Personnel support area

The facility requirements for both service and support elements, as utility and environmental systems together with the personnel support area (change house), chemical laboratory and surveillance area were identified and included within the frame work of the design. 

The personnel support area, primarily a change house and the personnel control center, is connected to the main building by a covered walkway. 

The personnel support area layout is as shown (Figure 12). 

Rescued persons who have been exposed only to arsine gas do NOT need decontamination, and rescue personnel in the Support Zone or other clean areas do not need any specialized protection if everybody has already been decontaminated or all victims now in the support areas have been exposed only to arsine gas. ... 

Within the service and support area are found a personnel service area which includes facilities for donning and doffing of DPE suits, office and operational control center, air conditioning system, emergency generator and air compressors for plant and life support air systems. 

An early activity on the project was the selection of a site out of the forty-three sites previously surveyed and deemed suitable. A composite team of Mobil and Bechtel personnel supported by New Zealand consultants narrowed the selection first to three sites, then to one by August 1980. The criteria for site selection were many and varied. The most significant were proximity to the natural gas pipeline, to a reliable source of water, to a centre of population which would provide the necessary infrastructure in support of plant operation, and to the Port of Taranaki for shipping the gasoline product and for reasonable transportation access for preassemblies. A clear and level site to minimize civil works was needed as well as a location that would not have an overwhelmingly negative environmental impact on the area. 

All personnel employed in a manufacturing organisation will have an impact on product quality. In some areas this is a direct effect, as in production or the support areas of QC and engineering. The impact from the areas of marketing, sales, development, training, purchasing, etc. may be less direct, but it is no less fundamental to the total product quality. 

Personnel in support areas shall wear garments designed to minimise particulate generation, but these garments normally need not be sterile prior to use. 

Personnel conducting filling operations should not be exchanged during a shift with employees performing other functions with the APA. Operators working in non-sterile support areas shall not have access to the critical processing zone. 

V. Victim management Victim management includes rapid stabilization and removal from the Exclusion Zone, initial decontamination, delivery to emergency medical services personnel at the Support Zone perimeter, and medical assessment and treatment in the support area. Usually only the HazMat team or other fire department personnel with appropriate training and protective gear will be responsible for rescue from the hot zone, where skin and respiratory protection may be critical. Emergency medical personnel without specific training and appropriate equipment must not enter the hot zone unless it is determined to be safe by the Incident Commander and the medical officer. 

Identify additional key departmental and other support-area personnel... 

Other reactor operations and support personnel shall be trained prior to restart, with concentration on changes in the conduct of operations and on specific job-related training. Training shall be provided for maintenance and support personnel staff including management and supervisory staff, as well as for personnel in health protection, electrical, instrumentation and technical support areas. 

HAZWOPER does not eover elerieal or support personnel, workers at the perimeter of a hazardous waste worksite, or workers engaged in eonstruetion aetivities in uneontaminated areas, provided they are not exposed, or have possibly been exposed, to hazards resulting from the operations. These workers would fall under the seope of other appropriate standards of praetiee that are more proteetive of health and safety [11-... 

Work zones are often temporary. Many times, onee the work has been eondueted, the zone boundaries ehange and sometimes beeome support zones. Temporary work zones ean be used to eflfeetively manage regulatory seope. Area and personnel exposure monitoring is erueial in order to verify that zoning, eontainments, work praetiees, and proeedures have been designed appropriately and maintain worker health and safety. 

Forty-hour training was required for personnel entering the exclusion zone, and additional supervisory training was required for site supervisors. Site control procedures described in the Site C contractor s SSAHP included maintenance of site control logs at each access point, use of red tape or chainlink fencing to demarcate hot zones, and use of the buddy system in all exclusion and contamination reduction zone areas. Site communications relied almost exclusively on visual sighting of employees the plan did not describe the use of two-way radios. This suggested that all employees in hot zones can be observed continuously from the support zones. 

Site D lacked a sufficient CRZ and also lacked access/egress control for the exclusion zone. The site control plan did not accurately identify the function of the CRZ as a buffer zone between the exclusion zone and the support zone, and there was no buffer area between the decontamination pad and the road that runs adjacent to the pad, marked as a support zone. Also, an exclusion zone log-in procedure for tracking personnel who enter and exit this zone was not used on site as called for in the SSAHP. 

Different research frontiers require different mixes of support mechanisms. The appropriate mix for a particular area depends on several of factors, including the nature of the scientific area its requirements for expensive equipment, instruments, or facilities and the need for trained personnel from that area in the broader economy. 

GLP regulations require QA personnel to inspect/audit each study conducted, but the extent to which QA personnel are involved in software development and the val-idation/verification process varies from company to company. In some companies, there is little or no QA involvement in these processes, whereas in others QA personnel are involved. QA personnel can provide assistance in the area of vendor audits for purchased software or can conduct inspections of in-house software development to ensure that internal procedures are being followed. QA personnel, who conduct in-process inspections and review the resulting data and validation report for accuracy, could provide inspection support during the validation and verification process. During system development and validation, properly trained QA personnel can provide the regulatory advice needed to ensure that the system will meet government standards. QA personnel become more familiar with the system(s) that will be used when they are involved early in the validation process. 

As discussed in Chapter 1, nonessential personnel, including secretarial, laboratory, and engineering and management work groups, are sometimes located near process areas. Buildings that support other activities, such as maintenance shops, instrument and electrical shops, and purchasing and stores, may also be located close enough to the process units to be possibly affected by an event of concern. 

Toxic operations must be supported by a good communications system. In laboratories where communications are inadequate, workers will naturally use "runners" for communication needs. This practice results in avoidable traffic in and out of toxic areas which increases the opportunities for contamination to spread. In emergencies, a phone or intercom can help ensure that assistance is tailored to the actual need. An "all purpose" response to an alarm will normally be less rapid at a time when speed may be of the essence. Video cameras trained on critical operations add a measure of safety, but annoy the workers who may feel that the purpose of the system is to "spy" on them. As a minimum, the laboratory doors should have windows so that entering personnel don t blunder into a rapidly developing scenario. 

Strength ACSO (Aiken County Sheriffs Office) personnel had Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in their vehicles and were directed to utilize it. ACSO Sheriff contacted neighboring county Sheriffs directly via cell phone to coordinate safe arrival direction to the staging area. ADPS (Aiken Department of Public Safety) Staging officer directed rescue personnel through specified safety routes. US-OSHA representatives offered support on Day 2 and identified no safety concerns for responders. 

Improvement Item ACEMS supervisor was not present at initial Command Post (CP). Local/National Red Cross point of contact needed at the CP to coordinate food for personnel in outlying areas. National Red Cross may be needed in the EOC (Emergency Operation Center). EPA personnel were initially unaware that the Aiken County EOC was operational. Aiken County GIS resources were not involved in UCP planning meetings. ACEMS observed additional EMS support arrive from outside Aiken County. Additional units were not coordinated with ACEMS. Large numbers of individuals at the CP did not... 

Strength ACEMS supported three separate decon sites with medical monitoring. Due to overwhelming number of calls for assistance being received from Graniteville area, decision was made to enter with Level-B suits by Haz-Mat technician-level EMS personnel. Decision to not transport patients prior to decontamination was made by ACEMS Shift Supervisor. 

Hold a briefing for entry personnel and support crew. Ensure that all staff on scene understand emergency signals, preplanned escape routes, locations of Hot/Warm/ Cold zones, operational hazards at this site, the evacuation system, the buddy system, the need for appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) the potential need to decontaminate rescuers and their equipment, and contaminated persons location of rehabilitation area, possible air space closure over incident site, etc. 

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