Traffic safety legislation

In this chapter we demonstrated the absurdity of NHTSA s claim that all of the 39 percent decline in the total fatality rate since 1966 can be attributed to its regulatory programs. We have seen instead that some of the decline can be attributed to NHTSA programs, but that other important factors exist as well. An optimistic current estimate is that some indication exists that NHTSA also is aware that a comprehensive framework is necessary for policy evaluation. In Traffic Scfety 84, the successor to Motor Vehicle Safety 1979, NHTSA again describes the downward trend in the fatality rate since 1966 when federal traffic safety legislation was passed. However, in the 1984 report only partial credit is claimed for the reduction in the fatality rate. Acknowledgment is given to many factors only one of which is the set of auto safety standards. An individual net benefit approach to traffic safety facilitates systematic consideration and analysis of all of the factors. 

Level of Motorisatioo Low Direct safely measures Personal Risk Trafic Risk Indirect safely measures Road safe statistics Road safety trend Road safety R D Road safety organisation Road safety program Road safety legislation Traffic police Driver education Alcohol In traffic Speed Seat belts Road standard Paved roads... 

The site manager should arrange for suitable plant and equipment to be provided so that the work can be executed to the standards required by health and safety legislation, in particular the Control of Asbestos at Work Regulations 2002. It may be necessary for the local authority and the police to be consulted about the proposed demolition so that issues of public protection, local traffic management and possible road closures can be addressed. There should be liaison with the occupiers of adjacent properties because, in some cases, they may need to be evacuated. 

Evaluative review of modern traffic safety policy, especially automobile safety standards, yields several results. The technological approach, the basis for the 1966 legislation, is shown to produce mistakes. Benefits are overestimated and endangerment of nonoccupants is ignored. The risk homeostatic approach, the devil s idea to some in the safety community, is shown to be a limiting case of the more general individual net benefit approach. Rationality and competency in travelers safety decisions are reviewed in a broad context. Evidence beyond the realm of behavioral... 

This seems to us to describe well why Australia s traffic safety efforts relied so heavily for so long on legislation/regulation, enforcement, and supporting public education and substantially underinvested in safe infrastructure and safe vehicles. Without a political and institutional safety culture, there will not be stretch targets, and without stretch targets there will not be optimal policies and practices. 

Although there are many attempts have been made to describe road accident problem, I used to describe the problem as a disease where the causes of road accidents are symptoms as (illness). The road safety problem is a sign of illness in society. To diagnose the problem, there are direct and indirect symptoms (causes). The direct symptoms in road safety can be easily seen in society from simple observation and data such as speed problems, alcohol and driving, vehicle conditions, road user behaviour, etc. The indirect symptoms in road safety are not simply obvious and they need more checking and examination such as the traffic management, education, traffic police enforcement, legislations, etc. 

With the Reich Liability Law, legislation created a basic example of future-oriented liability standards which meet the requirements of an increased hazard potential brought about by modern technology. In the following decades, Articles 7 ff Traffic Law, 33 ff Air Traffic Law. and 25 ff Atomic Energy Law were published. They are further examples of direct or strict liability of great importance to safety engineering. 

Work Zone Safety Information Clearinghouse http //wzsafety.tamu.edu/ (accessed November 3, 2010). This site provides information on the latest developments in U.S. and Canadian legislation, research, government agencies, and public and private organizations relevant to safety in traffic work zones. Spanish language version available. 

Peltzman s article has been criticized on a number of counts, primarily statistical but it did stimulate follow-up investigations. Dr. John Adams of University College, London, UK, for example, compared traffic fatality rates between countries with and without safety-belt use laws. His annual comparisons (from 1970 to 1978) showed dramatic reductions in fatal vehicle crash rates after countries introduced seat-belt use laws. Taken alone this data would lend strong support to seat-belt legislation. But the drop in fatality rates was even greater in countries without safety-belt use laws (Adams, 1985b). Apparently, the large-scale impact of increased use of vehicle safety belts has not been nearly as beneficial as expected from laboratory crash tests. Risk compensation has been proposed to explain this discrepancy. 

Experiences show that in-depth accident investigations provide important experience data from traffic accidents for use in design of vehicles. There are several examples of safety features that originate from these investigations. Many of these featnres have been taken over by the legislators and made mandatory for all trnck manufacturers. 

---