Hazards entry

Toluene Clear, colorless liquid with a slight fire hazard and moderate explosion hazard. Entry into the body is mostly by vapor inhalation. Acute and chronic exposures occur with concentrations greater than 200 ppm. Irritant to skin and eyes. 

The ERRSYS database is scanned for hazardous entries by safety personnel. All this information then serves as input for the hazard log. 

We expect the former to be relatively straightforward. For the latter, the goal is to set up appropriate reusable data for the post-deployment assessment process. This includes reusable artefacts such as hazard entries and derived safety requirements, but also specific versions of the assessment process for particular types of training scenario. 

Entry and exit hazards. Entry and exit time is of major significance as a physical limitation and is directly related to the potential hazard of the confined space. The extent of precautions taken and the standby equipment needed to maintain a safe work area will be determined by the means of access and rescue. The following should be considered ... 

For each new hazard, a system/hazard cross reference analysis is carried out. With this task, the applicability of a new hazard is investigated for each system under the supervision of the hazard log. This analysis results in the adaptations of the primary hazard entries, and initiates the respeetive project specific actions. 

Included ia the OSHA regulations are standards for safe work practices such as lock-out/tag-out and confined space entry, personal protective equipment, storage of hazardous materials, welding process, forklift operation, and requirements for fire protection. Basically, all activities within a chemical facihty are covered by OSHA standards. 

The consumption of oxygen due to atmospheric corrosion of sealed metal tanks may cause a hazard, due to oxygen-deficiency affecting persons on entry. 

System designers often think dampers bloek airflow and are suitable to prevent baek drafts in idle towers. This is not the ease. Airfoil dampers simply hamper fan housing efficiency- they do not block airflow. Air Inlet Screens are always part of blow through, counterflow towers to protect people from rotating equipment. Some designs can be a hazard when accessible from the underside and require the specifier to call out additional screening. They can be a worthwhile accessory when there are nearby trees even when not required for safety reasons. Air inlet screens should be eliminated on towers utilizing inlet ductwork. Inlet ductwork may also make it necessary to block extraneous air entry such as from the underside when towers are elevated. 

Chemical information is compiled in this volume in accordance with an alphabetical listing based on the most commonly used chemical name. The most common chemical name designation is based either on (1) that designation specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Titles 46 and 49, or (2) a common name for those chemicals known to be hazardous during shipment. As such, for most common names, the shipping name recommended by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is used as it appears in Title 49 of the CFRs. For each chemical entry, there are five data or information fields that are provided. These information fields are as follows ... 

Provisions must be made to ensure worker protection for a process located in a containment building. For example, the atmosphere in the containment structure should be monitored for hazardous vapors, operations should be remotely controlled from outside the containment structures, access should be restricted, and proper personal protective equipment should be used when entry into the containment structure becomes necessary. 

Controls degree of work exposure Protective clothing Head, eye, hand, and foot protection Additional protection (e.g., hearing) and hazard Expedites quick entry and response Reduces worker efficiency Requires professional health and safety coverage Requires specialized training certifications Generates waste... 

Not all existing procedures or program elements of the overall health and safety program need to be incorporated into the HASP. For example, if noise is a hazard, the plan does not have to cite the entire hearing conservation program. Procedures already established elsewhere may be referenced, as applicable. In another example, if a confined-space-entry procedure is required, the HASP could reference the particular procedure which is part of the overall program. The next step would be to identify confined spaces at the worksite where the procedure applies, and then provide appropriate implementation procedures (e.g., conditions to be monitored, evaluation of the space, issuance of an entry permit). If special operational procedures apply to the worksite, they can be attached to the HASP using an appendix. 

The contractors SSAHPs at Sites B, F, and K had general confined space provisions but lacked site-specific confined space procedures. For example, SSAHPs for the Site K contractor and subcontractor had written confined space entry programs, but the programs did not establish site-specific rescue procedures or identify the confined space hazards present on the site. The job hazard analyses for both programs failed to address site maintenance tasks that could involve confined space entry and hot work hazards. The programs also failed to identify the specific person or position responsible for supervising confined space entry procedures and the location of permit-required confined spaces on site. Interviews with both contractors indicated confusion about rescue procedures. 

Similarly, the Site B contractor s SSAHP provided corporate policy and procedures for permit-required confined space entry but lacked the site-specific detail necessary to describe the application of the corporate policy to procedures at the site. For example, the SSAHP did not identify specific components of the thermal treatment unit that presented confined space hazards, nor did it describe the specific circumstances or procedures that would require employee entry into these areas. In addition, the plan stated that the contractor would maintain an onsite employee confined space rescue team, but did not identify the members of this team. The SSAHP for Site F also contained a generic confined space entry program but did not identify the specific location of confined space hazards present at the site. 

The contractors SSAHPs at Sites I and K required that safety and health program inspections be conducted however, these requirements were not effectively implemented at either of these sites. Both Site K contractors required the HSO to conduct daily inspections, and both stated in their written plans that hazards would be immediately corrected. Neither contractor, however, had established hazard abatement procedures to ensure the prompt correction of hazards, and site records for both contractors indicated that hazard abatement activities were either not documented or not completed. For example, the subcontractor s daily safety log contained several notations of safety hazards, including an unstable concrete well and storage of diesel cans near the propane tank however, later log entries and site records did not track the abatement of these hazards. 

Contract employees must perform their work safely. Considering that contractors often perform very specialized and potentially hazardous tasks, such as confined space entry activities and nonroutine repair activities, their work must be controlled while they are on or near a process covered by PSM. A permit system or work authorization system for these activities is helpful for all affected employers. The use of a work authorization system keeps an employer informed of contract employee activities. Thus, the employer has better coordination and more management control over the work being performed in the process area. 

Nonroutine work eondueted in proeess areas must be eontrolled by the employer in a eonsistent manner. The hazards identified involving the work to be aeeomplished must be eommunieated to those doing the work and to those operating personnel whose work eould aflfeet the safety of the proeess. A work authorization notiee or permit must follow a proeedure that deseribes the steps the maintenanee supervisor, eontraetor representative, or other person needs to follow to obtain the neeessary elearanee to start the job. The work authorization proeedures must referenee and eoordinate, as applieable, loekout/tagout proeedures, line breaking proeedures, eonfined spaee entry proeedures, and hot work authorizations. This proeedure also must provide elear steps to follow onee the job is eompleted to provide elosure for those who need to know the job is now eompleted and that equipment ean be returned to normal. 

Safe work practices for hazards control lockout/tagout, confined space entry, procedures for opening process boundaries and entrance control for maintenance... 

The hazards of management-controlled nonroutine work in the process areas must be communicated to affected individuals. The work permit prescribes the procedures that must be followed to get the permit. Work authorization procedures specify lockout/tagout, line breaking., confined space entry, and hot work authorization through clear steps leading to job completion, closure, and return to normal. 

The MSDS from the chemical manufacturer identifies hazards for entry in the spreadsheet in columns 8 and 10. This is performed for all chemicals that are associated with the process, if the analysis is hmited to a process, or for a plant. The spreadsheet may be filled out variously according to convenience and effectiveness. It is practically impossible to get all needed information from documentation alone. A plant walk-through is advised for viewing operating conditions as they exist, for interviewing operators about the risk concerns that they have, and about the operability of safety and mitigation systems. These results are entered into the spreadsheet. 

Before entry is allowed into a vessel or other confined space, the vessel should be isolated from sources of hazardous material by slip-plating or physically disconnecting all pipelines and by isolating all supplies of electricity, preferably by disconnecting the cables. On the whole, these precautions seem to be followed. Accidents as the result of a failure to isolate are less common than those resulting from a failure to remove hazardous materials or from their deliberate reintroduction as described in Sections 11.1 and 11.2. However, the following are typical of the accidents that have occurred. 

The number of reactions that can run away is enormous, Bretherick s Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards [1] lists about 4,700 chemicals that have been involved in hazardous reactions of one sort or another, and there are more than 20,000 cross-references to entries involving more than one chemical. It is an essential work of reference for the chemist, the process engineer, and everyone involved in process safety. All I can do here is give a few examples to illustrate the reasons why runaways occur. 

The successes of the traditional approach have largely been obtained in the area of occupational safety, where statistical evidence is readily available concerning the incidence of injuries to individuals in areas such as tripping and falling accidents. Such accidents are amenable to behavior modification approaches because the behaviors that give rise to the accident are under the direct control of the individual and are easily predictable. In addition, the nature of the hazard is also usually predictable and hence the behavior required to avoid accidents can be specified explicitly. For example, entry to enclosed spaces, breaking-open process lines, and lifting heavy objects are known to be potentially hazardous activities for which safe methods of work... 

In the process of identifying chemical health hazards, tlie near term and long tenn fate of tlie hazard should be incorporated into tlie analysis. Near-term concerns relate primarily to tlie release of the chemical into the enviromnent. This leads to the general subject area of e.xposure assessment, including routes of e.xposure - a topic that is treated in e.xtensive detail in Cliapter 12. However, tlie fate of the chemical (hazard) following tlie point of human entry is another consideration when attempting to identify health hazards. An overview of tliis topic is presented here... 

The process of identifying chemical healtli liazards should also incorporate the near term (release into tlie environment) and long term fate of the chemical health hazard following entry into the human body. Non-carcinogcnic effects include all toxicological responses except tumors. Not all tumors are cancerous. Malignant tumors are cancerous and spread, or metastasize, to surrounding structures. 

For each of the criteria a two-star rating difference between an activity and an adjacent activity is taken to indicate incompatibility. Activities that are hazardous, dirty, noisy or needing good access to the entry/exit gate are consequently rated with many stars. In the site layout they should not be located near other activities with fewer stars because they could adversely affect that activity. However, an activity that is not critical and has a low star rating may be located next to an activity with many stars. 

Two main hazards associated with chemicals are toxicity and flammability. Toxicity measurements in model species and their interpretation are largely the province of life scientists. Chemical engineers can provide assistance in helping life scientists extrapolate their resrrlts in the assessment of chemical hazards. Chemical engineers have the theoretical tools to make important contributions to modehng the transport and transformation of chemical species in the body—from the entry of species into the body to their action at the rrltimate site where they exert their toxic effect. Chemical engineers are also more likely than life scientists to appreciate... 

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