Plant Safety Procedures Component

Safety procedures are set of instructions to be followed in certain conditions within the plant lifecycle to keep plant safe (Van, 1999). For more details, let us analyze a sample safety procedure from OSHA (OSHA Publication No. 3132) (see Ref. OSHA Administration) as follows  

Process Safety Information Employers must complete a compilation of a written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the standard 

The abstract of the above safety procedure could be as Safety Procedure is associated with Hazard Analysis Activity as a precondition. Employer is an actor associated with Process Safety Information . This is mapped to the object-oriented modeling approach by using Use Case and Collaboration diagrams. The completing the process safety information prior to conducting Hazard Analysis is implemented as a constraint associated with the Start Hazard Analysis  

Inspeetion/monitoring/checking. Where the unit of the operating 

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This safety audit is used for identifying inputs and material flows, processes and intermediates, and final products - but with special attention paid to human-material/process/equipment interactions that could result in (a) sudden and accidental releases/spills, (b) mechanical failure-based injuries, and (c) physical injuries - cuts, abrasions, and so on, as well as ergonomic hazards. Additional sources of adverse effects/safety problem areas are records/ knowledge of in-plant accidents/near misses, equipment failures, customer complaints, inadequate secondary prevention/safety procedures and equipment (including components that can be rendered non-operable upon unanticipated events), and inadequacies in suppliers of material and equipment or maintenance services. 

This verification is referred to as an operability study [4-20), [4-21], technical safety discussion [4-22J, or PI flow chart review [4-23] and is implemented according to different principles. H. Lawley [4-20] has established a strict system for the procedure. For the detection of the safety-relevant components, he follows the PI flow chart, and for the detection of hazardous plant conditions, a list of code words. H. Ullrich [4-24] describes a different way of proceeding. He applies a series of checklists in a determined sequence to the planning documents to confirm complete technical safety provisions. Individually such checklists are used to examine the completeness of procedure planning and construction documents as well as measuring and control plans. 

Several procedures have been developed to assure quality of the reliability data of NPPs. The utility have been recording reliability data on many areas of reactor plant from more than ten years, in particular on Atucha I PHWR NPP, with more than 20 years of operating experience and unique design. Such data retrieval was increased with the development of the PSA taking into account the scope and the applications of such assessment. Realistic input data for PSA models were necessary, in particular to include common cause failures (CCF) data due to its dominant risk factor on PSA s. The basis and the clear justification of safety related component data is a regulatory requirement. 

Safety historical data has been highlighted as part of the conceptual plant safety model. Figure 3-11 showed the detailed data groups of safety historical data component where safety historical data is divided into two parts plant specifications, which covers all specification changes due to design, operation, or any other process throughout the plant lifecycle and accident/incident data, which includes plant, events, process, equipment, cause, consequence, and procedures in-place. 

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) United Engineering Center 345 East 47th Street New York, NY 10017 The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, under the cognisance of the ASME PoHcy Board, Codes, and Standards, considers the interdependence of design procedures, material selection, fabrication procedures, inspection, and test methods that affect the safety of boilers, pressure vessels, and nuclear-plant components, whose failures could endanger the operators or the pubHc (see Nuclearreactors). It does not cover other aspects of these topics that affect operation, maintenance, or nonha2ardous deterioration. 

Will effective procedures guarantee that your plant can avoid all accidents No, they won t and they can t. However, as a component of your process safety management system, effective use of procedures can reduce the ntimber of accidents caused by hiunan error. Sound management practices encourage written procedures, and regulations now demand them for many processes. The purpose of this book is to make your procedurewriting efforts as productive as possible and to create accurate, efective procedures. 

Safety, on the other hand, is clearly an emergent property of systems Safety can be determined only in the context of the whole. Determining whether a plant is acceptably safe is not possible, for example, by examining a single valve in the plant. In fact, statements about the safety of the valve without information about the context in which that valve is used are meaningless. Safety is determined by the relationship between the valve and the other plant components. As another example, pilot procedures to execute a landing might be safe in one aircraft or in one set of circumstances but unsafe in another. 

The KNGR introduces a lot of brand-new human-machine interface (HMI) design features in nuclear industry of Korea, such as workstation-based control room Large Display Panel whieh provides a bird s view of plant condition the CPS which shows all operation procedures Soft Controls using toueh screen which can control both safety and non-safety components advanced alarm system using prioritization and filtering. 

The MS I group should be required by an administrative procedure to select records which provide a meaningful history of the plant and to retain them throughout the plant s lifetime. Other records that have only a transitory value (such as records on individual components that have been replaced) should be retained either until they cease to serve the purpose for which they were intended or until they are superseded by subsequent records. An important factor that should be considered in selecting records to be retained is their usefulness in assembling reliability data. More information on the retention of records necessary for quality assurance purposes can be found in Ref. [2], in particular in Safety Guide Q3 on Document Control and Records. 

The classification of components in German NPPs was carried out plant-specifically within the framework of the licensing procedure based on the BMI safety criteria for NPPs and the guidelines of the German Reactor Safety Commission. 

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