Hazards be identified and evaluated

OSHA s standard requires that The employer shall establish written procedures to manage changes— The principle involved here is important and is having its impact far beyond chemical companies. What is required is that hazards be identified and evaluated when changes are made in design criteria, operations, procedures, and facilities. That s a good thing to do, and I recommend a broad application of the principle. It is a concept that can be applied in all businesses and industries, as the top performers have learned. 

It is essential that good techniques be developed for identi ng significant hazards and mitigating them where necessaiy. Hazards can be identified and evaluated using approaches discussed in the section on hazard and risk analysis. 

After potential health hazards are identified and evaluated, the appropriate control techniques must be developed and installed. This requires the application of appropriate technology for reducing workplace exposures. 

The preliminary site plan characteristic analysis and hazard assessment should be performed by an experienced and trained technician before entering the site. A more detailed site evaluation and analysis must be done to establish the necessary engineering controls and personnel protective equipment. All potential hazards must be identified and evaluated and an air... 

Parental Hazards (Effects). For assessment of reproductive and developmental risk, parental hazards, both paternal and maternal, must be identified and evaluated. Parental hazards can be expressed as altered nutritional state, functional impairment, and systemic toxicity. Because of possible indirect affects, knowledge and evaluation of non-reproductive/non-developmental toxicity studies are useful. This information is available by examination of subchronic and chronic toxicity studies. 

There are a number of ways to approach the assessment of the environmental risk that may be associated with a process. Whatever strategy might be chosen, however, some general risk areas should be part of the overall assessment. First, the inherent hazard, fate, and effects of the materials in the process need to be determined and assessed from an environmental perspective. Second, the potential for any process or unit operations releases need to be identified and evaluated. Third, environmental impacts from transportation, storage, and disposal options associated with the materials used in the process need to be identified and evaluated. Finally, the environmental life cycle impacts of producing those materials need to be collected and assessed. 

DOE O 440.1A, 4(i) 48CFR970.5223-1 4.1.1 Hazards associated with all activities involving chemicals that could put the employee at risk of injury or illness shall be identified and evaluated before purchase. 

Hazards must be identified and evaluated, and then avoided, eliminated, or controlled so that the associated risks are at an acceptable level, throughout the entire life cycle of processes, equipment, and products. 

This is a good method of defining what training is required. Hazards that employees are exposed to should systematically be identified and evaluated. This evaluation can be accomplished by assessing compliance with the following activities and reviewing safety information,for example ... 

Next, die mediod requires a determinatioa of die plant limits (i.e., die areas of the plant diat will be evaluated). Some hazards identified may be considered for on-site impacts. An experienced team of principal engineers, a HAZOP chairperson, and an external HAZOP e.xpert is die recommended makeup of the fouiidadon for die team. Other experts from other disciplines, such as instrumentation and process control, may be periodically called on to identify and evaluate deviations from normal operations. 

The CCPS publication Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition (Ref. 3) provides considerable information on various hazard evaluation techniques that may be employed. Evaluating hazards affecting buildings in process plants may be performed as part of a review focused specifically on the siting issue or as part of a more comprehensive review intended to identify and evaluate all facility hazards. 

The advantage of a qualitative approach is that it can usually be accomplished more quickly than a quantitative study, with lower overall resource requirements. In addition, qualitative analysis methods are less narrowly focused than are quantitative methods, thus increasing the likelihood of identifying and evaluating a broad spectrum of hazards. Qualitative analysis often constitutes the basis, or starting point, for quantitative studies. 

Also indices such as the Dow Fire and Explosion Hazard Index and the Mond Index have been suggested to measure the degree of inherent SHE of a process. Rushton et al. (1994) pointed out that these indices can be used for the assessment of existing plants or at the detailed design stages. They require detailed plant specifications such as the plot plan, equipment sizes, material inventories and flows. Checklists, interaction matrices, Hazop and other hazard identification tools are also usable for the evaluation, because all hazards must be identified and their potential consequences must be understood. E.g. Hazop can be used in different stages of process design but in restricted mode. A complete Hazop-study requires final process plans with flow sheets and PIDs. 

Before safety measures are applied to a facility, it is prudent to identify and evaluate the possible hazards that may evolve before spending considerable amounts on protection that may not be needed or overlooking requirements for protection measures that are needed. The first step in fire protection engineering should therefore be to always identify the major risks at a facility. When conducting these analyses it is prudent only to only consider credible events. Farfetched or outlandish event considerations (e.g., a meteor striking the facility) are not necessary or practical and lead to a less cost effective approach. 

Many different loss event scenarios are possible with intentional chemistry. All of them relate to losing containment or control of the intended reaction, starting another reaction, side reaction or series of reactions that are not intended or expected. A process hazard analysis, using a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study or other appropriate method, should be used to systematically identify and evaluate a full set of loss event scenarios. General causes of uncontrolled reactions include, but are not confined to, the following list ... 

Unique aspects of reactive hazards that should be examined during process hazard analysis (PHA), such as the need for reactive chemical test data, and methods to identify and evaluate worst case scenarios involving uncontrolled reactivity. 

The basis of safety can only be selected once all the significant hazards have been identified and evaluated[3,41 (see Chapter 3). There are a number of options for the safe operation of chemical reactions and these are outlined below., ... 

In the previous ehapters, analysis teehniques were presented for identifying and evaluating the safety and seeurity risks assoeiated with the transportation of hazardous materials over a route(s) and aeross different modes of transit. Any of these techniques can be used to determine where additional risk reduetion options might be warranted and to identily and evaluate potential options. Additional risk reduction opportunities may include identified inconsistent operating practices, changes/advances in industry guidelines, or new regulatory requirements. 

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