Safe behavior

The traditional safety engineering approach to accident causation focuses on the individual rather than the system causes of error. Errors are primarily seen as being due to causes such as lack of motivation to behave safely, lack of discipline or lack of knowledge of what constitutes safe behavior. These are assumed to give rise to "unsafe acts." These unsafe acts, in combination with "unsafe situations" (e.g., imguarded plant, toxic substances) are seen as the major causes of accidents. 

Modem behavior-modification programs rely on the identification and reinforcement of safe behaviors. Considerable improvements in measures of safety performance have been attributed to the introduction of these approaches (see McSween, 1993, for a petrochemical example). However, other studies have indicated that performance may return to its original level if the programs are withdrawn. It is therefore important to maintain a continuing program to ensure that the initial levels of improvements are maintained. Also, the benefits of behavior modification programs have mainly been demonstrated in the context of work activities where there is a high level of... 

A more comprehensive approach consists of studying the variation of the Semenov criterion as a function of the reaction energy. Such an approach is presented in [12], where the reciprocal Semenov criterion is studied as a function of the dimensionless adiabatic temperature rise. This leads to a stability diagram similar to those presented in Figure 5.2 [11, 13]. The lines separating the area of parametric sensitivity, where runaway may occur, from the area of stability is not a sharp border line it depends on the models used by the different authors. For safe behavior, the ratio of cooling rate over heat release rate must be higher than the potential of the reaction, evaluated as the dimensionless adiabatic temperature rise. 

The remainder of this appendix contains discussions of several safety issues pertinent to physical chemistry and a brief description of safety equipment. Such information serves as a starting point for safe laboratory practices. The authors do not claim that this treatment includes a discussion of every conceivable hazard or establishes legal standards for safe behavior in the laboratory. The primary literature and specialized sources of safety information should be consulted. An extensive list of such sources is given at the end of this appendix. 

Many of our childhood experiences are this dramatic, and there are many more that aren t as dramatic, but make up in frequency what they lack in individual intensity. Is it any wonder that you wall off your essential self That you lose touch with your essence and replace it with safe behaviors, habits, learned feelings The safety of your defense is an illusion, of course, for any position that isolates you from knowing what is really happening in your world leads to actions that are flawed. And your life now has a constant undercurrent of anxiety from a new worry suppose the defenses break down ... 

Importance of positive recognition to influence job safety, why people take risks, human behavior, rewarding safe behavior, and improving communication. 

Instructions provide direction to employees that will help them to avoid or deal more effectively with hazards. They are the behavioral model that can be followed to ensure safety. The basis of good instructions is the job analysis, which provides detailed information on the job tasks, environment, tools, and materials used. The job analysis will identify high-risk situations. Based on verification of the information in the job analysis, a set of instructions on how to avoid hazardous situations can be developed. The implementation of such instructions as employee behavior will be covered in the next section under training and safe behavior improvement. 

As a final note on tools which might be used to select new employees, there are number of products on the market which claim to predict safely behaviors and safety-related outcomes. Providers of these assessment tools vary greatly in the claims that are made about their tools ability to predict employee safety behavior, and the degree of research based evidence which they provide to support these claims. Organizations using these products need to examine very carefully the nature of the instrument/measure, and the evidence that it is a valid predictor. As with other selection assessments, employees are likely to assume such measures will operate in a valid and reliable way. 

Employees in a strong safety culture, their behavior will naturally regulate the rules of this security values and safe behavior. To create a corporate safety culture, the following activities are feasible. 

STOP card, unsafe behavior is rectified and safe behavior is enforced. 

Target of STOP is human, whereas safety check includes human, thing etc. STOP emphasizes on two ways communication. Personnel are active. Whereas in safety check personnel checked is passive. For STOP, all personnel can be observation men, whereas for safety check only specialist and managerial personnel can be observation men. STOP both affirm safe behaviors and rectify unsafe behaviors safety check only aims to thing unsafe situation and human unsafe behavior. 

STOP can get personnel to learn that back of safe or unsafe situation substantively means human behavior. Safe behavior can bring up safety situation, in the converse, unsafe behavior can bring up unsafe situation. STOP can not only observe own unsafe behaviors but also observe others unsafe behavior. Safety knowledge and experience are shared each other. After STOP applied in safety management in coal mine, unsafe behavior clearly decrease. Safety consciousness of personnel evidently enhanced. 

Lu Diankun, et al. 2009. Research on human safe behavior[J]. Coal Mine Modernization 63(6) 82-83. 

M Fleming R Lardner 2002. Strategies to promote safe behavior as part of a health and safety management system [M]. Edinburgh the Keil Centre. 

According to the model of safe behavior, the unsafe behavior of the people and subject are the causes for the accident together. Accident statistics show that in the world, 70% 80% have a direct link to human wrong and unsafe operation. It is one of the important hazards to people s life and seriously endanger the normal operation of production and operation enterprises Lut-ness even said that 95% of accidents are caused by people s unsafe behaviors - In China, coal mines for unsafe operation behavior is also an important cause of the accident, 97.67% are caused by people s unsafe behavior. So how to take effective measures to control the happening of unsafe behavior is the most important thing. 

Safety and loss prevention professionals are always striving to modify employees unsafe behaviors to acceptable or safe behaviors. In essence, safety and loss prevention professionals are always searching for ways to communicate the concepts and ideas of safety and loss prevention to their employees so that they can identify and adopt such safe behaviors, replacing unsafe behaviors. 

Assumption 4 Most accidents are caused by operator error. Rewarding safe behavior and punishing unsafe behavior will eliminate or reduce accidents significantly. 

Operators use feedback to update their mental models of the system as the system evolves. The only way for the operator to determine that the system has changed and that his or her mental model must be updated is through experimentation To learn where the boundaries of safe behavior currently are, occasionally they must be crossed. 

Humans and organizations can adapt and still maintain safety as long as they stay within the area bounded by safety constraints. But in the search for optimal operations, humans and organizations will close in on and explore the boundaries of established practice. Such exploration implies the risk of occasionally crossing the limits of safe practice unless the constraints on safe behavior are enforced. 

Most accidents are caused by operator error. Rewarding safe behavior and punishing unsafe behavior will eliminate or reduce accidents significantly. Operator error is a product of the environment in which it occurs. To reduce operator error we must change the environment in which the operator works. 

While events reflect the ejfects of dysfunctional interactions and inadequate enforcement of safety constraints, the inadequate control itself is only indirectly reflected by the events—the events are the result of the inadequate control. The control structure itself must be examined to determine why it was inadequate to maintain the constraints on safe behavior and why the events occurred. 

Inadequate Control Algorithms This level of the accident analysis provides an interesting example of the difference between prescribed procedures and established practice, the adaptation of procedures over time, and migration toward the boundaries of safe behavior. Because of the many helicopter missions that ran from Diyarbakir to Zakhu and back, the controllers testified that it did not seem worth... 

---