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Preliminary hazard analysis specification

Partial what-if analyses for the two example processes described in Section 4.0 are shown in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. Although for actual, more complex analyses, the what-if tables for each line or vessel would be separate, for these examples, a single table was developed. A preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) would identify that the intrinsic hazards associated with HF are its reactivity (including reactivity with water, by solution), corrosivity (including carbon steel, if wet), toxicity via inhalation and skin contact, and environmental toxicity. The N2 supply system pressure is not considered in this example. The specific effects of loss of containment could be explicitly stated in the "loss of HF containment" scenarios identified. Similarly, the effects of loss of chlorine containment, including the reactivity and toxicity of chlorine, could be specified for the second example. [Pg.47]

Preliminary Hazard Analysis. The next step in the process is the development of a PHA. This analysis is the core of the FSS program and as such is vital in eliminating or reducing the inherent hazards associated with this laboratory operation. The PHA is used to further analyze the data identified in the PHL. This enhances the hazard control data base and provides specific recommended corrective action for the resolution of hazardous conditions. A combination of the informational sources used in the PHL development and any additional design information should be used in PHA development. [Pg.214]

The job safety analysis (JSA) [also referred to as the job hazard analysis (JHA)], which is a more simplified form of task analysis, has been a longstanding tool for task and function analysis. JSA has been available and utilized in general industry for many years by the industrial safety community. However, many practitioners do not understand or are simply unfamiliar with the connection between the JSA and the system safety tasks of hazard identification and analysis. It has even been suggested by some in the profession that the JSA itself is a type of oversimplified system safety analysis and, if performed earlier in the job development phase, could be used as the basis of a preliminary hazard analysis for a specific task or set of tasks. However, because JSA is often (if improperly) used to analyze a function only after it has been implemented, much of the data is not factored into the system safety process. The primary purpose of the JSA is to uncover inherent or potential hazards that may be encountered in the work environment. This basic definition is not unlike that previously discussed regarding the various system safety analyses. The primary difference between the two is subtle but important and is found in the end-use purpose of the JSA. Once the job or task is completed, the JSA is usually used as an effective tool for training and orienting the new employee into the work environment. The JSA presents a verbal picture of a specific job. [Pg.42]

The SSHA evaluates hazardous conditions, on the subsystem level, which may affect the safe operation of the entire system. In the performance of the SSHA, it is prudent to examine previous analyses that may have been performed such as the preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) and the failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA). Ideally, the SSHA is conducted during the design phase and/or the production phase, as shown in Chapter 3, Figure 3.4. However, as discussed in the example above, an SSHA can also be done during the operation phase, as required, to assist in the identification of hazardous conditions and the analysis of specific subsystems and/or components. In the event of an actual accident or incident investigation, the completed SSHA can be used to assist in the development of a fault tree analysis by providing data on possible contributing fault factors located at the subsystem or component level. [Pg.92]

The ETBA is an analytical technique that can be of great assistance in preparation of the preliminary hazard list (PHL). It can also be quite useful in the development of a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), subsystem hazard analysis (SSHA), or the more general system hazard analysis (SHA). The ETBA can also be used, depending on the specific system under consideration, in the development of the operating and support hazard analysis (O SHA), and, of course, during the MORT process from which the ETBA evolved. [Pg.106]

This example will develop a hardware FMEA for a proposed system that is well into the design phase of the product life cycle. For informational purposes, it is assumed that a preliminary hazard analysis was previously performed during the early stages of the design phase of this system. The information from the PHA will be used to assist in the development of the hardware FMEA. It should also be noted that the nature of a FMEA requires evaluation of subsystems, subassemblies, and/or components. For this reason, more detailed and specific descriptive information is provided here than that supplied for previous examples discussed in this text. [Pg.118]

Software Preliminary Hazard Analysis This type of analysis is used to identify software program routines that are considered to be safety-critical, and thus is conducted prior to software program coding. To perform the analysis, the analyst should make reference to any available system specifications, interface documentation, functional flow diagrams, software flowcharts, storage and file allocation specifications, and any other program descriptive information. [Pg.180]

A project hazard analysis (preliminary hazard analysis) should be performed for each project prior to the start of work and should provide a basis for the project-specific safety and health plan. The project hazard analysis should identify the following ... [Pg.70]

Introductory Information The analyst should provide basic information in this section of the report which describes the purpose and scope of the FMEA along with any limitations imposed on the analysis as a result (i.e., items not specifically within the scope of the analysis). The scope will also identify the type of FMEA (i.t., functional or hardware). Also included in the introduction section is an explanation of the methodology used to perform the analysis such as, but not limited to drawing reviews, examination of previous analyses (if applicable), evaluation of lessons learned, use of Preliminary Hazard List and/or Preliminary Hazard Analysis, and so on. Finally, any preestablished ground rules that may have been agreed upon should be provided here. Such ground rules typically limit or further narrow the scope of the FMEA, or just a portion of it, and should therefore be explained in the introductory pages of the report. [Pg.121]

In this paper we review the application of DP in harsh climate conditions more specifically we focuses on the Arctic conditions and the conditions in the South China Sea. Moreover, the paper deals with a preliminary hazard analysis of DP systems in such operational conditions. In this paper in section 2 the DP working conditions in Arctic... [Pg.743]

In June 1966, MIL-S-38130 was revised. Revision A to the specification once again expanded the scope of the SSP by adding a system modernization and retrofit phase to the defined life-cycle phases. This revision further refined the objectives of an SSP by introducing the concept of maximum safety consistent with operational requirements. On the engineering side, MIL-S-38130A also added another safety analysis the Gross Hazard Study (now known as the Preliminary Hazard Analysis). This comprehensive qualitative hazard analysis was an attempt to focus attention on hazards and safety requirements early in... [Pg.12]

The GPCA safety requirements were designed on the basis of a preliminary hazard analysis for the controller of the pump. We found that almost half of the requirements can be related to user interface functionalities, and correctly capture basic human factors concerns. However, a hazard analysis specifically addressing user interface functionalities is needed to cover a more complete set of aspects related to human factors. We are currently starting this hazard analysis. Some examples of safety features and constraints that are currently not considered in the GPCA safety requirements and can potentially make the user interface design safer follows. [Pg.231]

In order to utilize the ETBA in the performance of the system safety analyses listed above, certain essential data are required for evaluation. For example, if the ETBA is to be performed on a specific manufacturing facility, then the analysis should begin with an examination of completed facility drawings. If the ETBA is concerned with a specific project, or a newly designed piece of manufacturing equipment, the project plans and schematics must be evaluated. It should be noted that the level of detail required is dependent on the analysis itself. Development of a preliminary hazard list will not require extensive detail and evaluation, whereas an ETBA in support of a subsystem hazard analysis will meticulously analyze the project to the component level and detailed drawings will, therefore, be required. [Pg.106]

In the previous chapter, it was established that in industry, plant hazards can cause harm to property (plant—machinery, asset), people, or the environment. So, it is important to develop some means of analyzing these and come up with a solution. Unfortunately, it is not as straightforward as it sounds. There are plenty of plant hazard analysis (PHA) techniques and each of them has certain strengths and weaknesses. Also each specific plant and associated hazard has specific requirements to be matched so that hazard analysis will be effective. In this chapter, various hazards (in generic terms) will be examined to judge their importance, conditions, quality, etc. so that out of so many techniques available for PHA it is possible to select which one is better (not the best because that needs to be done by experts specifically for the concerned plant) suited for the type of plant. So, discussion will be more toward evaluation of PHA techniques. Some PHA is more suited for process safety management (PSM) and is sometimes more applicable for internal fault effects [e.g., hazard and operability study (HAZOP)]. In contrast, hazard identification (HAZID) is applicable for other plants, especially for the identification of external effects and maj or incidents. HAZID is also covered in this chapter. As a continuation of the same discussion, it will be better to look at various aspects of risk analysis with preliminary ideas already developed in the previous chapter. In risk analysis risk assessment, control measures for safety management systems (SMSs) will be discussed to complete the topic. [Pg.83]

As we shall see in Chapter 5, the PHA is used in support of the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) milestone to develop the requirements for new procurements while developing the statement of work or procurement specification for new hardware for the program. Completion of the PHA is required in support of the PDR to verify that the technical safety requirements have been incorporated into the preliminary design of the item for procurement. Hazards identified in the PHA will be updated in the System Hazard Analysis (SHA) and the Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA) as the life cycle progresses. [Pg.43]


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See also in sourсe #XX -- [ Pg.178 ]




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