Hazards accident types

Protection of people and the environment from the consequences of any accident, if it did happen, to ensure that the consequences of any radiation-hazard accident will be limited and will not exceed the limits accepted for the given type of accident ... 

Waterborne transportation of hazardous material has potential risk of endangering environment as well as loss of property and lives. Fire and explosion accidents are of particular importance since statistics show that these accident types generally lead to large damage to ships, thus incurring severe consequences especially to the environment. 

There is a significant number of other accident types in coastal engineering. Analysis of these accidents shows no major trend towards any particular hazard. However, it appears that there is a wider range of accident types than in general construction and this could be as a result of an unfamiliar environment. 

The following discussion of accident types assists in determining the potential hazards for the job safety analysis. 

Accident prevention techniques, such as job hazard analysis, safe operating procedures, and job safety observations, have their application to specific jobs within the workplace. In general, they aim to address and identify existing or potential work-related hazards. These types of accident prevention techniques are emphasized in this book. Most books addressing accident prevention techniques usually emphasize specific job hazards and their prevention, such as fire safety and machine guarding. This particular book places only minor emphasis on specific job hazards. 

To make this task manageable work with the basic types of accidents, the question to ask is Can any of these accident types or hazards inflict injury on a worker There are eleven basic types of accidents ... 

Look at each of these basic accident types in more detail. Analyze each job step (first column of the JSA/JHA form in Table 12.1) separately look for only one kind of hazard or accident at a time. 

Predetermine likely crisis communication scenarios If you already have a hazard analysis of your most likely hazards and accident types, how would you conununicate to the public and employees if those scenarios became real It would also be helpful to have some generic press releases prepared so that you do not have to invent on the spot. Of course, press releases and communications have to be specific to the situation. 

You should look at each of these basic accident types to identify procedures, processes, occupations and tasks that present a hazard to cause one of the accident types in the following section. 

A third important merit is the support the energy model offers in identifying hazards. Each type of industry is associated with certain types of hazards or energies , which show up in the accident records. Figure 5.8 shows an example from the accident statistics for Norway in 1993. 

The NRC has developed special procedures for the handling, transportation, and storage of nuclear fuel because radioactivity can be a health hazard if not properly shielded. Spent fuel is typically transported by rail or tmck in heavily shielded (Type B), sealed, thick metal shipping containers designed to withstand possible accidents, such as derailments or coHisions, which may occur during transport. The NRC certifies that each shipping container meets federal requirements. The U.S. Department of Transportation sets the rules for transportation. 

Consequence Phase 3 Develop Detailed Quantitative Estimate of the impacts of the Accident Scenarios. Sometimes an accident scenario is not understood enough to make risk-based decisions without having a more quantitative estimation of the effects. Quantitative consequence analysis will vary according to the hazards of interest (e.g., toxic, flammable, or reactive materials), specific accident scenarios (e.g., releases, runaway reactions, fires, or explosions), and consequence type of interest (e.g., onsite impacts, offsite impacts, environmental releases). The general technique is to model release rates/quantities, dispersion of released materials, fires, and explosions, and then estimate the effects of these events on employees, the public, the facility, neighboring facilities, and the environment. 

The accuracy of absolute risk results depends on (1) whether all the significant contributors to risk have been analyzed, (2) the realism of the mathematical models used to predict failure characteristics and accident phenomena, and (3) the statistical uncertainty associated with the various input data. The achievable accuracy of absolute risk results is very dependent on the type of hazard being analyzed. In studies where the dominant risk contributors can be calibrated with ample historical data (e.g., the risk of an engine failure causing an airplane crash), the uncertainty can be reduced to a few percent. However, many authors of published studies and other expert practitioners have recognized that uncertainties can be greater than 1 to 2 orders of magnitude in studies whose major contributors are rare, catastrophic events. 

In most cases, physical hazards are easy to identify. Let s consider housekeeping items. These items can contribute to slip, trip, and fall hazards. Most people are comfortable in observing and fixing these types of hazards, especially after an accident occurs. After all, you can easily see these types of hazards. The accident occurrence is also easy to envision. 

After the hazard assessment has been conducted and the data has been collected, it should be organized in a logical outline that will estimate the potential for employee injury The organized data will help to decide the type of hazard(s) involved, the level of risk, and the seriousness of potential injury The appropriate levels of PPE are then selected based on the hazard determination and the availability of PPE. The user should be properly fitted for the specified PPE, and the employer should make sure that it is comfortable to wear. Hazard reassessments should be conducted as necessary based on the introduction of new or revised processes, equipment, and accident experience, to ensure the continued suitability of selection of the proper PPE. 

The model contains a surface energy method for parameterizing winds and turbulence near the ground. Its chemical database library has physical properties (seven types, three temperature dependent) for 190 chemical compounds obtained from the DIPPR" database. Physical property data for any of the over 900 chemicals in DIPPR can be incorporated into the model, as needed. The model computes hazard zones and related health consequences. An option is provided to account for the accident frequency and chemical release probability from transportation of hazardous material containers. When coupled with preprocessed historical meteorology and population den.sitie.s, it provides quantitative risk estimates. The model is not capable of simulating dense-gas behavior. 

The types of records needed to demonstrate adherence to requirements and standards as well as effective operation of the quality (ESH/PSM) management system are covered in this element. In addition to many of the quality records listed (e.g., inspection reports, audit reports, operational procedures, and drawings), ESH/PSM requirements might include training records, permits, hazard analyses, audit and other response plans, and accident/inci-dent investigation reports. 

After tlie system has been defined, a hazard evaluation technique can be used to identify different types of hazards within tlie system components and to propose possible solutions to eliminate the hazards. This topic is treated in more detail in the next t o chapters. These procedures are e.xtremely useful in identifying system modes and failures that can contribute to the occurrence of accidents diey should be an integral part of different phases of process development from conceptual design to installation, operation, and maintenance. The hazard evaluation tecliniques tliat are useful in tlie preliminary and detailed stages of tlie design process include ... 

Reduction reactions are perhaps the second most common type of potentially hazardous reactions. Materials such as metallic sodium, aluminium, and magnesium hydrazine diborane sodium hydride and hydrogen have all been involved in a wide variety of chemical accidents. 

A traditional checklist analysis uses a list of specific items to identify known types of hazards, design deficiencies, and potential accident scenarios associated with common process equipment and operations. The method can be used to evaluate materials, equipment, or procedures. Checklists are most often used to evaluate a specific design with which a company or industry has a significant amount of experience, but they can also be used at earlier stages of development for entirely new processes to identify and eliminate hazards that have been recognized through operation and evaluation of similar systems. To be most useful, checklists should be tailored specifically for an individual facility, process, or product. 

The purpose of a what-if/checklist analysis is to identify hazards, consider the types of accidents that can occur in a process or activity, evaluate in a qualitative manner the consequences of these accidents, and determine whether the safety levels against these potential accident scenarios appear adequate. The what-if/checklist analysis is described in detail in Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS, 1992). 

Normally, a what-if/checklist analysis is used to examine the potential consequences of accident scenarios at a more general level than some of the more detailed PrHA methods. It can be used for any type of process at virtually any stage in its life cycle. However, this method is generally used to analyze the more common hazards that exist in a process. 

Property damage and loss of production must also be considered in loss prevention. These losses can be substantial. Accidents of this type are much more common than fatalities. This is demonstrated in the accident pyramid shown in Figure 1-3. The numbers provided are only approximate. The exact numbers vary by industry, location, and time. No Damage accidents are frequently called near misses and provide a good opportunity for companies to determine that a problem exists and to correct it before a more serious accident occurs. It is frequently said that the cause of an accident is visible the day before it occurs. Inspections, safety reviews and careful evaluation of near misses will identify hazardous conditions that can be corrected before real accidents occur. 

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