HAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

The hazard and accident analysis associated with normal operations is briefly discussed. For illustration, simple examples associated with the U.S. ceramic process will be used. The hazard analysis can be divided into four parts Hazard Identification, Accident Event Characterization, Hazard Controls, and Hazard Screening. 

Assess and compare the methodologies of hazard and accident analysis in both countries applicable to the excess Pu and HEU storage and disposition activities. 

Population and demographic information based on 1990 census data are included in this section to show the population distribution as a function of distance and direction from the HCF. The demographics described here are inclusive of all areas potentially affected by the accidents analyzed in Chapter 3, Hazard and Accident Analysis. ... 

This section identifies the DOE Orders and DOE Standards that are required for establishing the hazard and accident analysis-related safety basis of the Hot Cell Facility. Provided below is a listing of each major Order, Notice, and Standard and descriptions that summarize their safety basis requirements. 

DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, describes a SAR preparation method that is acceptable to the DOE. Chapter 3 of the Standard presents the format and content required for SAR hazard and accident analysis (DOE 1994b). 

This chapter includes a discussion of how a hazard category is determined for a nuclear facility and gives a thimibnail discussion of the development of a hazard and accident analysis. 

This section discusses the laws that have defined the processes for developing the hazard and accident analysis and the controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of government-owned contractor-operated nuclear reactors and nuclear facilities. 

DOE Order 5480.23 specifies that hazard and accident analyses be included in safety analyses for nuclear facilities. Likewise, DOE Order 5481.IB, "Safety Analysis and Review System," requires hazard and accident analyses be included for non-nuclear facilities. Two nuclear SAR topics overlap with the PrHA. 

These topics are the subject of DOE Standard DOE-STD-1027-92, "Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23 Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports," which provides guidance for facility managers and Cognizant Secretarial Offices (CSOs). They are also discussed in the DOE Standard DOE-STD-3009-94,... 

Criteria for job selection, breaking job into steps, identifying hazards, procedures to eliminate hazards, self-reference guides, new worker training, equipment safety maintenance checklists, and accident analysis. 

As part of a site s overall ISMS, hazard analyses are conducted at the site, facility, activity, and task levels utilizing a variety of resources. The need for an integrated approach is illustrated by reviewing DOE directives, and OSHA and EPA standards and regulations, many of which call for some type of hazard analysis. At the nuclear facility level, DOE-STD-3009-94, the preparation guide for SARs, requires hazard analysis in Chapter 3, Hazard and Accident Analyses, and Chapter 8, Section 11, Occupational Chemical Exposures. At the activity or worker level, DOE O 440.1A and its related guides (DOE G 440.1-1 and DOE G 440.1-3) requires the identification of workplace hazards and evaluation of risk, and calls out OSHA standards (i.e., 29 CFR 1910 and 29 CFR 1926). 

DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE 0 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports . 

NUCLEAR HAZARD CATEGORY 3 FACILITIES. Minimal hazard and accident analyses are required. PrHA should provide information to the safety analysis on release mechanisms, engineering analysis, and consequence analysis. 

After a brief description of the U.S. ceramic immobilization process, this section will describe a systematic approach of identifying and solving safety issues. In general, three types of hazards and accidents are considered in a safety analysis ... 

Accident Phenomenology and Accident Analysis Group. It will cover topics such as hazards, accident events, source terms, consequences, probability of occurrences, methodology, and computer codes. 

Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are important to safety and that are identified as Safety SSCs are based on criteria contained in DOE-STD-3009 (p. xix) and the results of safety analyses, which determine the safety contributions of specific SSCs. The degree of consequence mitigation is the basis for identification of Safety SSCs and associated Safety Functions". These Safety Functions are the essential performance requirements that are imposed on Safety SSC s which maintain the consequences of accident scenarios within bounds that are described in the SAR accident analysis. The use of the term Safety Function will be limited to these essential performance requirements in this SAR. While many SSCs provide a material safety benefit and could be considered to perform a safety function, SSCs that are not relied upon to effect an acceptable outcome will not have an associated Safety Function as the term is used in this S/VR. Safety SSCs and associated Safety Functions are based on the results of hazard evaluation and accident analysis described in Chapter 3, and are specifically identified in Section 3.3.2.3. The specific safety functions important to safety are described in Chapter 4, and form the basis of the derivation of Technical Safety Requirements presented in Chapter 5. 

Table 3.3-3 presents the risk ranking matrix used to compare all hazards and accident scenarios identified in the PHA and FMEA. A discussion of each risk measure is also provided. The risk ranking results serve as the basis for determining if a more detailed, quantitative analysis of specified hazards or accident scenarios is required. 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 1992b, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, DOE-STI5-1027-92, (Change Notice 1 September 1997), U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., December 1992. 

Other administrative controls that may not have been explicitly identified in the hazard or accident analysis include management commitments to establish, implement, and maintain appropriate controls and activities that provide additional defense-in-depth safety. Table 5.5-1 summarizes the controls required to be in-place within the HCF, along with a cross-reference to SAR sections in which these controls are described. 

The purpose of the project evaluation tree is to provide a relatively simple, straightforward, and efficient method of performing an in-depth evaluation or analysis of a project or operation. It is best suited for performing operating hazard analysis and accident analysis. It can also be a valuable review and inspection tool. If adequate information is available, PET analysis may be helpful in performing preliminary hazard analysis, subsystem hazard analysis, and system hazard analysis. 

Organizations can use a variety of processes to analyze workplace hazards and accident causal factors. Hazard evaluations and accident trend analysis can help improve the effectiveness of established hazard controls. Routine analysis enables an organization to develop and implement appropriate controls for hazardous processes or unsafe operations. Analysis processes rely on information collected from hazard surveys, inspections, hazard reports, and accident investigations. This analysis process can provide a snapshot of hazard information. Effective analysis can then take the snapshots and create viable pictures of hazards and accident causal factors. 

Understanding these points helps practitioners apply accident theories and models. Accident theories and models provide some insights when investigating accidents or conducting hazard and risk analysis aimed at prevention. 

DOE-STD-1027, Hazard categorization and accident analysis techniques for compliance 16 with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear safety analysis report. Document is available from Department of Energy, AD-631/FORS, Washington, DC. 

The analysis of industry-related hazards and the accident/incidents they cause are an important step in the overall process of reducing occupation-related injuries, illnesses, and deaths. Only after a systematic look at the hazards and accidents can you hope to integrate the accident prevention techniques and tools that can have an impact on a company s safety and health initiative. 

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