Risks checklist

Process Hazards Analysis. Analysis of processes for unrecogni2ed or inadequately controUed ha2ards (see Hazard analysis and risk assessment) is required by OSHA (36). The principal methods of analysis, in an approximate ascending order of intensity, are what-if checklist failure modes and effects ha2ard and operabiHty (HAZOP) and fault-tree analysis. Other complementary methods include human error prediction and cost/benefit analysis. The HAZOP method is the most popular as of 1995 because it can be used to identify ha2ards, pinpoint their causes and consequences, and disclose the need for protective systems. Fault-tree analysis is the method to be used if a quantitative evaluation of operational safety is needed to justify the implementation of process improvements. 

The detail plan for each audit may include dates if it is to cover several days but the main substance of the plan will be what is to be audited, against what requirements, and by whom. At the detail level, the specific requirements to be checked should be identified based upon risks, past performance, and when it was last checked. Overall plans are best presented as program charts and detail plans as checklists. Audit planning should not be taken lightly. Audits require effort from auditees as well as the auditor so a well-planned audit designed to discover pertinent facts quickly is far better than a rambling audit which jumps from area to area looking at this or that without any obvious direction. 

These questions tmd otliers are answered and analyzed. Changes are Uicn made to reduce the risk of an accident. Process checklists are updated and audited at reguhir inter als. 

The review looks for major risk situations. General housekeeping and personnel attitude arc not the objectives, although tliey can be significant indicators of where to look for real problems or places where meaningful improvements are needed. Various hazard evaluation teclmiques, such as checklists (see previous Section), what-if questions (see Section 15.5), and raw materitil evaluations, can be also used during tlie review. 

The effectiveness of a QA-related independent Part 11 audit is dependent on the checklist or audit plan utilized. Here, provided as a model, is a two-part audit checklist. The depth of the evidence and support required is dependent on the results of the risk assessment All high-, medium-, or low-risk systems should be subject to the same general questions. 

The what-if/checklist analysis method combines the creative, brainstorming features of the what-if analysis with the systematic features of the checklist analysis. The PrHA team uses the what-if analysis method to brainstorm the types of accidents that can occur within a process. Then the team uses one or more checklists to help fill in any gaps. Finally, the team members suggest ways for reducing the risk of operating the process. The what-if analysis encourages the PrHA team to consider potential accident events and consequences that are beyond the experience of the authors of a good checklist and, thus, are not covered on the checklist. Conversely, the checklist lends a systematic nature to the what-if analysis. 

Process hazard analysis (PHA) Any of a number of techniques for understanding and managing the risk of a chemical process or plant. Examples of PHA techniques include HAZOP, checklists, what-if methods, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and others. 

Loss-of-Containment Causes The list in Table 23-30 indicates four basic ways in which containment can be lost. These cause cate-ories can be used both as a checklist of considerations during the esign process and as a starting point for evaluating the adequacy of safeguards as part of a process hazard and risk analysis. 

SVA Methodologies There are several SVA techniques and methods available to the industry, all of which share common elements. The following is a list of some available SVA methodologies published by various governments, private, and trade andprofessional organizations. Some are merely chapters or sections of documents that address security or risk assessment/risk management in broader terms. Some are SVA or VA publications by themselves. Some of these methods are complete, systematic analytical techniques, and others are mere checklists. 

The facility is subjected to a process hazard analysis commensurate to the level of hazard the facility represents (i.e., Checklist, PHA, HAZOP, What-If review, Event Tree, FMEA, etc.). The results of these analyses are fully understood and acknowledged by facility management. Where high risk events are identified, quantifiable risk estimation and effects of mitigation measures should be evaluated and applied if productive. 

Both qualitative and quantitative evaluation techniques may be used to consider the risk associated with a facility. The level and magnitude of these reviews should be commensurate with the risk that the facility represents. High value, critical facilities or employee vulnerability may warrant high review levels. While unmanned "off-the-shelf, low hazard facilities may suffice with only a checklist review. Specialized studies are performed when in-depth analysis is needed to determine the cost benefit of a safety feature or to fully demonstrate the intended safety feature has the capability to fully meet prescribed safety requirements. 

Generally offshore facilities and major process plants onshore represent considerable capital investment and have a high number of severe hazards associated with them (blowouts, ship collisions, line and vessel ruptures, etc.). They normally cannot be easily evaluated with a simple safety checklist approach. Some level of "quantifiable evaluation" reviews are usually prepared to demonstrate that the risk of these facilities is within public, national, industry and corporate expectations. 

Checklist or Worksheet - A standardized listing which identifies common protection features required for typical facilities is compared against the facility design and operation. Risks are expressed by the omission of safety systems or system features. 

Relative Ranking Techniques (DOW and MOND Hazard Indices) - This method assigns relative penalites and awards points for hazards and protection measures respectivesly in a checklist accounting form. The penalties and award points are combined into an index which is an indication of the relative ranking of the plant risk. 

Many methods have been developed that are suitable for assessing risks associated with the operation of facilities involving chemical reactivity hazards. The more commonly used methods are summarized in Table 4.9. They differ in their applicability, level of effort, and how systematic they are in identifying accident scenarios. All of the methods except layer of protection analysis (LOPA) may be applied qualitatively, and all except checklist reviews may be performed in at least a semiquantitative manner. CCPS (1992a) is a basic source of information on each of these methods. 

Hendershot, D.C. 2002. "A Checklist for Inherently Safer Chemical Reaction Process Design and Operation." International Symposium on Risk, Reliability and... 

Several qualitative approaches can be used to identify hazardous reaction scenarios, including process hazard analysis, checklists, chemical interaction matrices, and an experience-based review. CCPS (1995a p. 176) describes nine hazard evaluation procedures that can be used to identify hazardous reaction scenarios-checklists, Dow fire and explosion indices, preliminary hazard analysis, what-if analysis, failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), HAZOP study, fault tree analysis, human error analysis, and quantitative risk analysis. 

The authors of this excellent book provide a concise but comprehensive review of various types of weapons of mass destruction, along with sound advice and simple actions that can be taken by emergency responders and the general public to reduce risks and avoid panic in the event of a terrorist attack. By simply reading through this book, emergency responders and the public will learn what they can do to minimize danger to health and life after an attack. The most important actions are summarized at the end of the book. This summary becomes a convenient checklist. 

The PHA procedure can be conducted using various methodologies. For example, the checklist analysis discussed earlier is an effective methodology. In addition, Pareto analysis, relative ranking, pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA), change analysis, failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, event and CF charting, PrHA, what-if analysis, and HAZOP can be used in conducting the PHA. 

ERPs do not necessarily need to be one document. They may consist of an overview document, individual emergency action procedures, checklists, additions to existing operations manuals, appendices, etc. There may be separate, more detailed plans for specific incidents. There may be plans that do not include particularly sensitive information and those that do. Existing applicable documents should be referenced in the ERP (e.g., chemical Risk Management Program, contamination response). 

Avoidance of errors in sample preparation (extraction, derivatization) could be minimized by rigorous training of laboratory personnel, including appreciation of the patient behind each anonymous test tube. An environment free of noise and distractions is required to minimize the risk of serial solvent extractions being pooled in the wrong tube redundant labeling of glassware and step-by-step checklists are also critical elements of error prevention and detection. 

Methods for performing hazard analysis and risk assessment include safety review, checklists, Dow Fire and Explosion Index, what-if analysis, hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis, and event tree analysis. Other methods are also available, but those given are used most often. 

Anyone who prescribes long-term glucocorticoids should have a checklist in mind of the undesired effects that they can exert, both during treatment and on withdrawal, so that any harm that occurs can be promptly detected and countered. The main groups of risks arising from long-term treatment with glucocorticoids are summarized in Table 2. 

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