Pipeline safety

Code of Federal Kegulations Tide 49, Transportation, Parts 100 to 199 Superintendent of Documents GPO Washington, D.C. 20402 Safety regulations related to transportation of ha2ardous materials and pipeline safety. 

Before the creation of the U.S. DOT in 1967, the now defunct ICC was authorized to prescribe rules and regulations for rad, tmck, and pipeline safety. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was responsible for air safety, and the U.S. Coast Guard for safety on the inland and coastal waterways. Upon estabHshment of DOT in 1967, the FAA and Coast Guard were transferred to the DOT, which assumed the safety functions the ICC formerly adrninistered. 

Identify hazardous or regulated raw materials, intermediates, products and wastes that fall under OSHA, resource conservation and recovery act (RCRA), Department of Transportation (DOT) pipeline safety regulations or other impacting regulations. 

First aid at work. Approved Code of Practice and guidance A guide to the Gas Safety (ManagementJ Regulations 1996 A guide to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996... 

This report is by Battelle Columbus Division to the Line Pipe Research Supervisory Committee of the American Gas Association. It presents an analysis of statistical data obtained from reports of lea)c or rupture (service) incidents and test failures in natural gas transmission and gathering lines over the 14.5 year period from 1970 through June, 1984. All gas transmission companies were required to notify the Office of Pipeline Safety Operations in the event of a "reportable" incident, as defined by the Code of Federal Regulations. The purpose of the study is to organize the reportable incident data into a meaningful format from which the safety record of the industry can be assessed. 

In the United States, pipeline transport is regulated by the Department of TransporUition (DOT) through the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 and... 

The primary objective of gas odorization is safety. Odorization serves as a warning in the detection of natural gas in air before it reaches combustible levels. Certain federal pipeline safety regulations require that combustible gases in pipelines be detectable at one-fifth of the lower explosive limit by a person with a normal sense of smell, either by the natural odor of the gas or by means of artificial odorization [574]. Therefore the proper odorization and odorants are integral parts of safety [813,1753]. 

Controlling Authority DOT/PHMSA (Over-road Transport, Pipeline Safety)... 

The PSA of 1987 is currently promulgated by the DOT Office of Pipeline Safety under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act as summarized in Table 2.3. Petroleum releases are addressed under 40 CFR Part 195 which is subdivided into six subparts (Subparts A through F). Although these regulations apply to pipeline facilities and the transportation of hazardous liquids associated with those facilities in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, they do not apply to transportation of hazardous liquids via the following ... 

In addition to carbon sequestration, technologies that would provide economic benefits include those that enhance oil recovery, produce coalbed methane, and maintain pressures in depleted gas reservoirs to avoid surface subsidence. Currently, companies in the United States sell one billion standard cubic feet of C02 each day, or approximately the C02 output from one conventional coal-fired electric power plant with a power capacity of 2300 MW. This C02 is used economically and with little or no environmental impact for approximately 70 enhanced oil recovery projects and for other industrial applications. Pipeline specifications for C02 quality, pipeline safety issues, and custody of the C02 have a base of industrial experience that goes back to the 1970s. Today, there are operating C02 pipelines of up to 760 mm (30 inches) in diameter and 640 km (400 miles) in length (Fig. 6-6). 

Historical experience with pipeline failures reveals that the two single most common causes for failures are outside forces and corrosion. There are variations in individual systems. Accordingly, a significant part of the effort in achieving better pipeline safety is corrosion control and damage prevention directed at outside forces. The other causes of pipeline failure, individually, contribute to a much smaller proportion of pipeline incidents, but they are still addressed because their aggregate contribution matters. 

The causes are influenced by the specific attributes of a pipeline system. Good discussions of these be found in the technical literature. As with the causes, the system attributes can also be defined af differenf levels of resolution and different terms are sometimes used by different experts. Fundamentally, however, the major relationships between attributes and causes are commonly understood. Ongoing research continues to refine current knowledge about the relationships and provides a basis for ongoing improvements in pipeline safety practices, whether technical or procedural. 

Besides regulatory development and enforcement, other OPS functions include pipeline safety data analysis based on data collected by OPS through annual and incident reports from the industry and from OPS inspections of pipeline systems, sponsoring of research, and training. 

Two other federal authorities, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the General Accounting Office (GAO), also have a role. The NTSB investigates reportable pipeline incidents to determine the causes and to make recommendations to the OPS for future prevention. The GAO audits the OPS for performance against its mission and makes recommendations for improvements, if needed. A report, issued by GAO in 2000, reviewed progress on pipeline safety issues by the OPS. ... 

The remainder of this entry discusses the role of industry standards and regulations in pipeline safety, technical factors, and other issues related to pipeline safety. 

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