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Accidents policies

The Severe Accident Policy Statement formulates systematic safety examinations for detection of accident vulnerabilities and implementation of cost-effective changes. The NRC issued Generic Letter 88-20 to implement this plan through IPEs. While the primary goal was the identification of plant vulnerabilities, no definition of vulnerability was provided. Only 4 operators of BWRs identified vulnerabilities and only 16 operators of PWRs did so. Over 500 plant improvements were identified, but few vulnerabilities were. [Pg.398]

A clause or provision in a life insurance or accident policy whereby the company agrees to pay the stated multiple (i.e., double, even triple indemnity is available) of the face amount in the contract in cases of accidental death. An accidental death is considered a death that is neither intentionally caused by a human being, such as murder or suicide, nor from natural causes, such as cancer or heart disease. In 2004, 4.67 percent of all deaths in the United States were declared accidental by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Double-indemnity clauses are therefore usually relatively economical and often highly marketed, especially to people over 45 and under 60. Children and people in dangerous jobs, such as heavy construction, are the exceptions. [Pg.90]

APPENDIX THREE. MEDICAL ACCIDENTS POLICY REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE, INCLUDING SENTINEL EVENTS... [Pg.285]

Past research has indicated the plant-specific nature of severe accident vulnerabilities. Therefore, the Severe Accident Policy stated the desirability of performing a systematic examination of each nuclear power plant in order to identify potential plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents. Three years later, the NRC issued a generic letter (88-20) and guidance (NUREG-1335), which called for licensees to perform a systematic Individual Plant Examination (IPE) of each nuclear power plant operating or under construction. The stated purpose of the Individual Plant Examination was to have each utility ... [Pg.60]

The severe accident policy recommends that new plants be shown to be acceptable for severe accidents by meeting specified criteria and procedural requirements, which include completion of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and consideration of the severe accident vulnerabilities that the PRA exposes. [Pg.60]

What are the rights and responsibilities regarding interviewing parties, requiring drug testing, medical review of people involved in the accident, as well as policies associated with these areas ... [Pg.67]

Regulate the design and operation of defined major hazard installations. All necessary measures are required to prevent and limit the consequences of major accidents. Operators of upper-tier sites must produce a detailed Safety Report those of lower-tier sites must prepare a Major Accident Prevention Policy. [Pg.594]

Error conditions at various levels of the organization result from inappropriate policies, or ineffective implementation of good policies by line management. Poor practices may produce "latent failures" that are not actuated until in combination with other conditions or failure that produce an accident. [Pg.166]

Accident defenses may be regarded as a series of barriers (engineered safety systems, safety procedures, emergency training, etc.). As barriers fail, incipient failures become real. Inappropriate management policies create inadequate PIFs, which give rise to opportunities foi ermr when initiated by local triggers or unusual conditions. [Pg.166]

Policy Statement on Severe Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants" (Federal Register, 50FR32138). [Pg.392]

In the shorter case studies, only the immediate causes of the errors are described. However, the more extended examples in the latter part of the appendix illustrate two important points about accident causation. First, the precondihons for errors are often created by incorrect policies in areas such as training, procedures, systems of work, communications, or design. These "root causes" underlie many of the direct causes of errors which are described in this section. Second, the more comprehensive examples illustrate the fact that incidents almost always involve more than one cause. These issues will... [Pg.22]

Management policies are the source of many of the preconditions that give rise to systems failures. For example, if no explicit policy exists or if resources are not made available for safety critical areas such as procedures design, the effective presentation of process information, or for ensuring that effective communication systems exist, then human error leading to an accident is, at some stage, inevitable. Such policy failures can be regarded as another form of latent human error, and will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.7. [Pg.41]

Management and Policy Influences on Error and Accident Causation As has been emphasized in Chapters 1,2, and 3, the system-induced error view states that it is insufficient to consider only the direct causes of errors. The underlying organizational influences also need to be taken into accoimt. However, most of the available techniques stop when an immediate cause has been identified, such as less than adequate procedures or poor equipment design. The questions of why the procedures were poor, or why the equipment was badly designed, are rarely addressed at the level of policy. Kletz (1994a)... [Pg.287]

With regard to evaluating these factors, it is recommended that structured checklists be used, such as those provided by the HFAM method described in Chapter 2. These checklists provide an explicit link between the direct causal factors and management policies. Figure 2.12 shows how these checklists could be used to investigate possible procedures deficiencies, and the policies that led to the deficiencies, as part of the incident investigation. Similar checklists can be used to investigate possible culture problems (e.g., inappropriate trade-offs between safety and production) that could have been implicated in an accident. [Pg.288]

For the most part, future trends will be found in liazard accident prevention, not liazard analysis. To help promote liazard accident prevention, companies should start employee-training programs. These programs should be designed to alert staff and employees about tlie liazards tliey are exposed to on tlie job. Training should also cover company safety policies and tlie proper procedures to follow in case an accident does occur. A major avenue to reducing risk will involve source reduction of hazardous materials. Risk education and communication are two other areas tliat will need iniprovemcnt. [Pg.432]

One of the most popular risk policies employed by industry is tlie FAR Concept (Fatal Accident Rate). FAR represents Uie nmiiber of fatal accidents per 1,000 workers in a working lifetime (10 lu-), where a working lifetime is assumed to be approximately lO lu-s. An acceptable FAR (by industries standards) is 4.0. Tliis is made up of ... [Pg.522]

When the cause of the incident has been established and the costs of rectification finalized, these will be compared with the insurance cover provided by the policy and the extent of the insurer s liability, if any, determined. The policy will normally be one of indemnity, i.e. returning the insured to the same position after an accident as he was before. This may be achieved by repairing or replacing what is damaged or by paying the amount of the damage. It may be necessary to carry out modifications to prevent a recurrence of the accident or desirable to up-rate the specification for better performance or the life of the machine may have been extended by the repairs carried out. In this case a degree of betterment is involved which will be reflected in the settlement by a contribution by the insured to the cost of repairs. [Pg.149]

Many accidents occur because the operator or maintenance person does not understand the hazards involved or has not been instructed on the precautions to be taken. The policy document should identify the main hazards within the company with advice on which rules must be obeyed while carrying out a hazardous task. General rules should also be included to cover items such as untidy work areas, replacement of guards, the use of protective cloth-ing/equipment where appropriate, safe working practices in handling goods and materials, etc. It is essential that on the introduction of new products, processes, operations or plant and equipment that any hazards associated with these are brought to the attention of all concerned. [Pg.1059]

Costs associated with increased government regulation are also difficult to quantify. Public concern in response to chemical release accidents affects regulators and community policy groups. It is evident that the U.S. chemical industry is already spending large amounts of money to avoid accidents and to deal with their consequences when they occur these costs are borne in part by the consumers. Continued expenditures are likely as industry strives to achieve an "acceptable" level of public safety throughout all chemical industry operations. [Pg.122]

Writing a health and safety policy statement is more than just a legal requirement - it is your commitment to planning and managing health and safety. It is the key to achieving acceptable standards, reducing accidents and cases of work-related ill health and it shows your employees that you care for their health and safety. [Pg.2]

You should consult your employees (through safety representatives, if you have any) about the policy statement. Everyone should be able to see from the policy statement exactly who is responsible for different things, such as advice, reporting an accident, and first aid. [Pg.2]

It is the duty of the company to prepare a Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP). This will set out the policies for ensuring the safe operation of the plant and the protection of employees and the environment. It will include details of the safety management organisation that will implement the policy. [Pg.394]

Swedish Lapland reindeer herders have experienced a variety of sociocultural problems as a result of the Chernobyl accident. The variability of contamination has been compounded by the variability of expert statements about risk, the change in national limits of Bq concentrations set for meat marketability, and the variability of the compensation policy for slaughtered reindeer. These concerns may result in fewer Lapps becoming herders and a general decline in reindeer husbandry (Beach 1990). [Pg.1688]


See other pages where Accidents policies is mentioned: [Pg.822]    [Pg.563]    [Pg.1298]    [Pg.11]    [Pg.15]    [Pg.59]    [Pg.60]    [Pg.237]    [Pg.822]    [Pg.563]    [Pg.1298]    [Pg.11]    [Pg.15]    [Pg.59]    [Pg.60]    [Pg.237]    [Pg.155]    [Pg.138]    [Pg.14]    [Pg.16]    [Pg.332]    [Pg.52]    [Pg.93]    [Pg.251]    [Pg.257]    [Pg.259]    [Pg.260]    [Pg.288]    [Pg.1055]    [Pg.116]    [Pg.128]    [Pg.134]   
See also in sourсe #XX -- [ Pg.210 ]




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