Behavioral Safety Measures

Accordingly, the steering committee reviews observation data to ensure that the process achieves the desired outcomes  

What is the percent safe on each checklist practice  

Is the percent safe on practices targeted by improvement projects increasing  

Have some of the safe practices remained near 100 percent for a year or more  

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The somewhat controversial theory of risk homeostasis is relevant to a discussion of risk taking. RHT was developed initially in the area of driving behavior (Wilde, 1984). The theory states that accident rates are not determined by actual levels of intrinsic risk but by the levels of risk acceptable to individuals in the situation. The theory implies that people adjust their risk-taking behavior to maintain a constant level of perceived risk. Thus, if improved safety measures are introduced (e.g., better guarding, improved protection systems then individuals will behave in a more risky fashion in order to maintain their accustomed levels of risk. 

Thus, for the prediction of the behavior of a reactor when there is a cooling failure, the knowledge of the instant at which it is maximum, is an important datum. The assessment of the process safety and the design of safety measures will be based on the MTSR corresponding to the maximum of Tcf ... 

There appears to be little data on commercial quantities of explosives. However, it has been shown that relaxation measurements can be used to correlate with probable electrostatic behavior. Such measurements are easily made with safety, and the method lends itself to a variety of studies, since only a few milh-grams need be used. It should be noted that none of the explosives studied exploded due to the corona discharge, although the charge was estimated to be two to three orders of magnitude greater than would be possible due to normal contact or induction. 

According to the safety culture—oriented organizational behavior, organizational behavior determine individual behavior , the measures should be taken from level of awareness of the safety culture (root cause), the improvement and enforcement of safety rules habits (primary cause) and the training of security acts habits (indirect cause). 

If employees received safety training, without any protective measures at the construction site, major hazards presented or exposed in front of employees directly, resulting in safe environment sensitivity to the staff, and they are always careful. When unsafe behavior occurs, staff will take into account the possible consequences without safety measures subconsciously, and the number and types of unsafe behavior will be relatively reduced. 

The stage for an accidental course of events very likely is prepared through time by the normal efforts of many actors in their respective daily work context, responding to the standing request to be more productive and less costly. Ultimately, a quite normal variation in somebody s behavior can then release an accident. Had this root cause been avoided by some additional safety measure, the accident would very hkely be released by another cause at another point in time. In other words, an explanation of the accident in terms of events, acts, and errors is not very useful for design of improved systems [167]. 

Simon expressed the view that the culture drives the behavior and that a culture change is required for success in behavior-based safety. A culture assessment (such as the Simon Open System Culture Change Model) measures the culture process and impacts on the whole of operations —the technology, tmst, leadership, symbols of the culture, et cetera. He also advised that before a behavior-based initiative is undertaken, management leadership must have been established. That s implicit. This factor cannot be overlooked. These are excerpts from Simon s paper titled The Culture Change Model of Behavioral Safety ... 

The BASICs are seven categories of safety behaviors measured in the CSA Safety Measurement System (SMS). The BASICs represent behaviors that can lead to crashes. 

Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories (BASICs) Seven categories of safety behaviors measured in the Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) Safety Measurement System (SMS). The BASICs represent behaviors that can lead to crashes. The BASICs are unsafe driving, hours-of-service compliance, driver fitness, controlled substances/alcohol, vehicle maintenance, hazardous materials (HM) compliance, and crash indicator. 

More recently, safety people have applied leading, upstream, predictive, activity, preventive or process indicators or metrics to measure safety performance. This family of measures often includes safety audits, behavior-based safety measures, safety perception surveys, safety training, corrective actions completed, reductions in risk and risk factors, identifying safety and ergonomic opportunities, and other measures. Many use leading indicators to do the following ... 

The first type of behavior-related measures that can be used before the fact, or before an accident occurs, is the percentage of safe behaviors observed for an observation time. The greater the percentage of safe behaviors, the smaller the percentage of unsafe behaviors, and, thus, the fewer chances for an accident. Other types of measures related to the performance of safe behaviors involve a number of activity-based measures. Some of these may include monitoring the number of job tasks evaluated for potential hazards and compliance with various safety regulations, the number of job tasks for which safe job procedures have been established, and the amount of safety training provided to workers. 

Identify best measures to track behavioral safety performance... 

Behavioral safety involves measuring safety-related behaviors. Krause notes that the behavioral inventory is how we measure behavioral safety performance. Benefits of using a Critical Safety Behavior inventory for continuous safety improvement include ... 

Other behavior/activity measures include participation in safety meetings, submission of safety suggestions that are implemented, number of near-hit reports over a period of time, number of JSAs performed or updated, and number of safety corrections made from Work Orders or similar avenues. 

As noted earlier, these measures add a proactive dimension to traditional safety measures, which tend to be based on injuries, failures, and mistakes. These behavioral measures are all positive and measure what an organization and individuals achieve and accomplish, rather than their failures. 

Top/mid-level managers. Measurement at this level includes personal behavior, safety activities, and statistical results, for example, following company safety rules, enforcing safety rules, arranging safety training, and monitoring workers compensation costs. 

What you will learn from this book is that people (employees) alter their behavior in response to safety measures, but everyday risk will not change, unless the management system is capable of motivating and allowing employees to alter the amount of risk they are willing to incur. 

Downstream to upstream in real time Behavior-based safety measurements are more than a review of the injury roster. Although recordable and lost-time injuries are one measurement of safety success, they are not the only measure. Looking at injury data is downstream, or reactive. BBS encourages organizations to look upstream at proactive data hke unsafe acts from safety observations, safety audit scores, inspection results, etc. The problem with this proactive data, however, is at least two-fold. 

Inadequate inclusion to the analysis of the positive impact from health and safety measures and proactive human actions. HRA methods, systemically, tend to overlook the effect of precautionary measures, actions and behaviors in the error-making process. This results to the exclusion from HRA of a significant part of the analysis, which renders the whole approach incomplete. 

The autonomous systems of interest to us offer a wide range of features and operate in a diverse unstructured environment. They can thus be complex, which makes them difficult to verify. Moreover, diversity of the environment implies that testing cannot significantly cover the situations that the system will face. Here, we choose a classical fault tolerance approach by considering online safety measures implemented in a device called a safety monitor, that is simple and independent from the main control channel, and thus easier to verify. The monitor is solely responsible for safe system behavior. To this end, the monitor is... 

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