Verification system

The prototype of verification system of ultrasonic flaw detector developed is described in the scheme given in figure 2. The verification operators performed with the system are as much automated as possible. The level of automatization is limited by the necessity of human reading of information on flaw detector screen, or other operations as manual adjustment of flaw detector settings. 

The automatic acquisition and analysis system we developed within the scope of the Super-Phenix steam generator tube inspection by ultrasonic arrays is a remarkable example of an exhaustive acoustic verification system. It works for every type of probe for tube inspection. 

There are two systems used for maintaining the accuracy and integrity of measuring devices a calibration system and a verification system. The calibration system determines the accuracy of measurement and the verification system determines the integrity of the device. If accuracy is important then the device should be included in the calibration system. If accuracy is not an issue but the device s form, properties, or function is important then it should be included in the verification system. You need to decide the system in which your devices are to be placed under control and identify them accordingly. 

Internal Verification Systems or procedures are in place for reviewing performance against standards and milestones and reporting departures from established (external or internal) standards. Exceptions and deficiencies are corrected in a timely manner. 

The feasibility of detection-based defensive strategies also depends on how the detectors are deployed and how they are actually used. Deployment considerations include the number and placement of detectors, whether in open spaces or in HVAC ductwork. In this respect, airport terminals are likely to be more difficult to protect by this strategy than are aircraft, owing to the vastly greater air volume and necessarily greater physical spacing between detectors in terminals. To the extent that more than one type of independent detection or verification system is needed to achieve acceptable POD and PFA, the system costs are multiplied. 

Regular calibration and verification ensures that the parameters measured by a particular instrument can be related to a recognized standard. The frequency of instrument calibration may be quite varied, depending largely on the application. If, during the verification of instrument performance, it has been shown that the instrument stays in calibration for about three months, the calibration would be repeated at approximately two-monthly intervals. However, verification (system suitability) will be carried out each time samples are analysed. For some critical analyses, calibration may be performed for each batch of samples or, in an extreme case, for each separate sample. 

Fit the purpose calibration. It is common sense to check instrument performance each day, and GLP requirements simply formalize the performance and documentation of these checks. On the other hand, it is also important to use the right test (full calibration, verification, system suitability test, or instrument and method validation) to verify the performance and to avoid needlessly lengthy procedures. As already discussed (see Sections 13.2.3 and 13.3.1), it is not always necessary to perform a MS full calibration every day. For example, if a particular MS is used only to record complete full-scan mass spectra, a daily calibration or verification of the calibration of the m/z ratio scale is required. However, in the case where a MS is coupled with an LC and utilized primarily for the analysis of one or more analytes in the selected ion monitoring (SIM) mode, it does not always require a daily verification of the calibration. In this specific case it is quite common in LC-MS and LC-MS/MS applications to test only the following performance parameters (a) sensitivity, (b) system precision,... 

Hazardous Material Document and Package Verification System... 

The challenges the OPCW faces in respect of the elimination of these stockpiles and CW production facilities include both the assurance that the destruction time targets will be met by all possessor States Parties, and the further optimization of the verification system as the destruction... 

In this context, one needs to recall the objectives of the multilateral verification system. Traditionally, two aspects were emphasized confidence-building and deterrence of treaty violation. In the CWC case, confidence-building relates to the confirmation (a) that the declared CW stockpiles and production capabilities are actually being destroyed, and (b) that chemical activities in those facilities inspected under Article VI are legitimate. The deterrence effect of the CWC verification system relies essentially on two interconnected factors the probability that an Article VI inspection can actually detect a violation (and, relatedly, that the inspection system is optimized in such a way that it induces compliance and maximizes the selection of relevant facilities ), and the confidence of States Parties in the OPCW s ability to conduct an effective and conclusive challenge inspection should it be requested to do so. 

In this chapter, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the object of examination. The CWC was the first disarmament treaty that totally prohibited and completely eliminated one whole category of weapons of mass destruction with an extremely extensive and intrusive verification system. The Convention has also become a model for subsequent disarmament treaties. It was no surprise that, when the CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, the international community enthusiastically welcomed it as a truly epoch-making treaty. 

At the same time, if it is not possible, that might entail a risk of undermining the whole verification system of the CWC. Let us assume that State Party A maintains military bases on the territory of non-State Party B. If State Party A could, however illegally, stockpile chemical weapons in those bases without any possibility of being inspected, that would represent a large loophole in the CWC verification system. That is perhaps why the above-quoted provision refers to the possibility of requesting a challenge inspection even in such cases. 

With current system improvements in development, a device that automatically detects, classifies with high probability, and extracts a sample which is diverted directly to an automatic rapid test verification system, all without operator intervention, will soon be commercially available. Combined with a suite of other chemical, toxin, and radiological real-time sensors and an integrated data analysis and alert response system, the ultimate water security system is quickly becoming a reality. 

Routburg, M. Swenson, R. Schmitt, B. Washington, A. Mueller, S. Hochlowski, J. Maslana, G. Minn, B. Matuszak, K. Searle, P. Pan, J. Implementation of an Automated Purification/Verification System, presented at The International Symposium on Laboratory Automation and Robotics, Boston, MA, October, 1996. 

A verification system can automatically create user dialogs or forms for input of fielded data on the basis of a human-readable textual specification, preferably in XML. This specification contains the following information ... 

While most chemicals companies buy in to the Responsible Care programme, what is being looked for here is the employment of, and a particular intention to work to, a recognised environmental management system such as ISO 14001, the European Eco-Management and Audit System (EMAS) or a management verification system such as that run by the US Chemical Manufacturer s Association. While it is expected that the company will have a significant proportion (>25%) of its production sites certified, a yes score may be achieved with a lower proportion if there is evidence that the company shows a continuous upward trend. 

EMS the short CER only discusses how Air Products discharges its obligations under the six Responsible Care codes of management practice. However, the internet report identifies that two sites in Europe achieved ISO 14001 certification in 1999 and that the corporate headquarters and two US plants were inspected under the Chemical Manufacturers management verification system in 1998. 

EMS Ashland Distribution and Ashland Specialty Chemical are stated to be industry leaders in implementing the Responsible Care Codes of Management Practice . Even so a no score has been awarded since no mention is made of any involvement in the Management Verification System run by the US Chemical Manufacturers Association. 

EMS in line with Dow s stated commitment to Responsible Care the corporate headquarters were visited in March 1999 as part of the voluntary management verification system. The CER refers to the main points raised in the audit report, which is also available on the internet. Dow participates in similar schemes in Canada and Australia. In Europe auditing is part of ISO 14001 and the EM AS requirements. No figures are presented concerning the number of sites audited or certified. 

EMS there is a stated aim to equip all plants with environmental management systems conforming to ISO 14001 or equivalent by the end of 2001 . To date 14 sites have received external certification. It is also stated that the 15 sites in the USA apply procedures complying with the country s laws and their own Responsible Care programs . It is unclear whether this includes auditing under the management verification system. 

Secondly, over the last decade a considerable number of traditional chemical firms were broken up and replaced by so-called industrial parks. This poses a potential problem for verification under the CWC as the Convention s definitions that form the basis for the verification measures assume the existence of plant sites - which were prevalent in the late 1980s, when the CWC was negotiated. A good example of this trend is the evolution of the former Hoechst AG near Frankfurt, Germany, into an industrial park with more than 75 international life science and chemical companies, employing more than 22,000 people.51 In order to maintain an effective and efficient industry verification system under the CWC, developments like these have to be monitored closely, so as to be able to adapt the verification procedures to the changed environment. 

Given the above mentioned impact of past developments in chemical technology and industry on military CW production programmes, verifying the permitted uses of toxic chemicals and related facilities had to assume an important role in the overall verification system of the CWC. Activities not prohibited under the CWC are dealt with in Article VI of the Convention and in Parts VI to IX of the CWC s Verification Annex. While the first three of these parts are informed by the subdivision of toxic chemicals into Schedules 1 to 3, Part IX of the Verification Annex deals with other, unlisted, chemicals -so-called discrete organic chemicals or DOCs - and other chemical production facilities (OCPF), which might be easily adaptable to CW production. 

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