Safety management initiatives

Process Safety Management Initial Planning Effort ... 

Most important, our process safety management initiative needs management s commitment to proceed. 

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the main requirements to ensure an appropriate safety culture are similar to those which are advocated in quality management systems. These include active participation by the workforce in error and safety management initiatives, a blame-free culture which fosters the free flow of information, and an explicit policy which ensures that safety considerations will always be primary. In addition both operations and management staff need feedback which indicates that participation in error reduction programs has a real impact on the way in which the plant is operated and systems are designed. 

March 1997 Amarillo, Texas, U.S.A. NATO Advanced Research Workshop 4th U.S.-Russia Workshop Nuclear Materials Safety Management Initiative... 

Monitor indicators reflect the potential and capacity of the organisation to perform safely. The indicators monitor the functioning of the system. These indicators seek to measure the internal dynamics of the sociotechnical system and provide information on the activities of the system. Information should be provided not only about safety management initiatives but also about the persoimel, work processes, stractures and technology in the system. Cultural issues such as norms, values and shared practices should also be incorporated into monitor indicators. Figure 9.2 illustrates the ways in which safety indicators can be used to provide information to support safety management. 

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) (Dowell, 1994, pp. 30-34.) The OSHA rule for Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Toxic Hazardous Chemicals, 29 CFR 1910.119, part (e), reqmres an initial PHA and an update every five years for processes that handle listed chemicals or contain over 10,000 lb (4356 kg) of flammable material. The PHA must be done by a team, must include employees such as operators and mechanics, and must have at least one person skilled in the methodology employed. Suggested methodologies from Process Safety Management are listed in Table 26-1. 

To eontrol these types of hazards, employers need to develop the neeessary expertise, experienee, judgement, and initiative within their workforee to properly implement and maintain an effeetive proeess safety management program as envisioned in the Oeeupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard. 

To develop a safe design, it is necessary to first design and specify all equipment and systems in accordance with applicable codes and standards. Once the system is designed, a process safety shutdown system is specified to assure that potential hazards that can be detected by measuring process upsets are detected, and that appropriate safety actions (normally an automatic shutdown) are initiated. A hazards analysis is then normally undertaken to identify and mitigate potential hazards that could lead to fire, explosion, pollution, or injury to personnel and that cannot be detected as process upsets. Finally, a system of safety management is implemented to assure the system is operated and maintained in a safe manner by personnel who have received adequate training. 

V thout such a commitment from management, process safety management will be far more difficult and time-consuming to implement. An initiative that lacks a collective sense of utgency and priority is likely to be carried out piecemeal, despite the best efforts and intentions of its champion. Over time, piecemeal implementation is a false economy, since it is likely to take longer and cost more most important, it is very likely to be less effective. PSM is a continuous process, not an event, or a series of discrete activities. Without continuity, the process can easily break down. 

Communication is a critical component of any major company initiative, especially one as complex and far-reaching as process safety management. As used here, "communication" applies to both internal information transfer (within a team and between the team and its sponsors) and companywide dissemination of information (outside the team to the broader employee base). 

As you know, the Task Force has spent the past five months reviewing the division s process safety management (PSM) systems as part of our company s corporate PSM initiative. We are pleased with our progress to date, and your support has enabled us to expedite the process ahead of expectations. 

Initial process safety management implementation usually focuses on your own production operations. However, there are a variety of related activities that teneht from similar approaches to safety. 

The number of initial ineffective control elements on each hierarchical control level (=where) and the corresponding latent conditions leading to these ineffective control elements (=why) will be discussed. The results of the discussion will be reflected on the number of affected safety barriers (=consequences). Furthermore, the individual affected safety barriers will be combined, to find possible alignments of affected safety barriers that enable accidents (=risks). Finally, the weaknesses of the current safety management system are indicated by the previous findings. 

Several voluntary industry initiatives, such as ACC s Responsible Care and NACD s Responsible Distribution Process (RDP), provide guidance on process safety management for chemical manufacturers and distributors. However, no voluntary industry initiatives list specific codes or requirements for reactive hazard management. 

Actually, before the Oklahoma City bombing, the anthrax attacks, and 9/11, OSHA and USEPA had already taken the initial steps to ensure safety and security in chemical production facilities and in other facilities that use, produce, or store listed chemicals. These steps were listed in OSHA s Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard and USEPA s Risk Management Program (RMP). Based on personal experience, having conducted VAs and modified VAs (wastewater) on both water and wastewater systems and having implemented RMP in a major U.S. wastewater system, we have to concur that these initial safety/security steps were quite effective. 

OSHA investigated this incident and applied Process Safety Management (PSM) standards to the company, despite the fact the PSM Law did not apply to other industries until May 1992. The initial OSHA fine of about 8.2 million in proposed penalties was reduced to a record 5.8 million for alleged safety violations. The gut-wrenching emotions of the company were expressed when a spokesman stated, You have to understand we are still grieving. The company took the initiative to settle—rather than litigate—because it s time to move forward. [9]... 

During the period of initial implementation of process safety management policies, existing facilities may also be the subject of HAZOP or What-If reviews. 

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