CCPS publications

This book provides practical assistance in how to implement the ideas and concepts found in earlier CCPS publications. 

Read Chapter 2 of the CCPS publication Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management Systems, 1993, for guidance on obtaining buy-in. The principles described for obtaining support and commitment for PSM are equally applicable to integration of PSM and ESH. 

There are numerous other CCPS publications that may be helpful in your integration effort. In particular, the selection of measures to monitor the effectiveness of your integration effort and identify continuous improvement opportunities can be enhanced through the use of the results of a CCPS research and development effort to develop performance measures for CCPS s 12 process safety elements. These results will be described in the CCPS Guidelines for Developing Performance Measures for Continuous Improvement of Process Safety Management (scheduled for publication in... 

The CCPS publication Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition (Ref. 3) provides considerable information on various hazard evaluation techniques that may be employed. Evaluating hazards affecting buildings in process plants may be performed as part of a review focused specifically on the siting issue or as part of a more comprehensive review intended to identify and evaluate all facility hazards. 

Potential explosion phenomena include vapor cloud explosions (VCEs), confined explosions, condensed-phase explosions, exothermic chemical reactions, boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions (BLEVEs), and pressure-volume (PV) ruptures. Potential fire phenomena include flash fires, pool fires, jet fires, and fireballs. Guidelines for evaluating the characteristics of VCEs, BLEVEs, and flash fires are provided in another CCPS publication (Ref. 5). The basic principles from Reference 5 for evaluating characteristics of these phenomena are briefly summarized in this appendix. In addition, the basic principles for evaluating characteristics of the other explosion and fire phenomena listed above are briefly summarized, and references for detailed evaluation of characteristics are provided. 

Specifically excluded from the guidelines are the following topics, which are or will be covered in other AIChE/CCPS publications ... 

It is difficult to identify all of the possible events and their consequences in a complex chemical processing plant without the application of systematic procedures and proper management techniques. Several hazard evaluation procedures have been developed. Most of these procedures are described in other AIChE/CCPS publications such as Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures [2,3] and Guidelinesfor Quantitative Risk Analysis [4]. Other publications on hazard evaluation techniques include [246,247]. 

This CCPS publication, Essential Practices for Managing Chemical Reactivity Hazards, may address this gap in industry guidance. 

As an aid to priority determination, it is often helpful to risk rank each recommendation. Several CCPS publications provide guidance on the use of a variety of risk ranking techniques. C,s)... 

If a recommendation asks for a change in the process, the action must undergo a formal process hazard analysis (PHA) study, such as a HAZOP or other methodology, before implementation. This systematic and formal approach identifies and evaluates hazards associated with the proposed revisions. The study may uncover failure scenarios, adverse consequences, and obscure relationships that are not immediately apparent. The CCPS publication Hazard Evaluation Procedures i is an excellent guide to selection and proper application of PHA methodologies. 

For a more detailed technical discussion of release mechanisms and their consequences, refer to other CCPS publications (CCPS, 1988a,b, 1989a, 1996). 

Center for Chemical Process Safety, Conferences and Events Web site, http //www.aiche.org/Conferences/Specialty/GCPS.aspx Center for Chemical Process Safety, Process Safety Beacon Web site, http //www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/beacon/index.aspx... 

As discussed earlier in the book, common metrics are necessary for companies to compare their performance with other companies and overall industry performance. Consensus process safety metrics are only beginning to be adopted within the processing industries. Consensus process safety metrics are being developed, such as those recommended in the CCPS publication Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics. Pressure from within the industries and from outside stakeholders will encourage the broader acceptance of current consensus metrics as well as the development of more such metrics. Such metrics will be used not only by companies and industries, but especially by outside parties to evaluate industry-wide performance or the performance of individual companies against the industry as a whole. 

For additional information on this topic, refer to Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) publication Guidelines for Integrating Human Factors into Process Safety Management Systems, New York, New York, 1995. 

A more detailed treatment of mergers and acquisitions can be found in the CCPS publication Guideline on Process Safety Consideration during the Merger and Acquisition Process. Quoting the guideline ... 

CCPS Process Safety Beacon, AICbE, published monthly, http //www.aiche.org/CCPS/ Publications/Beacon/index. 

Risk judgment/categorization CCPS publication gives four basic categories of... 

A Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) publication gives the following definition An IPL is a device, system or action which is capable of preventing a scenario from proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the initiating event or the action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario. The effectiveness and independence of an IPL must be auditable [12]. Discussions on layer of protection analysis (LOPA) were covered in Chapter V, so they are not repeated here. However, a few characteristic features of protection layers are presented. Similar to fault tolerance and security, this is also important so that the control system is always safe. As per lEC 61511 standard the core idea for integrated safety and security is defense-in-depth with independent layers of protection to reduce process risk. The strategy behind this is that the BPCS, critical... 

Interface Management - Effective Communication to Improve Process Safety CCPS AlChE 2004 www.aiche.org/uploadedRles/CCPS/Publications/Safety/ lerts/CCPS/ lertlnterface.pdf... 

The objective of this book is to review the range of models currently available for consequence analysis. Some material on these models is readily available, either in the general literature or as part of the AICHE/CCPS publication series. Where otherwise available, detailed model descriptions are not provided instead, the reader is directed to the specific references. Otherwise, a description adequate for initial calculations is provided. 

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