Safety flow chart

On the other hand, on larger, more complicated sites, one person might have only one job, or one piece of a job. As described earlier, the SSHO may have many levels of competence. We previously mentioned three levels commonly accepted at government sites. There may be three levels or more of SSHO. Each site may be different, yet the principles are the same. The HASP should show how safety issues are addressed. Typically, a flow chart can be used to clearly depict levels of responsibility along with straight-line versus dotted-line levels of reporting. 

Fig. 1. An overview of the DCLD tier/triage flow chart Boxes 1, 2, and 3 are taken from the Office of Device Evaluation decision tree, which is routinely used to determine whether a product can be reviewed as a 510(k) and found substantially equivalent to a predicate (currently marked) device or whether the product must be handled as a fundamentally new product and submitted to a PMA review. Box 4 determines the novelty of the product in terms of analyte, matrix, and/or technology. If new issues of safety and effectiveness are raised, a highly novel product might require review as a PMA. If the issues of safety and effectiveness are not new but require high-level scrutiny, then a tier III review is warranted. Examples of products requiring a tier III review would include 1. Analyte troponin for diagnosis of MI (with creatinine kinase as the predicate) 2. Matrix sweat patches for drugs of abuse (with urine drugs of abuse tests as the predicate) and 3. Technology nucleic acid...

Safety instructions Environmental restrictions Gas or liquid discharge limitations Solid or scrap disposal instructions Equipment Description Operation Cleaning Raw materials Pertinent characteristics Acceptance limits Analytical methods Packaging and storage Handling precautions Process flow chart... 

Although progress has been made in methods of evaluating hazards for self-reactive substances, further improvement is required on the international level. To insure safety, one needs to take the measures which are consider the best for each specific occasion. The flow chart shown in Fig.1.1 has been suggested by people involved with safety to evaluate whether new substances are hazardous reactive chemicals. 

For compressible fluid flow in plant piping, one can use Mak s Isothermal flow chart (Figure 1). Mak s chart was provided originally for relief valve manifold design and adopted by API. The relief valve manifold design method, and its derivation, is discussed in Section 20, Safety. Mak s methods can be applied to other common plant compressible flow situations. 

Figure 1.4 shows a simplified flow chart of the process. An intermediate in the processes is methyl isocyanate (MIC), which was stored in a series of tanks partially underground and equipped with cooling systems and a series of safety control devices (Figure 1.5). In fact, MIC is a highly toxic (maximum exposure TLV-TWA, during an 8-hour period is 20 parts per billion), flammable gas that has a boiling point near to ambient temperature and gives a runaway reaction vdth water unless chilled below 11 °C. Table 1.4 gives the list of MIC safeguards.

The flow chart showing the iterative safety assessment procedure for a chemical process under normal operating conditions (c.f. Section 2.1) has its central step in the evaluation of an adequate thermal design of the process. This is shown in a simplified form as the comparison of the chemically produced heat and the heat removal capacity of the system. A necessary prerequisite to this assessment of the suitability of the design is the knowledge of the time course of the heat production rate, which itself is directly proportional to the chemical reaction rate. This explains the pivotal significance of the identification of a reaction rate law that describes the investigated process with sufficient accuracy, and its parameters. 

Think about the potential hazards that you may encounter by recognizing these in this new experiment. What chemicals will be used and where can you find information about their hazardous properties and the hazardous properties of the products of this experiment Keep in mind that there are also physical hazards and hazards from equipment that you might use. Consider devising a flow chart of each step of the experiment and identifying potential hazards. Recognizing hazards is one of the most difficult tasks in safety and you must learn this skill early. Lastly, remember that not all hazards are created equal consider all hazards but focus on those hazards that carry the greatest risk. 

FIGURE 24.11 Respirator selection flow chart. (Courtesy of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.)... 

A HAZOP study requires a multi-disciplinary approach by a team made up of technical specialists, i.e. chemical engineer, chemist, production manager, instrumentation engineer, safety adviser, etc. It is co-ordinated by a leader who guides the systematic investigation into the effects of the various faults that could occur and their effects. The success of this study depends heavily on the quality of the leader and the positive and constructive attitude of the team members. It is essential that the team have all the basic data plus line diagrams, flow charts etc. 

On the basis of the flow chart and component list, it can be assumed that seven components are possibly involved in the origin of the undesired incident. They are entered in the upper left field in Table 4.10(a). The complete decision table would have to include 2 = 128 columns. If it is noted, however, that occurrence of the undesired incident UE2 is based on the premise, in every case, that there is excess pressure in the steam network and that the material then fails, this means that only those columns are to be considered which include a 1 (one) in the first two lines. Thus, for the description of the conditions to be observed, the columns entered in the decision table [Table 4.10(a)] remain, with 1 designating the failure of a component, or the undesired behavior of a relevant magnitude and 0 the desired behavior, The system states represented in one column and leading to the undesired event UE2 are marked by an X. This shows that the columns marked X differ in pairs such that in the case of component 9, a 0 or 1 (one) is entered. This means that the component, a safety valve on the tank, has no effect. Then the first 13 columns must be considered, while neglecting component 9. From column 8 it is obvious that the failure" of components W2, Piy. and 31 T already lead to the undesired event, irrespective of whether another component does or does not fail. Therefore columns 1-8 in Table 4.10(a) can be compressed into column 1 (one) in Table 4.10(b). Columns 9 and 10 differ merely in the... 

This verification is referred to as an operability study [4-20), [4-21], technical safety discussion [4-22J, or PI flow chart review [4-23] and is implemented according to different principles. H. Lawley [4-20] has established a strict system for the procedure. For the detection of the safety-relevant components, he follows the PI flow chart, and for the detection of hazardous plant conditions, a list of code words. H. Ullrich [4-24] describes a different way of proceeding. He applies a series of checklists in a determined sequence to the planning documents to confirm complete technical safety provisions. Individually such checklists are used to examine the completeness of procedure planning and construction documents as well as measuring and control plans. 

Both EdF reference sets of EOPs have four separate procedures for the reactor operator, for the water and steam (turbine) operator, for the shift supervisor (containing a combination of reactor, water and steam operator procedures) and for the safety engineer. All procedures are in the colour flow chart format (paper based). The recent four loop N4 plants have fully computerized procedures (with computerized operating actions actuated from the operator video display units) as well as a complete backup paper based set of procedures for operating from the auxiliary panel if the computer system fails. 

In short, the Accident Risk Assessment provides a comprehensive, detailed evaluation of the overall accident risk associated with the operation and maintenance of a specific facility, its systems, equipment, and hardware. It incorporates the results of integrated hazard analyses, recommended design changes, hazard reports, and procedural or administrative tools which will eliminate or reduce the risk of these hazards, operational flow charts, safety-critical procedure lists, and other such information pertinent to the overall assessment of accident risk. 

The Software Preliminary Hazard Analysis Used to identify software program routines that are considered to be safety critical, this analysis is conducted prior to software program coding. To perform the analysis, the analyst should make reference to any available system specifications, interface documentation, functional flow diagrams, software flow charts, storage and file allocation specifications, and any other program descriptive information. 

Job A job can be defined as a sequence of steps with specific tasks that are designed to accomplish a desired goal (Managing Worker Safety and Health, n.d. Managing Worker Safety and Health, Appendix 9-4 Hazard Analysis Flow Charts, n.d.). 

There are various fault flow charts in standards or other rules of technology, covering the specific design requirements of fail-safe behaviour for the safety device in question. The principle of all fault flow charts is always the same. The chart begins with the "ist failure" (e.g. emitter-collector of any transistor short circuit). It is to be verified that after each "ist failure" no dangerous situation may occur. If so, one has to ask what else happens after the "ist failure". There are 4 answers to this question ... 

The extended flow chart for an FMVEA in Figure 5, includes security in the analysis. As described in [1] there are different ways in which security or safety properties of a system can influence security or safety risks. Therefore, while the consideration of failure or threat modes of an item is split, the analysis of effects and causes combines both viewpoints. 

The following flow chart illustrates how the information begins with raw safety data and eventually arrives at the Safety Measurement System portal with a score. 

Identify potentially hazardous curves through crash analysis and safety reviews. (See Attachment 1.7 [Figure 4] for a decision tree flow chart on the treatment of existing horizontal curves.) Evaluate these for reconstruction or application of other safety measures. Even if a location doesn t have a high crash rate, improvements may still be desirable. Superelevation rates in excess of 8% shall be reduced to 8%, or less (see FDM 11-10-5). 

It is visualized by a flow chart diagram showing the procedures suggested for the management of the safety functions at each stage of the life cycle. 

---