Structural verification software

In this paper, a method of software safety verification at the system level based on STPA is proposed. We investigated the application of the STPA structure to software, and we found that STPA can be directly used for software. We mapped the results of the STPA safety analysis to a formal specification to be able to verify safety requirements at the software code level. The limitation of the method is that the formal specification is done manually which may lead to much effort to construct and check the potential combinations of relevant states. Therefore, we are exploring the automation of this step and integrate it with our A-STPA tool as future work. Furthermore, we plan in-depth case studies to improve the method by applying it to real safety-critical software in industry. We plan also to investigate the effectiveness of using the proposed method during an ISO 26262 life cycle in the automotive industry. 

There are many software tools available to help with the acquisition, processing and interpretation of NMR data. Attempts have been made to automate the verification process and even perform full structural elucidations of unknown compounds. As you might guess from the complexity of the interpretation chapters, these software solutions are not foolproof It remains to be seen whether they ever will be good enough but there have certainly been some major steps forward in all of these areas. 

Once the software installation qualification protocol has been completed, the test results, data, and documentation are formally evaluated. The written evaluation should be presented clearly and in a manner that can be readily understood. The structure of the report can parallel the structure of the associated protocol. The report should also address any nonconformances encountered during the software installation qualification and the resolution. The software installation qualification report summarizes the results of the verification and testing of all technologies that are part of the system. 

Theoretical simulation of mHPs with different wick structures (sintered powder, mesh structure, wire bundle) is an efficient tool to perform the comparisons of mHP efficiency. Experimental verification of mHP parameters proves validity of the simulation software. 

This chapter provides an overview of expert-system verification and validation (V V) techniques. Several methods are presented. First, many of the conventional software V V techniques such as requirements analysis and unit testing can be applied to expert-system development. Second, an expert-system developer can use automated tools to test rule consistency and structure. A more viable alternative, however, is for the developer to create his own set of consistency and completeness tests. Finally, a developer should rely on qualitative judgment to determine the validity of a knowledge base. This judgment could include expert opinion as well as specialized tests designed to determine knowledge-base certification. The chapter suggests that methods should be combined into an optimal mix in order to best undertake V V. 

Fully understanding this accident requires understanding why the error in the roll rate filter constant was introduced in the load tape, why it was not found during the load tape production process and internal review processes, why it was not found during the extensive independent verification and validation effort applied to this software, and why it was not detected during operations at the launch site—in other words, why the safety control structure was ineffective in each of these instances. 

This report presents the implementation of the software independent verification and validation (IV V) for the Distributed Control Information Systems ( DCIS) of the Lungmen Project. It covers the codes and standards as applicable, the scope of the software IV V and the documents reviewed, the organizational structure and activities for performing the IV V work. Furthermore, the problems which were encountered during the implementation are discussed, along with solutions for them. 

All the items of software including documents, data (and its structures) and support software shall be covered by a suitable, readily understood and fully documented configuration management system (CMS) throughout the lifecycle. An item of software or dociunentation shall not be accessible (to persons other than those responsible for its design and verification) imtil it is approved and under configuration... 

The quantum-chemical level simulation was performed to study first steps of fumed silica synthesis from molecules to small silica protopaiticles. Vibrational spectroscopy (infiared and inelastic neutron scattering) was used to verify simulated structures. There is an application of the thesis compute verifiable, verify computable because a lot of modeling methods may produce a lot of results, but how is one to select the more reahstic structure In our opinion the best method of verification is vibrational spectroscopy, especially for small particles and amorphous substances. To perform space structure calculations and evaluations of force field and dipole moments the sophisticated semiempirical quantum-chemical method AMI, with a PM3 parameter set, was used as a software CLUSTER-Zl and COSPECO applied to personal computers [1]. 

Testing that the application software correctly satisfies its test specification is a verification activity. It is the combination of code review and structural testing that provides that the application software module satisfies its associated specification, i.e., it is verified. 

The first step of safety verification is to verify that the software requirements are consistent with or satisfy safety constraints. Safety verification exists to provide evidence that associated risk has been reduced or eliminated [1]. Safety verification is not the same as functional verification. Functional verification assures that the software fully satisfies its specifications, while safety verification uses the results of the safety analysis process to assure that the software meets the safety requirements [20]. The safety verification can be done in two ways [1] (1) static analysis which looks over the code and design documents of the system (e.g. fault tree, formal verification) and (2) dynamic analysis requires the execution of the software to check all of the systems safety features. Static analysis is the same as a structured code review. Systems can be proven to match requirements, but it will not catch any safety states that the requirements miss [Ij. The dynamic analysis has the ability to catch unanticipated safety problems, but it cannot prove that a system is safe (e.g. software testing). 

Probabilistic methods are not commonly used in design practice despite calculation procedures and software products already enable a direct verification of structural reliability. Detailed guidance is provided by the Joint Committee on Structural Safety Probabilistic Model Code, JCSS (2014). 

The objective of this work is to analyze the use of software tools in hardware development for safety-critical systems, from the perspective of potential application of formal approaches to improve product quality. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the stage for the analysis, providing an overview of a design flow for PLD components, with emphasis on design verification. Section 3 outlines the potential impact of tool quality on product safety, and Section 4 discusses specific hardware issues that can still remain unresolved after formal verification of the design. 

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