Active protection systems location

A large number of parameters are involved in the choice of the corrosion protection system and the provision of the proteetion eurrent these are deseribed elsewhere (see Chapters 6 and 17). In partieular, for new locations of fixed production platforms, a knowledge of, for example, water temperature, oxygen content, conductivity, flow rate, chemical composition, biological activity, and abrasion by sand is useful. Measurements must be carried out at the sea location over a long period, so that an increased margin of safety can be calculated. 

An arming station, which is the main user interface with the security system, allows the user to arm (turn on), disarm (turn off), and communicate with the system. How a specific system is armed will depend on how it is used. For example, while IDSs can be armed for continuous operation (twenty-four hours/day), they are usually armed and disarmed according to the work schedule at a specific location so that personnel going about their daily activities do not set off the alarms. In contrast, fire protection systems are typically armed twenty-four hours/day. 

Some aspects of the proposed Rbr/Rbo oxidative stress defense system in D. vulgaris resemble those recently suggested for oxidative stress protection in the anaerobic hyperthermophilic archaeon Pyrococcus furiosus (Jenney et al. 1999). Pyrococcus furiosus contains an Nlr-like protein with superoxide reductase activity as well as an Rbr, the genes for which are tandemly located. The microorganismic segregation of SOD/catalase between aerobes and anaerobes appears to be less distinct than for Rbo/Rbr, which, as noted above, have so far been found only in air-sensitive microbes (Kirschvink et al. 2000). The latter segregation suggests that the Rbo/Rbr oxidative stress protection system is well suited to protection of anaerobic life in an aerobic world. 

The required protection may be obtained by active, passive, or a combination of both protection systems. For example, steel support located in a fire exposed area within process unit battery limits may be protected by either a fixed water spray system or the application of fire resistant insulating material to the steelwork or possibly both. Note Passive protection is generally the preferable method for protecting structural steel. 

The fire protection system consists not only of a deluge system activated by the ultraviolet sensors, but also of fusible link type fire systems. The deluge system has a trip mechanism from mercury checks activated by heat-activated-devices, a manual release on the deluge valve, a pneumatic remote trip station, and an electrical push button along with the electrical trip mechanism from the U/V detectors. The remote trip stations are located by escape routes so it is possible for the operator to trip the systems as he exits the building without exposing himself to further danger. 

This technique is mostly applied for the detection of spatial defects in anodic or cathodic protection systems on complex structures or components. Thus, attempts have been made to detect single locations in components that are usually passive but which may undergo some form of active corrosion in particular areas such as welds, crevices, pits, cracks, etc. 

Accidental activation of some controls can lead to serious consequences. There are several methods for protecting controls from accidental activation include recessing, location, orientation, covering, locking, operational sequences, and resistance. A desirable design may include a combination of methods. The appUcation and potential consequences of accidental activation will affect the methods selected and used. If accidental activation leaves a system in a safe condition, rigorous protective methods are not as important. If accidental activation can produce a serious accident or injury, prevention of accidental activation is critical. 

In case of failure to actuate the electromechanical protection system, reactor shutdown is accomplished by the emergency boron injection system (Fig 7.2.2.). Activation of the system is possible by opening valves in the pipelines connecting the system to the reactor or by rupture of a membrane with simultaneous opening of check valves in the drain line by direct action of the pressure in the reactor. The boron solution is supplied by gravity due to the location of the system tanks above the reactor. 

The preaction system. In libraries, museums, or other locations where special contents may be housed, the preaction sprinkler system must be used. Any operation of the sprinkler system in the absence of fire would be devastating to the building contents. Most fire safety professionals identify two events that must take place in order to activate the system. First, the heat of a fire will melt the fusible link in the sealed sprinkler heads. Second, a detector must open the deluge valve to admit the water. In the absence of either of these two events, the sprinkler system will not function. The biggest disadvantage of this system is the cost. However, when contents of great value must be protected, the expense of a preaction system may not be restrictive. 

The Brio refining site is approximately 58 acres in size and is the location of a former chemical production, recovery, refinery, and regeneration facility. The site includes closed impoundments into which hazardous substances were disposed in bulk, storage tanks, and approximately 1,750 drums of hazardous substances. Remediation activities included the excavation and incineration of contaminated soil, installation of protective liners around selected pits, and the installation of a groundwater extraction system adjacent to a gully. 

Hydrants should be considered as a backup water supply source to monitors and fixed fire suppression systems. Hydrants should be located on the ring main at intervals to suitably direct water on the fire hazard with a fire hose. Hydrants monitors and hose reels should be placed a minimum of 15 meters (50 ft.) from the hazard they protect for onshore facilities. Hydrants in process areas should be located so that any portion of a process unit can be reached from at least two opposite directions with the use of 76 meters (250 ft), hose lines if the approach is made from the upwind side of the fire. Offshore hydrants are located at the main accessways at the edge of the platform for each module. Normal access into a location should not be impeded by the placement of monitors or hydrants. This is especially important for heavy crane access during maintenance and turnaround activities. 

For means of protection, the use of water based suppression systems may be a hazard due to the disposal of firewater water, which will freeze quite readily in exposed locations. This may also be the case with exposed hydrocarbon fluid lines that, if isolated, say for an ESD activation, may freeze up due to lack of circulation. This will hamper restart operations for the facility. Typical use in the past has been the reliance on gases fire suppression agents for enclosed area, particularly Halon. Other methods include fire water storage tanks that are kept warm, together with fire mains deeply buried and continually circulated. 

Wet or dry chemical fixed suppression systems are typically provided over the kitchen cooking appliances and in exhaust plenums and ducts. Activation means is afforded by fusible links located in the exhaust ducts/plenums usually rated at 232°C (450°F). Manual activation means should not be provided near the cooking area, but in the exit routes from the facility. The facility fire alarm should sound upon activation of the fixed suppression system and power or gas to the cooking appliances should be automatically shut off. The ventilation system should also be shut down by the activation of the fire alarm system. Protective caps should be provided on the suppression nozzles to prevent plugging from grease or cooking particulates. 

The size of the system should be limited to avoid overtaxing the fire water drainage systems. For locations with multiple systems it is common to activate 3 or 4 systems to ensure adequate protection. Many designers use 2,000 gpm (7,571 Ipm) and 65 psi (207 kPa) as a reasonable limit on size to avoid the issues discussed... 

If trained to do so and confident that you are capable, activate any fire monitors and/or fixed fire water systems in the immediate area and attempt to cool the tank and surrounding equipment. If the tank is receiving material or product, close a valve on the inlet line at a safe location. Stand by to direct the Emergency Response Team (ERT) to scene Use appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) First Responder... 

The sulfuric acid plant has boiler blowdown and cooling tower blowdown waste streams, which are uncontaminated. However, accidental spills of acid can and do occur, and when they do, the spills contaminate the blowdown streams. Therefore, neutralization facilities should be supplied for the blowdown waste streams (Table 15), which involves the installation of a reliable pH or conductivity continuous-monitoring unit on the plant effluent stream. The second part of the system is a retaining area through which non-contaminated effluent normally flows. The detection and alarm system, when activated, causes a plant shutdown that allows location of the failure and initiation of necessary repairs. Such a system, therefore, provides the continuous protection of natural drainage waters, as well as the means to correct a process disruption. 

---