Safety, Safeguards, and Security

Potential Impacts of Material Safeguards on Nuclear Criticality Safety, R. A. Knief (GPU Serv Corp) 

Increased concern over the potential diversion of nuclear materials has led to an escalation in materials safeguards requirements nationally and internationally. As with any externally imposed regulations, these may be expected to impact operations and nuclear safety. This paper identifies m or concerns as they relate to tte conduct of nuclear criticality safety. 

As currently employed, material safeguards is a somewhat vague term representing a wide range of measures used to assure that nuclear materials are not diverted for unauthorized uses. Domestic and international concerns are fundamentally different and, thus, require separate methods. 

Domestic safeguards directed toward subnational terrorist groups have the following constituents material accountancy, material control, and physical protection. It has been recognized that none of the three is capable by itself of preventing theft by insiders and/or outsiders. However, by complementing each other the risks may be reduced greatly. 

Each of the facets of safeguards has the potential for impacting operations and nudear safety in a different manner. The following observations are based on tours and discussions at a number of different types of cycle facilities. 

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The staff has stated that the contractor must comply with the list of DOE Orders related to safety, safeguards and security referred to as Level I DOE Orders (Appendix II). The WSRC revised self-assessment has not been finalized, and there has been no other mechanism by which WSRC has stated that it would assess its compliance against all of the Level I DOE Orders. 

Occupational safety and health Radiological characterization Reactor Division remganization, stafiBn and training Conduct of operation programs and procedures Authorization basis Standby Technical Specifications Emergency preparedness Safeguards and security DOE Order compliance and commitments dmhilstrative procedures... 

The safeguards and security-dedicated computer system at the ICPP provides storage basin and operations personnel with a detailed processing list, criticality safety with additional administrative controls, and S S with a means of monitoring process activities. In addition tO providing criticality controls, various operational plans can be readily evaluated. The computerized system has been used for the 1978 and 1980 dissolution campaigns and has proved an invaluable aid to plant operation. 

In particular, the IWS demonstrates that the framework, for consideration of potential waste management options, transparently takes account of the full range of relevant health, safety, environmental, and security (including safeguards) principles and regulatory requirements. 

See Appendix I for a more detailed set of requirements. Specific issues include mission requirements, potential burnup criteria, heat rejection, economic resources, environmental impact, safety, technology development risk, completion schedule, repository issues, social and political acceptance, and diversion and proliferation. In addition to these issues, others that need to be considered include plutonium handling, waste disposal, environmental regulations, safety regulations and analysis, safeguards and security, technology development, economic analysis, and government and public policies. A variety of reactor concepts exists, and each concept has unique and specific concerns. The intent is not to present a complete set of requirements, but to briefly discuss a few selected issues. 

The staff determined that the SRS Emergency Plan and RAEP do not contain information on credible emergencies (either operational or safeguards and security), nor do they contain information on technical assessment and mitigation of reactor conditions, radiological conditions, and core damage. However, these documents do reference the Safety Analysis Report (Reference 18) as a source of this information. The Reactor Area Abnormal Conditions... 

Reprocessing of highly enriched irradiated reactor fuel at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) presents significant problems to the Criticality Safety (CS) and Safeguards Security (S S) Sections. Two major interactions between these sections occur when irradiated fuel is stored and fuel b dissolved. 

Gen-m designs have advanced safety features and set the worldwide standards for the Safety, Security, and Safeguards concept ( 3S ). However, they have also produced a legacy of significant quantities of used fuel, require relatively large electric grids, and present public acceptance challenges in some coimtries. 

People use the safety deposit box services provided by the banks to secure a tangible asset from loss or theft. The bank provides its customer with a safety deposit box with a lock and the only key for the lock. The bank keeps the safety deposit box in the vault as the custodian without knowing what is kept in the box. Only the owner of the safety deposit box knows the content of the box and has access to the content, while the bank safeguards the box itself. As a result the individual s belongings are secured in the locked box that only the owner has the key for, and the box is secured in the bank s vault that only the vault keeper at the bank has access to. 

Operational Emergencies include the spectrum of significant emergency events or conditions that involve or affect facilities and activities by causing or having the potential to cause serious health and safety impacts onsite or offsite to woikers or the public, serious detrimental effects on the environment, direct harm to people or the environment as a result or degradation of security or safeguards conditions or release (or loss of control) of hazardous materials. 

Additional items in safety analysis, e.g. initiating events like collision, sinking, fuel recovery after sinking accident, extent of security ad safeguards implied in the design of plant and ports. 

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