Deepwater Horizon incident

If the worst happens, and there is a big release of oil or gas to the ocean, industry needs to be able to respond quickly and effectively. The Deepwater Horizon incident demonstrated that such a response capability was not in place—it took industry 3 months to cap the leak from the damaged well head and to direct the flow of oil to a safe location. The National Commission report to the President (discussed in detail in the next chapter) says the following about that event. 

For those primarily concerned with the financial costs and opportunities from the planned change, it is good to note the severe financial consequences of process safety incidents, such as the Deepwater Horizon incident. According to a CCPS study, in the... 

This issue has come under particularly close scrutiny following the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico. At the time of the incident, the safety regulation in place for the offshore oil and gas industry in the United States took the form of a prescriptive, standards-based regime. The report of the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Blowout includes a summary of the development of the safety case approach in the nuclear, chemicals, aviation, and offshore oil and gas industry (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011b, 69) and points out that the fatality rate in the offshore oil and gas industry in the United States is at least four times the fatality rate in European jurisdictions that have operated for several decades under safety case... 

Risk Management This first chapter provides an overview ot satety management in the offshore oii and gas industry. Trends within the industry are discussed, aiong with an assessment ot the impact of the Deepwater Horizon incident. A description of the different types of safety— occupationai, process and technicai —is provided, aiong with a description of Safety Management Systems. 

The Deepwater Horizon incident was the first major release in U.S. waters since... 

Industry has had two responses to the above requirement in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon incident. They are the Helix Fast Response System and the Marine Well Containment System (MWCC). The BOEMRE required that companies use one of these two systems before drilling permits could be issued following the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe. Both companies reported that their systems were ready in February 2011, although the MWCC System will undergo much more development. 

The recommendation requires that owner/operators develop realistic plans for responding to worst-case situations. (One of the more embarrassing features of the Deepwater Horizon incident was the cookie-cutter nature of the oil-spill plans... 

Offshore oil and gas properties are almost always owned by the national government. Through an agency such as BOEM, the government then leases the property to an operator. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon incident, for example, BP leased the Macondo property from the United States government. BP then became the operator. Typically, the operator arranges financing, is responsible for most of the costs of exploration and production, and collects the profits (or a royalty on the profits) from subsequent production. It is the operator who has... 

The offshore oil and gas industry in the United States, at least up until the time of the Deepwater Horizon incident, was quite resistant to the need for increased regulations—specifically the need for SEMS. The Commission s report suggests that a change is needed. After all, the oil industry does not own the outer continental shelf. The federal government has the authority and responsibility to require industry to take whatever actions are needed to achieve safe operations. 

BP Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010, on the Deepwater Horizon incident on April 20, 2010. Available at http //www.bp.com/ liveassets/bp internet/globalbp/globalbp uk english/incident response/ STAGING/local assets/downloads pdfs/Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report.pdf. 

New projects are now (circa 2010) in the region of 50billion, which equates to the Deepwater Horizon incident loss, and the potential for even larger losses from a single incident is still a possibility. The industry must do more to prevent these incidents and improve so the loss trend decreases. 

There are four main hazards ship collision, dropped objects, fire, and explosion. Specially, the topsides of the offshore platform, which treats combustible oil and gas, are always exposed hydrocarbon fire hazards bring out a high consequence disaster. Moreover, damages from fire accidents have increasingly been astronomical in accordance with the growing scale and complexity of the recent plants, as seen in the Deepwater Horizon incident. 

The use of API standards and related docmnents has proven to be successful. The Deepwater Horizon incident was the first major release in the US waters since the Santa Barbara blowout of 1969, thus indicating that the SEMP-based systems have been effective. Furthermore, the recent Montara incident (discussed in Chapter 2) occurred in an area of the world that does use safety cases. 

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