Challenge inspections

The OPCW performs verification activities on a regular basis and can conduct challenge inspections. The purpose is to verify that the SPs fulfill their obligations under the CWC. Regular verification includes assessment of the declarations made by the SPs by conducting on-site inspections of declared sites. 

The equipment is selected on the basis of the type of mission to be conducted and the requirements resulting from the Inspection Mandate , which contains the instructions issued by the Director-General to the inspection team for the conduct of a particular inspection. For an Investigation of Alleged Use (IAU) or a Challenge Inspection (Cl), the complete S A equipment will be taken to the site,... 

In this context, one needs to recall the objectives of the multilateral verification system. Traditionally, two aspects were emphasized confidence-building and deterrence of treaty violation. In the CWC case, confidence-building relates to the confirmation (a) that the declared CW stockpiles and production capabilities are actually being destroyed, and (b) that chemical activities in those facilities inspected under Article VI are legitimate. The deterrence effect of the CWC verification system relies essentially on two interconnected factors the probability that an Article VI inspection can actually detect a violation (and, relatedly, that the inspection system is optimized in such a way that it induces compliance and maximizes the selection of relevant facilities ), and the confidence of States Parties in the OPCW s ability to conduct an effective and conclusive challenge inspection should it be requested to do so. 

At the conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992, this treaty was heralded as a major breakthrough in multilateral arms control. It was the first comprehensively verifiable multilateral treaty that completely banned an entire class of weapons, and went further than any previous treaty in the depth, extent and intrusiveness of its verification. Verification under the CWC includes compulsory national declarations about relevant industrial and military activities, destruction of chemical weapons within a time frame with intrusive verification, and a regime of routine inspections of declared industrial and military facilities. Additional features are the possibility of a challenge inspection, whereby a State Party can request an inspection of any site in another State Party at short notice, and provisions for the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons. 

By the time of the RevCon, no challenge inspections had been requested or conducted. However, several practice challenge inspections had been conducted, including a number in collaboration with OPCW inspectors. " The Technical Secretariat has also put into place the necessary internal procedures so that it can react rapidly and effectively when a request for such an inspection is made by a State Party. In relation to inspection team members, approved equipment and logistical snpport, a state of readiness is maintained that would allow the Secretariat to dispatch an inspection team at short notice. 

By the time of the RevCon, no investigations of alleged nse (LAU) had been requested or conducted. There have been a nnmber of training exercises on lAU and delivery of assistance conducted by the OPCW and States Parties. These have highlighted the importance of hnman factors, such as interviewing techniques and the collection of evidence, and the need for appropriate equipment. As in the case of challenge inspections, the Secretariat has put in place the necessary internal procedures for an lAU to allow it to dispatch an inspection team at short notice. 

From the perspective of one who has been involved in the negotiation and the various phases of implementation of the CWC for the past 20 years, one of the most interesting aspects of the RevCon was how a number of issues that were considered to be potential treaty stoppers in the end-game of the negotiations of the CWC in 1992, and that at that time might have been expected to feature very prominently at the first RevCon, did not cause major concerns. These issues included the declaration and routine verification of other chemical production facilities the composition of the Executive Council the initiation and conduct of challenge inspections the destruction of CW stockpiles and former CW production facilities and export controls on CW dual-use items. ... 

It is interesting to note that the United States has expressed concerns that some States Parties are not in full compliance with the CWC, but so far has chosen to seek clarification through bilateral consultations rather than request a challenge inspection. 

One of these exercises simulated the entire challenge inspection process from the submission of the request, the convening of a special session of the Executive Council to consider the request, through to the preparation of a final report. These practice inspections are seen as valuable experience for the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat and States Parties in preparing for the possibility of a real challenge inspection. 

Article IX, para. 2, states Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. ... 

In 1992, there was an expectation in some quarters that there might have been at least three or four challenge inspection requests a year in the early years of the operational CWC. As discussed above, a number of States Parties have used the clarification procedures, as set out in Article IX, paras 3-7, to resolve their compliance concerns. 

The challenge inspection system of the Chemical Weapons Convention Problems and prospects... 

This chapter tries to answer these questions with particnlar reference to the CWC challenge inspection system, because this is one of the most striking featnres of the Convention and, in fact, the Convention s epoch-making character has often been attributed to the existence of that system. The challenge inspection system, whose effectiveness seems to govern the tolerance threshold of non-compliance concerns, is also important from the perspective of the current security environment, be-canse the risk that the production of prohibited weapons might lead to their actnal nse is now greater than ever before. 

The significance of a challenge inspection system and the conditions for its effective functioning... 

The central importance of the challenge inspection system seems to lie in its role as a deterrent. The very existence of the inspection system, applicable to any place at short notice, would certainly make it difficult to conceal non-compliant activities. Furthermore, considering the sanctions that may be imposed in case of breaches discovered, a potential violator might hesitate to proceed with such activities and could thus be deterred and discouraged from committing a breach in the first place. 

The basic provision of the CWC concerning challenge inspections Article IX, paragraph 8 is as follows ... 

Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection conducted anjrwhere without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General [of the Technical Secretariat] and in accordance with the Verihcation Annex. 

According to the challenge inspection procedure in the CWC, the requesting State Party is first required to submit an inspection request to the Executive Council of the OPCW (where the decision on the challenge inspection would be made) as well as to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat. The request must contain, at least, the following information (a) the State Party to be inspected, (b) the point of entry into the inspected State Party, (c) the size and type of the inspection site,... 

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