Audits nuclear

Attritors, 8 704 Attritus, 6 705 A-type gravure inks, 74 324 Audemars, George, 11 248 Audits, nuclear power facility, 17 539 Auger electrons, 27 312 24 85, 94 energy of, 24 95... 

The aforementioned reviews and assessments were assimilated to characterize the effect of dielectric, rotational, and mechanical hazards on motor performance and operational readiness. Functional indicators were identified that can be monitored to assess motor component deterioration caused by aging or other accidental stressors. The study also includes a preliminary discussion of current standards and guides, maintenance programs, and research activities pertaining to nuclear power plant safety-related electric motors. Included are motor manufacturer recommendations, responses from repair facilities to a questionnaire, in-service inspection data, expert knowledge, USNRC-IE audit reports, and standards and guides published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). 

Schwartz, S.I., Atomic Audit The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 1998. 

The chemical aspects of these studies focus primarily on the chemical characterization of the test substance and/or mixture. The identity of the test chemical should be proven, and the analytical procedures used, such as gas or liquid chromatography, nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry, or nass spectroscopy, should be available for audit. This would include the chromatograms or spectra from these analyses. It is imperative that raw data be left intact as they emerge from an instrument to maintain data integrity. Chro-natographic printouts are to remain attached and in sequence. If some data points are not used in the final report, the reason is to be documented and those not used are to remain with the stud/ file. 

The equipment used should provide the IAEA with an immediate capability to carry out also non-routine inspection activities. It is assumed that in the course of such inspections, it may be necessary to locate and identify nuclear-related materials, equipment, and activities. It would also be necessary to provide a clearly documented audit trail of the inspection times, locations, activities, and results. The equipment selected to provide this capability should meet the highest current standards for high measurement sensitivity, flexibility in use, portability, and quality. The equipment should provide, but not be limited to, the following functions ... 

DOE 0 420.1 Facility Safety Requires fire hazard analysis and natural phenomena analysis for all facilities. For Hazard Category 2 or 3 nuclear facilities only, requires a criticality safety evaluation. Criticality Safety Analysis Fire Hazard Analysis Effects of natural phenomena hazards on facility systems, structures, or components (SSCs) included as part of safety analysis documented in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), Basis for Interim Operation (BIO), or Auditable Safety Analysis (ASA). 

Besides outcome measures, interviews represent a possible data-collection method. Whether directed or not (e.g., Sinclair 1990) they can produce critical incidents, human factors examples, or networks of communication (e.g., Drury 1990a), which have vrilue as part of an audit procedure. Interviews are routinely used as part of design audit procedures in large-scale operations such as nuclear power plants (Kirwan 1989) or naval systems (Mrilone et al. 1988). 

Regulatory Guide 1.168, Verification, Validation and Audits for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants, Sept. 1997... 

The audit team was composed of four members two of them, including the audit team leader, were the NPP Dukovany I C reforbishment project staff members, the other two were I C consultants of the Scientech, Inc. company. A nuclear safety inspector of the SUJB and two staff members of the prime contractor, i.e. SKODA JS, participated in the audit as observers. 

The RCSC conducts appraisals of the HCF at least annually, and the RCSC Charter identifies criticality-safety items to be included in the audit. HCF criticality-safety issues are documented and followed up in accordance with SNL ES H requirements of GN470072, which are reflected in nuclear facility operations procedures. HCF operational procedures require a record of HCF fissile inventory at ail times. These records shall be used and maintained to document compliance with criticality mass limits. 

Copies of Hot Cell Facility documents and records (e.g., SAR, TSR, operations logs, maintenance logs, and experiment logs) and external audit reports and action plans in response to those audit reports are maintained in the TA-V Nuclear Facilities Document Collection library in Building 6588. 

Especially in the nuclear industry and other potentially high consequence endeavors, there are formal sets of rules for the QA and safety audit process. ANSI/ASME NQA-1 (ASME 2001) nuclear quality audits use certified and trained auditors and lead auditors who are also expert in the areas being audited. 

Because of the potential for high-consequence accidents, since inception the nuclear industry has been closely regulated and audited by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The audit process is formalized with the industry standard ASME/ANST NQA-1 (ASME 2001). The NQA-1 standard provides comprehensive QA requirements and audit process requirements to include auditor and lead auditor training, certification, and continuance of certification standards. 

PSM or RMP audits have multiple objectives. Most important is the assurance an audit brings or the adequacy of implementation of the particular program. Specifically, the audit measures program effectiveness, identifies deficiencies, and verifies correction of previously identified deficiencies. The audit also provides management with a status assessment and may recommend improvements and identify good practices. The material in this section is based on a portion of the content of a Nuclear QA Certification Course taught at Sandia National Laboratories and several companies, the ASQ Nuclear Auditor Training Manual (ASQ 1986), the System Safety Analysis Handbook (Stephans and Talso 1997), and the OSHA Inspection Manual (U.S. Department of Labor 1994). 

We found relatively little meaningful information in the published literature about the safety impacts of the British privatization and restructuring experience on the nuclear power sector, with the exception of the safety audit reports discussed in the next chapter. Hood (1997) notes that in the U.K., there was some stinging criticism of privatization, based on anecdotal evidence to the effect that increased commercial pressures were in some way incompatible with... 

Our initial round of interviews in the U.K. nuclear power industry was conducted in July 1999 with the British nuclear safety authorities— the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (Nil)— and the private nuclear generating company in England (British Energy). A second round of interviews was conducted in January 2000 to follow up on open issues. Additional background information was obtained from discussions with trade union representatives and a local U.K. trade press correspondent. The U.K. interviewees were given considerable latitude to describe the process and impacts of industry restructuring in their own terms, in part because a sensitive audit was still pre-decisional at the time of the interviews. 

SAFETY AUDITS OF BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS LIMITED AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY... 

Since privatization, the Nil has conducted three significant audits that shed light on the impacts of restructuring on nuclear safety management. The first two of these are discussed below. The third major safety audit, of British Energy, is discussed in more detail in the next section. 

Audit of British Nuclear Fuels Limited (Sellafield site)... 

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