Preliminary documented safety analysis

Safety auditors should collect the following safety facilities and non-fmancial information related to the project (1) the written request for the project construction units (2) safety preassessment report (3) safety specific report and relevant documentation about project preliminary design (4) written approval of preliminary design safety fadhties of construction projects (5) the project completion report and related construction drawings (6) the safety assessment report (7) safety faciUties construction project completion and acceptance approval letter (8) technicd indicator information apphes to the audited entity s safety faciUties three simultaneous . Safety facilities "three simultaneous" can be audited by audit, supervision, observation, inquiry, confirmation, calculation, analysis and review and other conventional methods of audit. Due to the comprehensive and technology of safety audit project, safety auditors should also use cost-benefit analysis and economic evaluation of safety and other methods. 

XI. Preliminary Process Safety Studies A simple what-if study is generally performed to identify major safety concerns, if any, with the project scope. FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis) or HAZOP (Hazard and operability) study can also be performed if sufficient design documents are available. Otherwise, these detailed studies will be conducted in FEED. Necessary changes are made to the project scope for mitigating any significant process safety concerns. 

As mentioned above, NNSA had organized to establish technical documents before the licensing procedure started. The second document, namely the Standard Content and Format of the Safety Analysis Report of the lOMW High Temperature Gas-cooled Test Reactor, which defines the content framework of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the lOMW High Temperature Gas-cooled Test Reactor (PSARy, has guided the compilation of the document. 

In 1985, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) initiated a project to produce the Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures. This document, prepared by Battelle, includes many system safety analysis tools. Even though frequently identified as hazard and operability (HazOp) programs, the methods being developed by the petrochemical industry to use preliminary hazard analyses, fault trees, failure modes, effects, and criticality analyses, as well as similar techniques to identify, analyze, and control risks systematically, look very much like system safety efforts tailored for the petrochemical industry (Goldwaite 1985). 

The MORT tools and techniques can be helpful in preparing a safety analysis report (SAR), the upstream safety product most frequently required for new DOE programs, but the more common system safety products (system safety program plan, preliminary hazard analysis, system/subsystem hazard analysis, operating hazard analysis) are not a dominant part of the MORT program and are seldom even referenced in System Safety Development Center (SSDC) documents. 

Preliminary safety analysis report completion Completion of all detailed design reviews Detailed construction planning Final cost estimate Final tender document... 

For the regulatory review, the most important document to be included in a construction licence application is the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR). It should define the design bases for the facility and include a detailed description of the site, facility and its operation. The PSAR should also include a safety assessment that is based on the design bases and specifications of the plant, site specific data and safety regulations and guidelines, if available. Occupational and public... 

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) A system safety analysis method used to formally evaluate and document the hazard risks associated with a new or modified system. 

A preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA) is essential in order to determine (and agree) the depth of assessment needed, the criteria utilised and the manner in which the safety objectives are to be accomplished. The PSSA concentrates on the functions and vulnerabiUties of the system instead of the detailed analysis, and can thus be conducted prior to the definition of the system s architecture. The PSSA remains a live document until the final SSA can be issued. By the preliminary design review (PDR), the PSSA should include functional failure consequences to the aircraft and its occupants consequences of other possible malfunctions of a system (e.g. overheating) and their effects on surrounding systems consequences to the system of failure in other systems or parts of the aircraft, identification of any possible common-mode failures or cascade failures which my need detailed investigation the identification of possible vulnerabilities to flight crew or maintenance error. 

Pantex uses its Facility Hazard Classification as the basis for determining if a facility is nuclear (which requires the development of Authorization Basis Documents) or if a facility requires control under the plant s PSM program because it is classified as an Explosive Manufacturing Operation or has threshold inventories of Highly Hazardous Chemieals. The Preliminary Hazard Analysis serves as the safety basis for facilities that are not classified as nuelear or eoveied by PSM. 

Two types of analytical methods are used to evaluate hazards 1) preliminary hazards analysis (PHA), and 2) failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). PHA is an accident scenario-based form of analysis. The FMEA is a complementary type of evaluation that utilizes a system failure-based form of analysis. Generally, FMEAs were only accomplished for equipment which was perceived to have a significant safety role, i.e. SSCs which were anticipated to be designated as safety significant in accordance with DOE-STD-3009. Unlike PHA, the first objective of FMEA is to subdivide the facility into several different (and, to the maximum extent possible, independent) system elements. Failure modes of each system element are then postulated and a structured esramination of the consequences of each failure mode follows. However, similar to PHA, FMEA. documents preventive and mitigative features (failure mechanisms and compensation) and anticipated accident consequences (failure effects). This appendix documents the FMEA for the HCF. 

The preliminary hazard list (PHL) dcKuments and provides initial assessment of hazards identified very early in the life cycle. The PHL is a feeder document for the preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) and provides the first information to aid in scaling the system safety effort. 

Fault hazard analysis is mentioned very frequently in system safety literature, sometimes as a type of analysis and occasionally as a technique. One NASA system safety document (NHB 1700.1-V3, System Safety) describes it as the analysis to be performed after the preliminary hazard analysis for further analysis of systems and subsystems and suggests that it can be either a separate analysis or an extension of the failure modes and effects analysis (NASA 1970). Most programs today (including NASA) refer to this analysis as the subsystem hazard analysis (SSHA) and the system hazard analysis (SHA). 

Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) As described in NHB 1700.1(V1-A) and this document. The PHA is to identify safety-critical areas, to identify and evaluate hazards, and to identify the safety design and operation requirements needed in the program concept phase (NSTS 22254). 

Software Preliminary Hazard Analysis This type of analysis is used to identify software program routines that are considered to be safety-critical, and thus is conducted prior to software program coding. To perform the analysis, the analyst should make reference to any available system specifications, interface documentation, functional flow diagrams, software flowcharts, storage and file allocation specifications, and any other program descriptive information. 

The Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) document for K>Reactor in Cold Standby and the L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Barins was pr ared in accordance vrith the draft DOB standard for BIO preparatiott (dated October 16, 1993). The actives for tte BIO preparation process included hamd iden carion, hazard categorization, and a preliminary hazards analysis. These actmties, along with the review of the K-Reactor Safety Anafysis R rt (SAR), K-, and P>Reactor Technical Spedfications (TS), K-Reactor Cold Standby Plan, L-Reactor ( Id Shutdown Plan, P-Reactor Standby Plait, and other safety documents, were used to compile the BIO. 

The predominant method of evaluation in these studies has been fault tree analysis. The Reactor Safety Study also utilized event tree analysis to conveniently document accident sequences and to link the subsystem fault trees into a plant analysis. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, used extensively in fast reactor safety, is the recommended method for preliminary analysis. All of these methods have application to the analysis of the fuel cycle Including the problems of safe arding special nuclear material. ... 

So if we say that the hazard analysis is the baseline document, then a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is the initial hazard assessment conducted on the system. It identifies safety-critical areas within the system and starts evaluating hazards and identifying safety design criteria and applicable safety requirements. 

Concept stage In the Concept stage, the requiranents of the stakeholders are identified, clarified, and documented. Subsystem elements of the overall system are generated. Hardware and software modeling are used in order to establish the requirements, and begin to validate the systan design. Safety objectives are documented and the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is performed. 

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