderliness in the laboratory. When housekeeping standards fall, safety performance inevitably deteriorates. The work area should be kept clean, and chemicals and equipment should be properly labeled and stored. 

Visibly supporting a continuous improvement culture that benefits everyone is an effective strategy to sustain process safety performance. Improvement efforts are often cast as a program with a definite beginning and presumptive end point. Driving to zero process safety incidents will require a sustained effort with evolving focus over the life of the process operations. 

The term indicator may be used in several ways, which means that there exist many definitions (see 0ien et al. [2011a] for more thorough discussion). Also, terms which may have different meanings, such as safety performance measures or safety outcome measures and safety indicators or risk indicators , are sometimes used interchangeably. 

Different definitions can have different purposes. For instance, OECD (2003) defines a safety performance indicator as a means for measuring the ehanges over time in the level of safety (related to ehemieal aecident prevention, preparedness and response), as the results of actions taken . Skogdalen et al. (2010, p 109) similarly consider a safety performance indicator to be a means for measuring the changes in the level of safety (related to major accidentprevention, preparedness and response), as a result of actions taken . These definitions reflect that they are made for comparisons over time to demonstrate developments as results of actions. Accordingly, they are not made for comparison between countries and they do not give attention to the needs of special users of the indicators. 

In the second edition of this book, I wrote that a renewed interest had developed in having measurement systems that effectively assess occupational safety performance, measurements that are universally applicable. Preferably, those measures would not only be historical but also predictive and serve as a base from which to prioritize future safety efforts. A significant goal was to have those measures communicate well in terms that managements understand. This renewed interest in performance measures arose out of the increased desire of some environmental, safety, and health professionals to move the profession forward by being able to establish more definitively the value of their work in relation to organizational goals. 

Sklet, S. 2006. Safety barriers definition, classification, and performance. Journal of loss prevention in the process industries, Vol. 19 494-506... 

Moreover, analyses of new entrants are subject to significant caveats. First, they are based on very few accidents—e.g., three fatal accidents among new entrants in the Barnett and Higgins database, five total accidents among new entrants in the data used by Oster et al. In addition, as noted by Rose (1992, pp. 84-85), the results are sensitive to the measures of safety performance employed in the study, and also may depend on the definition of entrant carriers... 

Behavior-based Safety The use of applied behavior analysis methods to achieve continuous improvement in safety performance (Krause, 1997, p. 3). See additional definitions in this chapter. 

Various definitions have been used for safety culture. It is important to understand that safety culture is a subset of an overall culture of an organization. It follows that aspects of management that have not traditionally been seen as part of safety influence the safety performance of organizations [4]. 

This Appendix provides definitions for many of the terms used within the petroleum industry. Having consistent definitions allows different companies to compare the results of their safety programs with industry norms. The Appendix is divided into two sections E. 1—Definitions and E.2—Safety Performance Measures. 

Emphasis is given in this chapter to the need for a set of performance indicators—lagging and leading— to communicate properly on safety. Many definitions have been written for lagging and leading indicators, some of which are questionable. For this chapter, the following definition fits well. It also appears in Safety Performance Indicators ... 

Knowledge The auditor will need to be knowledgeable about both school operations and safety implications in order to effectively assess safety performance and the unique challenges that might exist at a school. The auditor must be a subject matter expert on all topics covered within the scope of the audit. Certain situations may arise that will challenge the knowledge of the auditor that can be researched by the auditor for a definitive answer. The auditor must be able to clearly articulate why each question on the audit is in compliance or not in compliance. 

Because we have only one major railway in New Zealand there is a real need for us to have some basic performance measures available from worldwide sources to allow definition of tolerable safety performance of our railway and effectiveness of safety regulation. The principal purpose of our interest in international benchmarking is to allow us to gauge the safety of our industry relative to best practice standards so far as valid and reliable comparisons can be made, to provide a measurable basis of continuous improvement. (Atkinson, 1999)... 

The research into safety culture has led to the use of safety climate measurement tools as a Safety Performance Indicator (Guldenmund, 2000) but the results are largely intangible and may not help organizations identify where they need to focus attention in order to improve safety (Sorenson, 2002). The lack of a generally accepted definition for safety culture or safety chmate also limits their usefulness as concepts since they do not support a systemic methodology for their measurement (Zhang et al., 2002). 

A study conducted by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board reported that 73% of accidents were due to flight crew failures rather than technical-related problems [10]. Furthermore, the studies conducted by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (in the form of pilot interviews, simulator observations, and accident analyses) reported that there was a definite need for more focus on team work and communication of pilots including command, decision making, and leadership [3]. Furthermore, the studies revealed that the crew factors such as the attitudes of the team toward communication and coordination, command responsibility, and recognition of stressor effects affect safety performance. 

Becanse audits are typically designed by safety professionals, they would be assumed to have content-based validity. Certainly the questions are those deemed by the designers to be the most important indicators of safety performance. The fact that, at least in some circumstances, reliable scores can be generated should satisfy us that the method has content-based validity. The presence of reliability indicates that several auditors are using similar definitions of the content, which provides a validation of that content. 

System event trees are built by classifying subsystems into unique groups that can perform a given safety function. Each group has its own system event tree (which shows how the function is accomplished by this set of subsystems). System event trees may be richer than safety fimction event trees because they may involve the impact from the system side (which is not included in safety function definition) or may consider foults of multiple safety functions (due to some system foults). The ordering of events in the system event tree reflects the temporal, fimctional and hardware dependencies of subsystems the event refers to. Event trees contain success/foult events. In event trees, function (component) failure means that the fimction has not been performed as specified, or was performed at wrong time or was not performed at all. 

This definition does not include those types of workers because in my experience, upper-echelon management, owners, principals, or workers who depend on bonuses have little effect on accident statistics or safety performance. For purposes of this discussion, when using the terms team members or workers, I will be referring to the typical factory worker, construction worker, technician, warehouse worker, assembly line worker, delivery person, general laborer, equipment operator, foundry worker, or other typical American workers—basically, the group of people that usually are the categories of workers who are involved in on-the-job accidents. 

A simple answer to this first question is a simple yes. Or at least, I believe that if your company is well managed, the answer should be a simple yes. Maybe your company philosophy does not link performance evaluations with safety performance. This is a mistake. K your aim is to further develop or define your safety culture, there is—or at least there should be—a link between safety performance and performance evaluations. So, the answer to the first question is a definite YES. If safety is not part of your general performance evaluations or reviews, you should seriously consider making some changes. 

The barrier model can be used to set safety performance objectives for conflict removal and collision avoidance, and thus contributes to the definition of the function and performance requirements for the systems which iirqilement the barriers -for example the necessary accmacy of surveillance systems. The barrier model can also be used to set integrity targets for the incorrect operation of the barriers. This can be illustrated by the conceptual model in Figure 2, which shows the risk reduction achievable by the correct operation of each group of barriers (left-pointing arrows) and the risk increase from incorrect operation of the barriers (rightpointing arrows). 

The safety management system should comprise such organizational elements as definition of safety policy identification of the main responsibilities, competences and activities that are needed to ensure safety arrangements to ensure that the required activities are implemented safely monitoring of safety management plans and improvements of safety performance on the basis of lessons learned at the plant concerned and at other plants. In addition, the safety management system should set up the framework that will enable individuals involved in plant activities to carry out their tasks safely and successfully. 

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