Technical organizational

Vulnerability is the manifestation of the inherent states of the system (e.g., physical, technical, organizational, social, cultural) that can be exploited by an adversary to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to) that system. 

Within firms, the hybrid or matrix concept has become increasingly fashionable in pharmaceutical companies. Project teams are created that comprise membership from departments with specific technical, organizational, and management expertise. Such teams form and dissolve as the need arises. In principle, advantages of the matrix structure include cross-disciplinary enrichment of the team s activities and crossfertilization of expertise. Disadvantages of the matrix system include a relative lack of professional development for specific technical expertise for each team member, the potential for cross-departmental rivalry, and competition for each team member s time based on the needs of the interdisciplinary project versus those of his/her technical "home" department (Verona and Ravasi 2003). These multi-functional teams have the potential to increase bureaucracy and delay innovation. At least on a small scale, it may be better to solve a problem with two people rather than with ten. 

A variety of technical-organizational measmes imdertaken to store SRU of KM-1 stand allows for the control over nuclear and radiation safety during storage to be performed in compliance with the standards and regulations in force. 

The Supplier Audit shall establish whether the controls applied to the development of the core product and application confignration are consistent with GxP requirements and whether the organization is technically, organizationally, and commercially capable of supporting the application for its anticipated life. The Snpplier Audit will collate information for review and, where reqnired, corrective action, and determine whether a follow-np andit is reqnired. An example postal andit questionnaire is presented in Table 31.6. The qnestionnaire is not exhaustive. However, it clearly demonstrates the objective and scope of the postal andit. 

Technical, Organizational and Personnel Requirements Concerning the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Agents and Medical Materials... 

Many preventive measures (technical, organizational and personal), which have led to the improvement of the working conditions and to the higher protection of workers, were taken in the operator s workplace. The lead concentration measuring confirmed the highest quahty of the working envhonment. 

Too often, accident investigations blame a failure only on the last step in a complex process, when a more comprehensive understanding of that process could reveal that earlier steps might be equally or even more culpable. In this Board s opinion, unless the technical, organizational, and cultural recommendations made in this report are implemented, little will have been accomplished to lessen the chance that another accident will follow. 

Be considered as a prime source for selecting leading indicators for safety management system improvement. Because—If incident investigation is done well, the reality of the technical, organizational, methods of operation, and cultural causal factors in the work system will be revealed. 

For emphasis, I paraphrase If the cultural, technical, organizational, and methods of operation causal factors are not identified, analyzed, and resolved, little will be done to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. 

Up to 90 in general, all workplaces/in workplaces constructed before 1/5/76 in new workplaces if technical, organizational, or economic reasons prohibit (he application of the S5 dB (A) limit 0) (3)... 

Characteristics mapping real features of system structural elements important for proper flows distribution that minimize emission of harmful compounds, including technical, organizational and economical characteristics,... 

In previous work (Karagiannis et al. 2010) develop a method laying on models to assess robustness of Emergency Response Plan in industrial context. This method is based on questionnaires to assess probability of resource failure modes, organize and combine them in a Fault-Tree (FT) specific to each category (human, technical, organizational and informational). In this way plan failure scenarios can be built. Authors developed also a resource taxonomy for Emergency Response Plan to build patterns of Fault-Tree. A limit of this work is that it considered for model elements (both resource and function) only two binary states and so does not take into account partial failures of these elements, specifically function element. As it can be noticed in real world many elements of a system may have more than two possible states of failure. Moreover, these states may be qualified by a real value (not only 0 and 1). 

Secondly, Platypus provides insight into the factors that influence the frequency of LoC events before accidents have taken place, whereas traditionally that information could only be derived from historical data. In Platypus, technical, organizational and human factors elements are integrated which enables an in-depth analysis of causes of LoC and the effectiveness of measures. This paper demonstrates how easy it would be to perform such an analysis. 

Occupational health and safety managanent systans have to be more flexible to be independent from technical-organizational and social-economic fields of a society s progress. 

Apart from technical, organizational, and economic prerequisites for... 

For example, accidents such as the Piper Alpha disaster [1] clearly illustrate that a highly complex sociotechnological system performance is dependent upon the interaction of human, technical, organizational, social, environmental, and managerial elements. More clearly, all these factors or elements can be very important cocontributors to incidents that could result in catastrophic events. Thus, this chapter presents various important aspects of human factors contribution to accidents in the oil and gas industry and fatalities in the industry. 

It is commonly known that to a wide extent a concept is a system of views on any fact, way of understanding and explaining of any facts, the main idea of any theory. Therefore, maritime safety concept is a system of views on providing safety of the operations at sea, description of its facts and processes. However, navigation safety is defined as a relatively constant state, clear of dangers provided by the system of international and national technical, organizational, economical, social, and juridical standards, which are aimed at the reduction and prevention of accidents at sea to provide safety of fife and property at sea and marine environmental protection. 

The issue of resilience of lifelines and critical facilities is of utmost priority for the preparedness and mitigation of seismic risk a good evaluation of the resilience of the lifelines for different seismic scenarios and the implementation of pro-seismic actions to improve it are of major importance. In other words, lifeUne companies, public administration, and community need to be prepared and less vulnerable, in order to achieve a high resilience. In the last years, as the idea of the necessity of building disaster resilient communities gains acceptance, new methods have been proposed to quantify resilience beyond estimating losses. Because of the vastness of the definition, resilience necessarily has to take into account its entire complex and multiple dimensions, which includes technical, organizational, social, and economic facets (Cimellaro et al. 2010). 

A recent attempt to integrate physical and social-economic perspectives of resilience has been done with the PEOPLES Resilience Framework (Renschler et al. 2010), linking different resilience dimensions (technical, organizational, societal, and economic) and resilience properties (robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity) as proposed by Bruneau et al. (2003). 

An empirical ratio of near misses, property damage incidents, and accidents does not imply any causal relationship between them. The empirical findings are determined by technical, organizational, and human system components and their... 

Both the integrative model by Smillie Ayoub (1975) and the deviation concept by Kjellen (1984a) connect the general systems theory to the sequencing and energy models of accident causation. They encompass technical, organizational and human components of the system. Various methods of system safety analysis (e.g. fault tree analysis, incidental factor analysis) support the identification of technical and human deviations as well as the analysis of the conditions and consequences of these deviations. From the discussion of near misses and conflicts it became clear that frameworks of accident causation should cover all kinds of incidents, thus becoming frameworks of incidents. 

Procedures of direct hazard and safety analysis attempt to circumvent these drawbacks and identify accident conditions before an accident occurs. However, the problem about these procedures is to identify technical, organizational, and human factors that can lead to an accident or disturbance. Many factors seemingly dangerous do not necessarily lead to an accident, though. As a consequence, conditions to make safe behavior more likely have to be established. 

Behavioral methods applied in hazardous situations include techniques to gain personally evaluated information on technical, organizational, and human aspects of safety conditions. Those are direct methods trying to identify accident potentials and to establish a safe working environment. Methods applied are checklists, questionnaires, and interviews, including the critical incident technique. Behavioral methods to analyze human behavior in terms of human error and reliability are discussed in Chapter 5 and 7. 

Kunkel (1973) defines accident proneness as an "interindividually differing, personality constant, time-stable tendency to become involved into accidents", (p. 27). The proneness results in an interindividually different accident risk. Farmer Chambers (1926) reached the conclusion that the results of accident statistics allow to differentiate between accident proneness and accident liability. According to them accident proneness is a narrower term compared to accident liability and means a personal tendency predisposing the individual to a relatively high accident rate. Accident liability includes all the factors determining accident rates technical, organizational, and personal factors. 

Measures are suggested for the following technical, organizational, and personal problem areas especially ... 

Accident cause analysis Technical, organizational and human factors... 

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