Safety multiplicity

Any event that draws a large number of individuals to the same location at the same time creates a potential hazard to health and safety. Multiple variables are present during a mass gathering that interact to create the potential for increased illness and injuries to attendees. Mass gatherings provide difficult settings to plan for or render an... 

Cultures and Climates (of Change, Effectiveness and Safety), Multiple Areas of Ambiguity and Confusion... 

The choice of reactor temperature depends on many factors. Generally, the higher the rate of reaction, the smaller the reactor volume. Practical upper limits are set by safety considerations, materials-of-construction limitations, or maximum operating temperature for the catalyst. Whether the reaction system involves single or multiple reactions, and whether the reactions are reversible, also affects the choice of reactor temperature, as we shall now discuss. 

Safety is thus the result of multiple barriers operating in concert. Whereas each approach individually may have limitations, use in an integrated manner provides overlapping and complementary levels of protection. These approaches may provide an effective method of overcoming risk and represent the only feasible approach in the face of theoretical risks which cannot be adequately characterized by classical technology. 

The two procedures primarily used for continuous nitration are the semicontinuous method developed by Bofors-Nobel Chematur of Sweden and the continuous method of Hercules Powder Co. in the United States. The latter process, which uses a multiple cascade system for nitration and a continuous wringing operation, increases safety, reduces the personnel involved, provides a substantial reduction in pollutants, and increases the uniformity of the product. The cellulose is automatically and continuously fed into the first of a series of pots at a controlled rate. It falls into the slurry of acid and nitrocellulose and is submerged immediately by a turbine-type agitator. The acid is deflvered to the pots from tanks at a rate controlled by appropriate instmmentation based on the desired acid to cellulose ratio. The slurry flows successively by gravity from the first to the last of the nitration vessels through under- and overflow weirs to ensure adequate retention time during nitration. The overflow from the last pot is fully nitrated cellulose. 

The safety principles and criteria used ia the design and constmction of the faciUties which implement the nuclear fuel cycle are analogous to those which govern the nuclear power plant. The principles of multiple barriers and defense-ia-depth are appHed with rigorous self-checking and regulatory overview (17,34). However, the operational and regulatory experience is more limited. 

The project review process involves multiple steps that should be definea in management gmdelines (CCPS, 1993, pp. 57-61). The steps include (1) review pohcy, (2) review scheduling, (3) reviewtech-nique, (4) review team representation, (5) review documentation, (6) review follow-up, (7) review follow-up verification, and (8) review procedures change management. These steps define how a review, whether it be a safety review, environmental review, pre-start-up review, or whatever, is conducted and how closure of review aclion items is achieved. 

The approaeh taken by Carter (1986, 1997) to determine the reliability when multiple load applieations are experieneed (equation 4.34) is first to present a Safety Margin, SM, a non-dimensional quantity to indieate the separation of the stress and strength distributions as given by ... 

The topology is going to be an isolated, multiple output flyback converter that must meet the safety requirements of UT, CSA, and VDE. These considerations affect the design of the final packaging, transformer, and voltage feedback designs. 

The entire inlet line must be at least the size of the PR valve inlet. When multiple safety valves are manifolded on the inlet side, the cross-sectional area of the maitifold piping must be equal to or greater than the sum of all the inlet areas of valves open to the manifold. 

Credit for additional height of the flame center for multiple valve installations may be taken by clustering the safety valve discharge pipes to the atmosphere. The following procedure should be used for determining equivalent diameter and exit velocity to be used in the flame center calculation. Diameter and velocity are based on the total acmal area of the clustered vents. 

The type of safety valves employed (either conventional or others) in a specific collection system dictates the level of back pressure in that system. In flare headers where multiple discharges exist, each safety valve must be checked so that it does not exceed its allowable back pressure. 

Deactivation and D D actions can range from stabilization of multiple hazards at a single site or facilities containing chemical or radioactive contamination, or both, to routine asbestos and lead abatement in a nonindustrial structure. Strategies include programs that meet compliance objectives, protect workers, and make certain that productivity and cost-effectiveness are maintained. The content and extent of health and safety-related programs should be proportionate to the types and degrees of hazards and risks associated with specific operations. 

OSHA found multiple defieieneies in the design, management, and implementation of safety and health plans at all the sites that it visited and in all of the plans reviewed. These defieieneies fell into twelve fune-tional areas and were often eommon to all the sites. A diseussion of the findings speeifie to eaeh funetional area follows. Note, for the remainder of this report, that the identities of the sites are masked and are referred to by a randomly assigned letter designation (Site A-K). 

System event trees use the information on the effects of loss of various safety functions identified in the function event trees. However, the sequences in the system event trees are likely to differ somewhat from the function event trees because system faults may fail multiple functions. 

Infectious patients present a difficult challenge when trying to protect health care workers. These patients must be isolated from the health care workers as well as from the other patients in the hospital. Special isolation rooms are used for this purpose. These rooms are generally used for isolation of infectious tuberculosis (TB) patients, but could be used for patients with other airborne-transmitted diseases. In the United States, there were 22 812 new cases of tuberculosis in 1993, equal to 8.7 per 100 000 population. This represents a 2.8% increase since 1985, following a 6-7% annual decline from 1981-1984.Several studies have documented higher than expected tuberculin skin test (TST) conversion rates in hospital personnel.The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health " reports that multiple-drug-resistant (MDR) strains of TB have been reported in 40 states and have caused outbreaks in at least 21 hospitals, with 18-35% of exposed workers having documented TST conversions. 

It was not nndl the 1950s that detonation flame arresters made of crimped metal ribbon elements were developed and began to be used more freqnendy (Binks 1999). The major impetus for die use of crimped metal ribbon detonation flame arresters in the US was the enactment of clean air legislation (Clean Air Act of 1990) which inadvertently created a safety problem by requiring reductions in volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions. To do this, manifolded vent systems (vapor collection systems) were increasingly installed in many chemical process industry plants which captured VOC vapors and transported them to suitable recovery, recycle, or destruction systems. This emission control requirement has led to the introdnction of ignition risks, for example, from a flare or via spontaneous combustion of an activated carbon adsorber bed. Multiple... 

During the PHEA stage, the analyst has to identify likely human errors and possible ways of error detection and recovery. The PHEA prompts the analyst to examine the main performance-influencing factors (PIFs) (see Chapter 3) which can contribute to critical errors. All the task steps at the bottom level of the HTA are analyzed in turn to identify likely error modes, their potential for recovery, their safety or quality consequences, and the main performance-influencing factors (PIFs) which can give rise to these errors. In this case study, credible errors were found for the majority of the task steps and each error had multiple causes. An analysis of two operations from the HTA is presented to illustrate the outputs of the PHEA. Figure 7.12 shows a PHEA of the two following tasks Receive instructions to pump and Reset system. 

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