Loss prevention

The spillage of a hazardous chemical results in hazardous waste. Washdowns of spilled toxic chemicals create liquid hazardous wastes which are subsequendy transferred off-site for disposal. Mopups using absorbent materials create hazardous solid waste which must also be disposed of. To minimize the costs incurred in chemical spill incidents which can be a range of costs from disposal fees and employee-care to fines from enforcement actions - the best practice is to prevent spills from occurring in the first place. 

The design-freeze phase is that interlude between the completion of the piping and instrumentation diagrams and the determination of operating procedures. For new facilities, a full hazard and risk assessment should be performed here. At this point, alterations in process design still can be made relatively inexpensively since equipment has not yet been ordered. Ozog (1985) details the steps needed in the procedure. 

Prior to starting up the process, a final check should be done to verify the status of recommended changes that emerged from the hazard and risk assessment. A site inspection should be conducted to form an impression of spatial dimensions, and the hazard and risk assessments should be brought up-to-date. Design changes at this point are expensive. 

Shortly after startup, operating procedures may be revised, and these revisions should be reviewed in the context of the hazard and risk assessments. Also, changes in the process may be made during the operational life of the plant these changes should be similarly reviewed under further hazard and risk assessments. Assessments should be carried out regularly during the operational life of the plant. 

Sound practice dictates that storage tanks and process vessels containing hazardous chemicals be properly designed and used only for their intended purpose. They should also have, as a minimum, overflow alarms. Once these conditions are met, it remains to ensure the structural soundness of the containers, to enforce proper hazardous materials handling procedures, and to construct and maintain secondary containment and collection facilities (Shields 1980). 

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FDA has pubHshed two final rules for hair products as of this writing (69). Any over-the-counter (OTC) dmg product labeled or promoted for external use as a hair grower or for hair loss prevention is regarded as a new dmg and must be the subject of an approved new dmg appHcation (NDA). Products making these claims without an NDA are considered to be ia violation of the Federal Food, Dmg and Cosmetic Act and are also mislabeled. 

Health and safety of personnel and loss prevention are paramount concerns of the chemical iadustry. Injuries and property damage have high costs, not the least of which are busiaess iatermption and loss of trained personnel or equipment. Over the years, worker fataUties have decreased and lost time has leveled, but property losses have iacreased. 

Safety, Health, and Loss Prevention in Chemical Processes Student Problems Instmctor s Guide for Undergraduate Engineering Curricula Ha2ard Evaluation Procedures, with Worked Examples, 2nd ed. 

Factory Mutual provides loss prevention data sheets that explain how to protect buildings from wind damage. Pressure coefficients that define increased uplift at corners and edges adjust the calculated uplift pressures. A laboratory uplift pressure test rates roofing assemblies. An uplift pressure of 2.9 kPa (0.42 psi) must be withstood under FM conditions to meet the Class 1-60 requirements. The FM approval guide is revised aimuaHy (37). 

These agents are often combined with a vasoconstrictant such as epinephrine [51-43-4]. By using such a combination, the local anesthetic is held in the area for a longer period of time and its effect extended hemorrhage is minimized, blood loss prevented, and a better surgical repair obtained. 

In a series of papers by Leung and coworkers (AlChE J., 32, 1743-1746 [1986] 33, 524-527 [1987] 34, 688-691 [1988] J. Loss Prevention Proc. Ind., 2[2], 78-86 [April 1989] 3(1), 27-32 [Januaiy 1990] Trans. ASME J. Heat Transfer, 112, 524-528, 528-530 [1990] 113, 269-272 [1991]) approximate techni ques have been developed for homogeneous equilibrium calculations based on pseudo-equation of state methods for flashing mixtures. 

Process safety differs from the traditional approach to accident prevention in a number of ways (Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2ded., Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996, p. 1.8) ... 

SHEL (Safety Healthy Environmental and Loss Prevention Reviews) These reviews are performed during design. The purpose of the reviews is to have an outsider s evaluation of the process and layout from safety, industrial hygiene, environmental, and loss prevention points of view. It is often desirable to combine these reviews to improve the efficiency of the use of time for the reviewers. 

Reactive Chemicals Reviews The process chemistry is reviewed for evidence of exotherms, shock sensitivity, and other insta-bihty, with emphasis on possible exothermic reactions. It is especially important to consider pressure effects— Pressure blows up people, not temperature The pumose of this review is to prevent unexpected and uncontrolled chemical reactions. Reviewers should be knowledgeable people in the field of reactive chemicals and include people from loss prevention, manufacturing, and research. 

Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Biitterworths, Boston, 1980. World Bank, Manual of Industrial Hazar d Assessment Techniques, Office of Environmental and Scientific Affairs, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1985. 

Review Follow-up Verification In addition to someone tracking the follow-up through progress reports, responsibility should be assigned to verify that any process changes were ac tuaUy made in the field. This verification can be done by a review team as part of a process pre-start-up review. It could also be part of the project team management responsibihty or assigned to a particular functional (i.e., safety and loss prevention) representative. The closure of the review process is complete once implementation is verified. 

In addition, restrictions on industrial air emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended in 1977, the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990, and other state and local statutes and regulations have universal impact on the storage of toxic materials, with direct and significant effects on the design and operation of toxic material storage facilities. Whereas the primary factors which once determined how air emissions from storage tanks were handled were fire protection and loss prevention, in recent years environmental protection concerns nearly always determine the extent and nature of the air emission controls required to be installed. 

General Storage Safeguards, Loss Prevention Datasheet 8-0, Factory Mutual Engineering Corp. 

Warehousing of Chemicals, Loss Prevention Bulletin 088, IChemE, August 1989. 

Protection of Warehouses Against Fire, Loss Prevention Bulletin 084, IChemE, 1989, pp. 2-6. 

Dailey, W. V. 1976. Area Monitoring for Elammable and Toxic Hazards. Loss Prevention Manual, Vol. 10. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York. 

EMEC 1974. Loss Prevention in Chemical Plant. Eoss Prevention Data Sheet No. 7-43, pp. 1-17, Eactory Mutual Engineering Corporation, Norwood, MA. 

Erurip, D. J., T. C. Elofelich, D. J. Eeggett, J. J. Kurland, and J. K. Niemeier, 1997. A Review of Chemical Compatibility Issues, Proceedings of the Annual Loss Prevention Symposium, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Vol. 31, 1997. 

IRI. Loss Prevention and Protection for Chemical and Petrochemical Plants. Industrial Risk Insurers, Hartford, CT. 

Part 4 Reliability and safety of complex systems (German only) (July 1995) Warehousing of Chemicals Loss Prevention Bulletin 088, IChemE, Rugby, U.K., August 1989. 

A valuable QRA result is the importance of various components, human errors, and accident scenarios contributing to the total risk. The risk importance values highlight the major sources of risk and give the decision maker a clear target(s) for redesign or other loss prevention efforts. For example, two accident scenarios may contribute 90% of the total risk once you realize that, it is obvious that you should first focus... 

Another way to evaluate risks is to calculate the sensitivity of the total risk estimates to changes in assumptions, frequencies, or consequences. Risk analysts tend to be conservative in their assumptions and calculations, and the cumulative effect of this conservatism may be a substantial overestimation of risk. For example, always assuming that short-term exposure to chemical concentrations above some threshold limit value will cause serious injury may severely skew the calculated risks of health effects. If you do not understand the sensitivity of the risk results to this conservative assumption, you may misallocate your loss prevention resources or misinform your company or the public about the actual risk. 

Risk sensitivity results are also very useful in identifying key elements in your existing loss prevention program. For example, suppose your fire protection system was assumed to have a very low probability of failure because you test it weekly. Fire protection failures may not show up as an important contributor to your total risk (because failure is so unlikely), but your total risk estimate may be extremely sensitive to any change in the probability of fire protection failures. Flence you should not divert resources away from testing the fire protection system unless the alternate use of funds will decrease risk more than the reduced testing will increase risk. 

Vernon L. Grose, Managing Risk—Systematic Loss Prevention for Executives, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987. 

M. L. Casada, J. Q. Kiikman, and H. M. Paula, Facility Risk Review as an Approach to Prioritizing Loss Prevention Efforts, Plant/Operations Progress, October 1990. 

Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is a powerful analysis approach used to help manage risk and improve safety in many industries. When properly performed with appropriate respect for its theoretical and practical limitations, QRA provides a rational basis for evaluating process safety and comparing improvement alternatives. However, QRA is not a panacea that can solve all problems, make decisions for a manager, or substitute for existing safety assurance and loss prevention activities. Even when QRA is preferred, qualitative results, which always form the foundation for QRA, should be used to verify and support any conclusions drawn from QRA. 

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