Safety performance judging

Metrics should relate to the elements of the process safety system. Poorly selected metrics that do not specifically relate to the execution of process safety elements will not provide an accurate evaluation of process safety system performance. Occupational injury and illness reporting rates are sometimes used to judge overall safety performance, and this metric does track the incidence of employee injuries quite well. However, this rate does not reflect the effectiveness of the process safety system. Occupational safety is quite important to the health and well-being of employees, but the metrics involved in assessing the occupational safety performance are not appropriate for process safety system evaluation the detailed elements of a process safety program differ markedly fl-om an occupational safety program (as discussed in Chapter 3). 

For instance, many objectives and data collection similarities exist between the mechanical integrity (MI) system and the process safety metrics system, and data available in the MI system can be used to judge process safety performance. How information from the MI system will be captured and used needs to be defined, including who will be responsible for ensuring the proper information flow. This requires the metrics system developers to coordinate with the MI personnel regarding what information will be monitored and how it will be... 

Quality assurance is essentially a systematic and documented method to ensure that the required conditions or levels of safety are consistently achieved. Any systematic evaluation and documentation of performance judged against an appropriate standard is a form of quality assurance. A disciplined approach to all activities affecting quality, including, where appropriate, specification and verification of satisfactory performance and/or implementation of appropriate corrective actions, will contribute to transport safety and provide evidence that the required quality has been achieved. 

If fatalities (or frequency rates) are a poor measurement of supervisory performance, what is a good measurement What is wrong with fatalities as a measurement Measuring our failures is not the best approach to use in judging safety performance. This is not the way we measure employees in other aspects of their jobs. We do not, for example, measure line managers by the number of parts the employee in their departments failed to make. We do not measure the worth of sales professionals by the number of sales they did not make. In cases like these we decide what performances we want and then we measure to see if it is getting done [2]. 

The high level of safety performance provided by the VHTR requires a high level of fabrication quality for the fuel. This is judged with the failure rates of the TRISO ceramic layers in manufacture. An acceptance criterion for the HTTR fuel, for example, is through-coating defect in 1.5 per 10,000 particles, or 0.015% as fabricated. The operation of the HTTR first loading of fuel has proved that the actual fraction of fabrication defect is about two orders of magnitude less than the specification. 

Inspections of the workplaces at randomly selected intervals to observe the items and whether the performance is correct or not. Plotting the safety performance index on a control chart. The safety performance index is defined as the percentage of the observed items that are judged as correct. 

Therefore, it is important for judging the performance and the safety of the product to understand the size of the defect and the position by the ultrasonic method quantitatively. And, the reliability of the product improves further by feeding back this ultrasonic wave information to the manufacturing process. 

Essential Parameters. Traditionally, all vacuum environments are characterized in terms of one parameter, ie, pressure in the gaseous phase. However, when costs, energy, safety, hazardous wastes, and other requirements are taken into account, each system must be characterized by a host of parameters. Their magnitudes must be deterrnined in order to judge system performance. 

These objective, quantitative tests have shown that nitrile containers should protect the taste and odor of packaged foods and beverages. But the primary consideration in judging overall package performance, once safety is assured, rests on the subjective evaluations of taste, odor, and appearance. It is well known that the animal senses, in many instances, are far more sensitive than the best instruments and also are capable of integrating the individual effects of the several influences on product quality. 

Waste generated in the laboratory can often be characterized from knowledge of the starting materials (e.g., hydrocarbon mixture, flammable laboratory solvents, chlorobenzene still bottoms). Professional expertise, common sense, judgment, and safety awareness of trained professionals performing chemical operations in the laboratory usually put them in a position to judge the type and degree of chemical hazard. 

Begimiing in the 1980s, Flamm et al. (1987) and Rulis (1989) documented FDA s exploration of the use of large databases of toxicity data to address very low exposures to components of food contact materials more efficiently. Flamm et al. (1987) performed a probabilistic analysis of carcinogenic potency data in an attempt to discern a dietary level below which no specific toxicity testing data should be considered prerequisite to judge the safety of a compound used in a food contact material. 

One documented method uses process safety barriers identification for metrics selection. This concept uses a combination of lagging and leading indicators associated with process safety barriers and incident escalation controls to evaluate the process safety system performance. The basis for this method is documented in the U.K. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) publication HSG254 and illustrated by Figures 4.1-4.3. The strength of this technique arises from using the combination of indicators that provides multiple perspectives for judging the surety of a barrier or escalation control. For example, this basic concept was adopted and modified by BP to focus upon three information sources to assess key control barriers as summarized below ... 

The primary function of sensors is to gather information about the wearer (mostly physiological data), his/her performance (including speed, posture, impact, hit, movement and locatirai, for example) or his/her environment such as temperature and humidity. How this information is used is then up to the athlete, coach or judge/referee to decide, but in general there are four main areas of use training, competition, safety and recovery. An overview of the potential functions of the sensors for each area is provided in Table 8.1. 

Heinrich s premises, and the several causation models that are based on them, are still the foundation of the work of many safety practitioners. Indeed, most causation models have focused on the behavior of the individual who is presumed to have acted unsafely. And many safety practitioners, in the prevention measures they propose, emphasize training, quality of leadership by supervisory personnel, behavior modification, and appropriate methods of discipline — a great range of activities directed toward the control of man failure. These solutions are to achieve a change in the performance of the employee who, when judged retrospectively, is deemed to have acted unsafely. 

First, a safety-related fimction is identified. Knowledgeable persons must then determine the risks posed if the function were not to be performed as intended. If the frequency of an unwanted event was judged to be unacceptable or intolerable, then an existing or proposed safety-related fimction would need to detect precursor conditions and render the system safe before the unwanted event occurred. It would need to do so with a suitable reliability (e.g., operate 99 times out of 100 ), such that the frequency of the unwanted event would now become tolerable. 

The manual uses the notion that a preventable accident is one wherein the driver and/ or the carrier failed to act in a reasonably expected manner to prevent it. This concept is broader than the commonly used safety management tool for improving safety where accident preventability is judged only on the basis of the driver s performance. Thus, this manual presents countermeasures which seek to improve carrier performance as well as driver performance. The countermeasures are broken down into three classes ... 

The performance of a reverse engineered part compared to its original equipment manufacturer (OEM) counterpart is vitally critical to the success of a reverse engineering project. The performance of these parts is usually evaluated based on three primary criteria engineering functionality, marketability and safety. From an engineering functionality perspective, part performance is judged based on its structural integrity and system compatibility [2]. 

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