Checklist analysis risk assessment

Process Hazards Analysis. Analysis of processes for unrecogni2ed or inadequately controUed ha2ards (see Hazard analysis and risk assessment) is required by OSHA (36). The principal methods of analysis, in an approximate ascending order of intensity, are what-if checklist failure modes and effects ha2ard and operabiHty (HAZOP) and fault-tree analysis. Other complementary methods include human error prediction and cost/benefit analysis. The HAZOP method is the most popular as of 1995 because it can be used to identify ha2ards, pinpoint their causes and consequences, and disclose the need for protective systems. Fault-tree analysis is the method to be used if a quantitative evaluation of operational safety is needed to justify the implementation of process improvements. 

The PHA procedure can be conducted using various methodologies. For example, the checklist analysis discussed earlier is an effective methodology. In addition, Pareto analysis, relative ranking, pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA), change analysis, failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, event and CF charting, PrHA, what-if analysis, and HAZOP can be used in conducting the PHA. 

Methods for performing hazard analysis and risk assessment include safety review, checklists, Dow Fire and Explosion Index, what-if analysis, hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis, and event tree analysis. Other methods are also available, but those given are used most often. 

Allowing time in the early stages of design for critical reviews and evaluation of alternatives would involve studies such as an early hazard and operability (HAZOP) study, using flowsheets, before final design begins,4 Fault tree analysis, quantitative risk assessment (QRA), checklists, audits, and other review and checking techniques can also be very helpful. These techniques are extensively discussed in the technical literature and will not be discussed in detail here. 

Sampling/Analysis Checklist. This module of Risk Assistant, developed specifically for the review of Superfund risk assessments, prompts the user to consider key issues in quality assurance and quality control for sampling conducted at a waste site. It provides a concise summary of whether the standards developed under EPA s Superfund program have been met. 

The Information System of Logistics has been used for the choice of a mUitary installation to examine risks of occupational exposure to NIEMR. Checklist Analysis method (Dickert, T.G. 1974) has been applied for identifying NIEMR sources and traditional brainstorming (Beranek, Z. et al. 1996) for qualitative risk assessment. 

In ANSI/ASSE Z590.3—2011, the Prevention through Design standard, Addendum G comments on only eight hazard analysis and risk assessment techniques, intentionally. They are Preliminary Hazard Analysis, What-If Analysis, Checklist Analysis, What-If Checklist Analysis, Hazard and Operability Analysis, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, and Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT). It was also said in Z590.3 that ... 

HAZOP and what-if/safety checklists perform the same function as the hazard analysis in the risk assessment process. 

The fault identification process is detailed in Chapter 5 of this PCSR. Fault identification is based on the use of fault checklists, which are augmented by operating experience and consideration of the APIOOO design. These checklists inform the design basis assessment, the probabilistic risk assessment and the severe accident analysis. 

Process hazard analysis. See also PSM fProcess Safety Management Risk assessment RMP fRisk Management Planl. checklists, 866... 

After evaluating the planned barriers as well as the influencing factors, then, the assessment of the occupational hazards within the defined susceptible hazards/risks exposed area need to be performed. The susceptible hazards/risks exposed area can be defined as per expert s judgement (opinions) and past experience. For example, a checklist analysis which is an experience based approach, can be used to identify known types of occupational hazards, potential accident situations, or design deficiencies (Neogy et al., 1996). Thereafter, the hazards needs to be classified as well as prioritise based on the standards, regulations and statutory requirements. 

Many methods have been developed that are suitable for assessing risks associated with the operation of facilities involving chemical reactivity hazards. The more commonly used methods are summarized in Table 4.9. They differ in their applicability, level of effort, and how systematic they are in identifying accident scenarios. All of the methods except layer of protection analysis (LOPA) may be applied qualitatively, and all except checklist reviews may be performed in at least a semiquantitative manner. CCPS (1992a) is a basic source of information on each of these methods. 

What-lf Hazard Analysis. This hazard assessment method utilizes a series of questions focused on equipment, processes, materials, and operator capabilities and limitations, including possible operator failures, to determine that the system is designed to a level of acceptable risk. Users of the What-If method would identify possible unwanted energy releases or exposures to hazardous environments. Bulletin 135 contains procedures for use of a What-If checklist. For some hazards, a What-If checklist will be inadequate and other hazard analysis methods may be used. 

A management-risk analysis method would not only inform safety cases, it would also be complimentary to an organisation s audit function. For example, a checklist to inform audits could be made of processes or activities that are deemed particularly risky or that rely on assumptions in which there is limited confidence. In addition, the frequency or thoroughness of audits and the focus of safety assessments may also be increased for parts of a management system that are considered similarly risky, or whose failures could lead to particularly severe consequences. In these ways, both the efficiency and the effectiveness of audits and safety assessments could be improved. 

Conducting Risk Analysis—Assessment Formats 6.5.1 Safety Strategy Checklist... 

---