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Shutdown potential

The total control rod worths are 8071 and 8264 pcm at BOEC and EOEC, respectively. They show a weak dependence on fuel enrichment variation and spectmm changes during bum-up. The total control rod worth implies a sufficient shutdown potential to bring the core to a subcritical state even in the sodium-void cases. The negative reactivity induced by GEM... [Pg.558]

Degradation and durability of a PEM fuel cell or stack can be affected by many internal and external factors, including fuel cell design and assembly, operating conditions (e.g. humidification, temperature, cell voltage), impurities or contaminants in the feeds, environmental conditions (e.g. subffeezing or cold start), and operation modes (e.g. startup, shutdown, potential cycling). [Pg.287]

Main steamline section and weld of the same Unit 4 f600 MW3 as above the weld connects 2 steamline sections of different materials (stainless steel and low-alloy steel) through a transition material section, ahead of the Y-piece where branching of the turbine inlet lines takes place (255 mm internal diameter, 44.5 mm thickness). Ultrasonic inspection pointed out potential integrity problems in the weld. The requirement was again that AE could support safe operation of the weld until the next incoming planned maintenance shutdown. [Pg.71]

Make maintenance planning more flexible, by providing, wherever possible, viable alternatives to unplanned shutdowns and to immediate component replace or repair actions. Increased flexibility of maintenance planning, by conditionally running under surveillance components with potential or incipient stmctural integrity problems, means improved plant availability, reduced energy replacement and maintenance costs. [Pg.75]

Plant Fireproofing. There is a growing practice in the chemical industry of locating principal equipment out of doors and to enclose only a control room where all instmments and control equipment are centered. The control room should be resistant to potential explosion, fire, and toxicity ha2ards of processes in the vicinity. Prompt and ordedy shutdown of processes following a serious incident is essential in order to minimise personnel-injury and property-loss ha2ards (65,66). [Pg.97]

Internal Regenerator Bed Colls. Internal cods generate high overall heat-transfer coefficients [550 W / (m -K)] and typically produce saturated steam up to 4.6 MPa (667 psi). Lower heat fluxes are attained when producing superheated steam. The tube banks are normally arranged horizontally in rows of three or four, but because of their location in a continuously active bubbling or turbulent bed, they offer limited duty flexibdity with no shutdown or start-up potential. [Pg.219]

In selec ting the machines of choice, the use of specific speed and diameter best describe the flow. Figure 10-67 shows the characteristics of the three types of compressors. Other considerations in chemical plant service such as problems with gases which may be corrosive or have abrasive solids in suspension must be dealt with. Gases at elevated temperatures may create a potential explosion hazard, while air at the same temperatures may be handled qmte normally minute amounts of lubricating oil or water may contaminate the process gas and so may not be permissible, and for continuous-process use, a high degree of equipment rehability is required, since frequent shutdowns for inspec tion or maintenance cannot be tolerated. [Pg.923]

Other advantages of gravity beds include flexibility in gas and sohds flow rates and capacities, variable retention times from minutes to several hours, space economy, ease of startup and shutdown, the potentially large number of contacting stages, and ease of control by using the inlet- and exit-gas temperatures. [Pg.1220]

The fact that batch processes are not carried out at steady state conditions imposes broad demands on the control system. The instrumentation and control system have to be selected to provide adequate control for a wide variety of operating conditions and a wide variety of processes. In addition, basic process control and shutdown systems have to deal with sequencing issues. This chapter presents issues and concerns related to safety of instrumentation and control in batch reaction systems, and provides potential solutions. [Pg.6]

Vibration is both a cause of problems and an effect of equipment problems. The potential destructive force of an out-of-balance load has led to setting lower shutdown limits on the magnitude of vibration than other rotating equipment. Flexible connections for process and utility lines become a must so these vibration problems are not transmitted to connected equipment. Flexible hoses with liners having concentric convolutions (bellows type) avoid the sharp points inherent with spiral metallic liners. By avoiding the sharp point the liner is less likely to cut the exterior covering. [Pg.39]

If operating procedures need to be developed from scratch, this could account for a considerable portion of the pre-startup work. If current, valid standard operating procedures exist, and the toll is only introducing a new set of batch instructions, the task becomes simpler. However, it is recommended that the new batch instructions are reviewed simultaneously with the existing startup, shutdown, normal and emergency operating procedures for the equipment to help ensure potential process deviations are examined and addressed. [Pg.86]

Check valves are required in the piping system at any point where backflow of gas after a shutdown has the ability to restart the compressor, running it backwards or, for that matter, even in the normal direction. Reverse rotation is totally bad, as many components of the various compressor types are not designed for reverse rotation, and there is some possibility, generally remote, that the compressor could reach a destructive over speed. Forward rotation is bad primarily because the intent was to stop the compressor, and it is now operating out of control. This is a problem, particularly if the shutdown was caused by a compressor failure indication, and the need to stop was to prevent further damage. In this mode, it is unlikely that the compressor can attain an overspeed condition. An application with a high potential for backflow is the parallel operation of two or more compressors. [Pg.472]

Potential for Plugging the Containment Sump When Recirculation Is Needed transient material and equipment are brought into containment during shutdown. This could increase the potential for plugging the containment sump if an accident requiring recirculation from the containment sump occurs,... [Pg.391]

To develop a safe design, it is necessary to first design and specify all equipment and systems in accordance with applicable codes and standards. Once the system is designed, a process safety shutdown system is specified to assure that potential hazards that can be detected by measuring process upsets are detected, and that appropriate safety actions (normally an automatic shutdown) are initiated. A hazards analysis is then normally undertaken to identify and mitigate potential hazards that could lead to fire, explosion, pollution, or injury to personnel and that cannot be detected as process upsets. Finally, a system of safety management is implemented to assure the system is operated and maintained in a safe manner by personnel who have received adequate training. [Pg.386]

The Chemical Process Industry (CPI) uses various quantitative and qualitative techniques to assess the reliability and risk of process equipment, process systems, and chemical manufacturing operations. These techniques identify the interactions of equipment, systems, and persons that have potentially undesirable consequences. In the case of reliability analyses, the undesirable consequences (e.g., plant shutdown, excessive downtime, or production of off-specification product) are those incidents which reduce system profitability through loss of production and increased maintenance costs. In the case of risk analyses, the primary concerns are human injuries, environmental impacts, and system damage caused by occurrence of fires, explosions, toxic material releases, and related hazards. Quantification of risk in terms of the severity of the consequences and the likelihood of occurrence provides the manager of the system with an important decisionmaking tool. By using the results of a quantitative risk analysis, we are better able to answer such questions as, Which of several candidate systems poses the least risk Are risk reduction modifications necessary and What modifications would be most effective in reducing risk ... [Pg.1]

Major and minor type failures are treated. Minor failures are defined as those which cause (or would have caused) an unscheduled shutdown of equipment for a period of less than 24 hours. A major failure is defined as any failure which results in an unscheduled shutdown for a period tif greater than 24 hours. Safety-related failures were defined as failures which resulted either in a fire, injury, loss of life, or a large lea)c of liquid or gas. To qualify as a safety-related failure, the liquid or gas release had to be large enough to have the potential to injure or have injured plant personnel, or have been severe enough to propagate beyond the immediate area. [Pg.32]

Bums and Hazzan demonstrated tlie use of event tree and fault tree analysis in tlie study of a potential accident sequence leading to a toxic vapor release at an industrial chemical process plant. The initiator of tlie accident sequence studied is event P, the failure of a plant programmable automatic controller. Tliis event, in conjunction willi the success or failure of a process water system (a glycol cooling system) mid an operator-manual shutdown of tlie distillation system produced minor, moderate, or major release of toxic material as indicated in Fig. 21.4.1. The symbols W, G, O represent tlie events listed ... [Pg.618]

For a flare stack to function properly and to handle the capacity that may be required, the flows under emergency conditions from each of the potential sources must be carefully evaluated. These include, but may not be limited to, pressure relief valves and rupture disks, process blowdown for startup, shutdown, upset conditions, and plant... [Pg.528]

Troubleshooting deals with identifying and solving problems. Problems can be immediate or long term and can be associated with off-spec products, poor efficiency, process improvements, capacity increases, or potential shutdown items. Problems can be related to management, operation, hardware and equipment, or process issues. Solutions can include improved operating procedures and training, preventative maintenance, or installation of new equipment or controls. [Pg.234]

Since the aggregate risks from Process Unit 2 are largely the result of single event—brittle fracture—the qualitative hazard assessment identified potential safeguards that could be put in place to prevent a brittle fracture occurrence. It was decided that the best option would be to install an emergency shutdown system in Process Unit 2 to prevent pressuring the nitrogen vapor vessel if a cold temperature situation was present. [Pg.128]

Accident Mitigation 28 Detection of leaks/ruptures 29 Emergency shutdown switch locations 30 Accessibility of isolation valves 31 Potential for fire/explosion in unit affecting other equipment 32 Critical controls, mitigation, communication, and fire protection sy stems functional and accessible after initial explosion or release 33 Back-up power supply/redundant feeds for critical electrical systems 34 Water supply for fire fighting 35 Routing of utilities... [Pg.31]

Hydrocarbon processing facilities pose severe risks with respect to fire, explosions and vessel ruptures. Among the prime methods to prevent and limit the loss potential from such incidents are the provisions of hydrocarbon inventory isolation and removal system. These systems are commonly referred to in the petroleum industry as ESD (emergency shutdown) and depressuring or blowdown. Although most standards and practices acknowledge the need for depressuring capabilities the exact determination of their requirement is not wholly defined. NFPA fire codes and standards rarely mention the subject. [Pg.125]

This problem can be solved partially with careful procedures for cell shutdown, including use of a polarisation current (about 50 A m-2) and flushing of the cathode chamber with nitrogen. In these conditions the cathode works as a hydrogen-evolving electrode at the potential required for protection from chemical attack. This solution, however, requires additional costs, and appears to be rather critical in view of the long lifetime required for industrial application of catalysts. [Pg.129]


See other pages where Shutdown potential is mentioned: [Pg.105]    [Pg.123]    [Pg.97]    [Pg.62]    [Pg.142]    [Pg.269]    [Pg.500]    [Pg.506]    [Pg.8]    [Pg.112]    [Pg.344]    [Pg.303]    [Pg.250]    [Pg.217]    [Pg.818]    [Pg.201]    [Pg.238]    [Pg.50]    [Pg.92]    [Pg.95]    [Pg.119]    [Pg.428]    [Pg.79]    [Pg.110]    [Pg.89]    [Pg.90]    [Pg.125]   


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