Unsafe action

If the trainee attempts an unsafe action or ignores a potentially hazardous condition, STOP the trainee and terminate the qualification session. Discuss the violation with the trainee before allowing the trainee to reschedule another qualification. 

According to the researchers statistics in China, people s unsafe actions take up 85% cxu2oo5) According to the statistics in the last decade, first three coal mines with high frequent accidents on the... 

Unsafe operation is the abnormal behavior that conflicts with the psychological characteristics of people. Behavior which has caused or may cause accident must be an unsafe behavior during production activities. Once unsafe behavior in a person s life does not necessarily occur, it causes harm. Often unsafe actions, however, definitely lead to accidents. Even though the objects are the main reason for the accident, it also can t rule out human wrong behavior transformation hidden behind the unsafe state. Simply speaking, unsafe behavior has the following characteristics. 

Not only are individual unsafe actions difficult to identify in this nontraditional control model of human decision making, but the study of decision making cannot be separated from a simultaneous study of the social context, the value system in which it takes place, and the dynamic work process it is intended to control [166]. This view is the foundation of some modern trends in decision-making research, such as dynamic decision making [25], the new field of naturalistic decision making [217,102], and the approach to safety described in this book. 

It is advisable to make clear that reference is made here to trained professional psychology. The successful accident preventionist, although untrained and inexperienced professionally, already applies psychological methods in his work. Knowing that the unsafe actions of persons predominate in accident causation he endeavors to sell safe methods. Specific effort is made, when simple and direct remedies such as instruction fail, to find ont why the unsafe action persists and then to apply a remedy based on what he finds. [Citation 13]... 

The cornerstone of BBS is the principle that most accidents are caused by unsafe acts of workers. Traditional safety management theory (as developed by Heinrich, yet based on no scientific proof) is that management should focus on unsafe actions since they account for 85 to 95 percent of accidents. 

The EFC is defined as the situation that arises when particular combinations of performance shaping factors (PSFs) and plant conditions create an enviromnent in which unsafe actions (UA) are more likely to occur. The UA is a mode of human fadure that results in the Human Fadure Event (HFE) and, thus, is a specific inappropriate action taken (error of commission) or not taken when needed (error of omission), that results in a degraded plant condition. 

Modeling and anal3rzing on the level of specific actions (UAs) enables the investigation of the potential impact of each action on the plant response. Additionally, this reveals the level of influence from different contexts on the operator actions and the recovery factors which are reflected in the model and the HEP. This can be observed in Fig. 2, the header 1C (OPEN SRV), contemplates 2 unsafe actions, UA-lCl is the failure to open a SRV when the procedures are followed correctly and UA-1C2 is the failure to open the SRV when only one procedure is followed. 

Frequent switching between screens can distract the operator from the task, and often requires the retention of information to memory, which can be remembered incorrectly and lead to an error or unsafe action. The hoisting operation is too complicated to permit complete representation of all hoist sub-systems on a single screen therefore, careful planning is required in the design of each screen to ensure that all necessary information and controls are included for all of the required tasks. 

Unsafe actions and behaviors of your drivers not only result in needless loss, but can adversely impact your customer relations, and the general public s perception of your company and the motor carrier industry. 

Evaluates and investigates past incidents or accidents Uses risk management to control losses Satisfied with reducing accident recurrence Disciplines unsafe actions and behaviors Accepts some losses if not too severe Documents errors and primary causes Responsive to formal culture expectations Leaders delegate responsibilities to others... 

A third important component of the audit process is the performance indexing of the audit results. The task of performance indexing requires the results of the audit to be quantified in a manner that allows for comparisons against performance benchmarks. While the actual audits may identify the number of unsafe actions performed by personnel during an observation period, the raw numbers are really meaningless until they are placed in a context which is comparable to an established index. The performance indices established from an audit can include the percentages of unsafe acts performed, the frequencies of hazardous conditions identified, or the accident rates for a period of time to name a few. 

It is unusual for different types of accidents to occur within an organization, and most that continue to occur after the unsafe condition has been removed are the result of unsafe acts or behaviors. The unsafe actions are usually the result of error, violations of best practices, or disregard for established rules and can be avoided. Most often, those making such errors are aware of their mistakes. They take short-cuts even though they have received training, but fall prey to a culture that allows workers to take calculated risks. 

In a planned observation, the supervisor selects the employee and the job to observe. The supervisor also decides the most suitable time. Some supervisors may want to make assignments for planned job safety observations. The basic tool for making a planned observation is job safety/hazard analysis (JSA/JHA). (If a JSA/JHA is not used, the supervisor must be completely familiar with the job steps, job hazards, and safe job procedures.) The supervisor should observe the employee doing a complete job cycle, paying attention to safe or unsafe procedures and conditions. A Planned Job Safety Observation Form should be used (see Table 14.1). All safe practices noted should result in a sincere compliment to the employee involved while any unsafe actions call for appropriate corrective measures. In either instance, the supervisor should make an observation record. A planned safety observation is a valuable loss prevention tool. 

When a JSA/JHA is not available, the supervisor should make notes beforehand in preparation for the planned observation. A list of possible unsafe actions for the job would provide a guide to use. The supervisor must keep an open mind for possibilities that are not on the list. Most checklists do not cover every conceivable unsafe action. Use a general checklist with information similar to Table 14.1. 

Unsafe actions that seriously jeopardize the safety or health of others... 

Be capable of overriding unsafe actions of the control system [15]... 

In the middle 1920s a series of theorems were developed which are defined and explained in the following chapter and illustrated by the domino sequence. These theorems show that (1) industrial injuries result only from accidents, (2) accidents are caused directly only by (a) the unsafe acts of persons or (b) exposure to unsafe mechanical conditions, (3) unsafe actions and conditions are caused only by faults of persons, and (4) faults of persons are created by environment or acquired by inheritance. 

A Technique for Human Event ANAlysis (ATHEANA) was developed by the nuclear industry due to a perceived need for a human error analysis tool that more closely modeled actual operational events and which put a stronger focus on contextual factors. The quantification is based around three calculations. Eirst, calculating the probability of an Error Eorcing Condition (EEC i.e. the probability that the plant will be in a state which may induce an error). This is determined by a combination of plant conditions and PSEs. Second, the probability of an Unsafe Action (UA). And third, the probability of not recovering from the initial UA. This third area incorporates the possibility of alarms and/or feedback to the operator allowing them to correct the UA. 

Identification of human failure events and unsafe actions that are relevant to the issue of concern ... 

For each human failure event or unsafe action, identification of (through a structured and controlled approach) the reasons why such events occur (i.e. elements of an EFC—plant conditions and performance shaping factors) ... 

Quantification of the EFCs and the probability of each unsafe action, given its context ... 

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