The Workforce

The very nature of construction work has inevitably created a project-based industry, where temporary project teams are formed on the construction sites. The workforce comes together for the 

Less than 1% of the construction industry operative and site-based workforce are women (UCATT 2015), and it has been estimated that less than 4% within the workforce as a whole are from a black or ethnic minority background (Chaudhry 2014). Whilst the industry has been a traditional employer of foreign and migrant workers on sites, they have been estimated to only form around 12% of the site-based workforce (McMeeken 2015). The vast majority of the site-based workforce is white and male. The lack of women within the workforce has led to what is frequently described as a macho culture on sites, and on UK construction sites at least, this last bastion of the traditional male working class is characterised by the use of sexual language and humour, macho behaviour 

And construction operatives do take risks, as evidenced in industry-specific accident models. For example, two of the three root causes of accidents under the construction industry-specific Accident Root Cause Tracing Model (ARCTM) developed by Abdelhamid and Everett (2000) are assigned to deliberate risk taking on the part of operatives. Whether they decided to proceed with work activities once an existing unsafe condition had been identified, or decided to act unsafely regardless of the initial conditions of the work environment, either approach requires the identification of the risk - and its subsequent acceptance on behalf of the workforce. 

It can be suggested that work develops to suit its workforce, which in turn perpetuates these requirements in those it seeks to employ in the future. So it is perhaps unsurprising that the dominance of white men on construction sites has continued, despite many attempts to improve equality and diversity within the workforce. As a result, aspects such as risk tolerance and accepted ways of working, such as long hours and heavy manual labour, all of which can be readily associated with a macho culture, will have influence on how we manage our construction sites, as well as workers expectations of their environments. 

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The workforce consists of 92 shift and 8 daily workers. Approximately 20 to 30 different fine chemicals are produced per year which range ia volume from 20 to 200 metric tons per train and ia campaign length from 20 to 180 days. 

The adoption of the Taylor system in the late nineteenth century changed the lines of responsibihty for product quahty (4). This management philosophy was based on using incentives, such as pay based on output, to motivate worker productivity. As the workforce became better educated and labor unions gained strength, it became difficult to motivate workers doing simple, repetitive tasks (5). 

The technical workforce has become more diverse. Technology managers need to educate themselves about the changing nature of the workforce, the implications for the future, and the opportunities made possible by a more heterogeneous organization (66). 

Training and instruction of the workforce. Retraining. This should cover both normal and emergency situations. 

In the first environment, we are concerned with the potential health risks that chemicals pose to the public, as well as possible impacts on the ecology. In the latter case, we are concerned with indoor air quality and its possible adverse impacts on the health and safety of the workforce. In both cases the health dangers may be either acute, or long-term chronic health risks. We will first discuss general concepts of air pollution and table our discussions on... 

Announce to the workforce that you now have a quality policy that affects everyone from the top down. 

Logically, a representative carries the wishes of the people they represent to a place where decisions are taken that affect them - this is the case for Members of Parliament, Union Representatives, Committee Members, etc. The note would appear to address the need for representation outside the business. Inside the business, the representative represents management to the workforce but not in the same sense. The person carries the wishes of management (i.e. the policies) to the workforce so that the workforce makes decisions that take into account the wishes of management. 

Measures to reduce human error are often implemented at an existing plant, rather than during the design process. The decision to conduct an evaluation of the factors that can affect error potential at an existing plant may be taken for several reasons. If human errors are giving rise to unacceptable safety, quality or production problems, plant management, with the assistance of the workforce, may wish to carry out a general evaluahon or audit of the plant in order to identify the direct causes of these problems. 

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the main requirements to ensure an appropriate safety culture are similar to those which are advocated in quality management systems. These include active participation by the workforce in error and safety management initiatives, a blame-free culture which fosters the free flow of information, and an explicit policy which ensures that safety considerations will always be primary. In addition both operations and management staff need feedback which indicates that participation in error reduction programs has a real impact on the way in which the plant is operated and systems are designed. 

Success is more likely if the appeal is direct and specific rather than diffuse and general. Similarly, the propaganda must be relevant for the workforce at their particular place of work or it will not be accepted. 

The worker knew that valve A had to be closed. However, it was believed by the workforce that despite the operating instructions, closing B had a similar effect to closing A and in fact produced less disruption to downstream production. Possible cause violation as a result of mistaken information and an informal company culture to concentrate on production rather than safety goals (wrong intention). 

From the perspective of the CPI, this result suggests that it would be valuable to carry out a survey of the perceptions of the workforce with regard to the risks associated with different aspects of plant operations (both field and... 

The first area focuses on the cultural and organizational factors that will have a major influence on the effectiveness of a human error data collection system and how well the information derived from such a system is translated into successful error reduction strategies. Regardless of how effectively the technical issues are dealt with, the system will not be successful imless there is a culture in the organization which provides support for the data gathering process. No data collection system aimed at identifying human error causes of accidents will be workable without the active cooperation of the workforce. 

Consideration of how formal data collection incident investigation methods are to be introduced into a plant in order to ensure acceptance and long-term support by the workforce... 

Workforce Support for Data Collection and Incident Analysis Systems Few of the incident investigation and data collection systems reviewed provide any guidelines with regard to how these systems are to be introduced into an organization. Section 6.10 addresses this issue primarily from the perspective of incident reporting systems. However, gaining the support and ownership of the workforce is equally important for root cause analysis systems. Unless the culture and climate in a plant is such that personnel can be frank about the errors that may have contributed to an incident, and the factors which influenced these errors, then it is unlikely that the investigation will be very effective. 

This phase of the program is designed to ensure that the information produced by the system is fed back to all levels of the workforce, including process operators, managers, supervisors, engineers, and senior policy makers. 

Evaluate Effectiveness on the Basis of Outputs and Acceptance Once the system has been implemented on its chosen site, its effectiveness needs to be evaluated at frequent intervals so that corrective action can be taken in the event of problems. The first criterion for success is that the system must generate unique insights into the causes of errors and accidents, which would not otherwise have been apparent. Second, the system must demonstrate a capability to specify remedial strategies that, in the long term, lead to enhanced safety, environmental impact and plant losses. Finally, the system must be owned by the workforce to the extent that its value is accepted and it demonstrates its capability to be self-sustaining. 

Three major themes have been emphasized in this chapter. The first is that an effective data collection system is one of the most powerful tools available to minimize human error. Second, data collection systems must adequately address underlying causes. Merely tabulating accidents in terms of their surface similarities, or using inadequate causal descriptions such as "process worker failed to follow procedures" is not sufficient to develop effective remedial strategies. Finally, a successful data collection and incident investigation system requires an enlightened, systems oriented view of human error to be held by management, and participation and commitment from the workforce. 

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are step-by-step job instructions which can help workers perform their jobs safely and efficiently. When the end users are involved in their design, SOPs can provide a basis for arriving at a method of work agreed-to by different shifts. In this sense, SOPs can be used to develop training programs and specify measures of competence. Because of the importance of SOPs in the work situation, a systematic framework is needed to enable the design of reliable procedures which are acceptable by the workforce. 

There are many sad examples of installations that have gone disastrously wrong, and these are by no means limited to small facilities or those in which water is a relatively unimportant service. For example, manufacture of microchips is wholly dependent on a supply of highly purified water. In recent years two of the largest UK manufacturers, sited at opposite ends of the country, have had to shut down and send the workforce home because their purified water facility had failed. 

No maintenance task can be issued without the person responsible for controlling the workforce establishing that the work is to be carried out safely. Areas where this is essential would include boilers, pressure systems, electrical systems, confined spaces, hot work, deep sumps/shafts, tanks, and lone working. 

Clear lines of responsibility identified for each level of management and the workforce to enable the policy to be implemented. 

A minor incident is one capable of being dealt with fairly effectively and quickly by personnel on the spot using the emergency equipment, e.g. fire extinguishers and monitors, on hand. The situation can be dealt with by the workforce, possibly including a Works Fire Brigade, fairly rapidly. It is reasonably localized and no other unit is affected. 

Man-made structures and architecture operate under similar constraints. Three factors come together to produce the final object. There is a design in the form of a blueprint, the workforce to manipulate the components, and the components themselves whose physical properties also play a role in determining the ultimate form. One cannot build a car engine from rubber or Wellington boots from steel. Classical Greek architecture... 

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