Failure Plant

Identify possible routes to selected failures typically involving operator errors, equipment failure, plant aging, corrosion, over-filling, impurities, fire, explosion, missiles, and flooding 5 Quantify the probability of selected failures and their consequences... 

Unit substations can be either single-ended, fed by a single primary feed, or double-ended, fed from either end by a separate primary feed. Double-ended substations are usually designed so that either transformer can assume two thirds of the load in the event of a failure of one primary feeder. This is accomplished by the inclusion of a normally open tie circuit breaker in the switchgear lineup. The apphcation of double-ended substations to industrial plants increases the rehabUity of the system and allows partial operation in the event of partial power failures. Plant operators must have a plan for immediate dumping of nonessential loads before closing the tie circuit breaker. This plan will keep essential processes functioning while power is down. 

The AEBIL acoustic emission monitoring system installed on site has shown a good level of functional reliability no instrumentation failure is to be recorded in over 1 year of continuous in-plant operation. 

Welded structures often have to be tested nondestructively, particularly for critical application where weld failure can he catastrophic, such as in pressure vessels, load-bearing structural members, and power plants. 

The plant incorporating the air cathode electrolyzer must include a high performance air scmbbing system to eliminate carbon dioxide from the air. Failure to remove CO2 adequately results in the precipitation of sodium carbonate in the pores of the cathode this, in turn, affects the transport of oxygen and hydroxide within the electrode. Left unchecked, the accumulation of sodium carbonate will cause premature failure of the cathodes. 

A varnish is often appHed on top of the paint layers. A varnish serves two purposes as a protective coating and also for an optical effect that enriches the colors of the painting. A traditional varnish consists of a natural plant resin dissolved or fused in a Hquid for appHcation to the surface (see Resins, natural). There are two types of varnish resins hard ones, the most important of which is copal, and soft ones, notably dammar and mastic. The hard resins are fossil, and to convert these to a fluid state, they are fused in oil at high temperature. The soft resins dissolve in organic solvents, eg, turpentine. The natural resin varnishes discolor over time and also become less soluble, making removal in case of failure more difficult (see Paint and FINNISH removers). Thus the use of more stable synthetic resins, such as certain methacrylates and cycHc ketone resins, has become quite common, especially in conservation practice. 

The failure rate changes over the lifetime of a population of devices. An example of a failure-rate vs product-life curve is shown in Figure 9 where only three basic causes of failure are present. The quaUty-, stress-, and wearout-related failure rates sum to produce the overall failure rate over product life. The initial decreasing failure rate is termed infant mortaUty and is due to the early failure of substandard products. Latent material defects, poor assembly methods, and poor quaUty control can contribute to an initial high failure rate. A short period of in-plant product testing, termed bum-in, is used by manufacturers to eliminate these early failures from the consumer market. 

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) United Engineering Center 345 East 47th Street New York, NY 10017 The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, under the cognisance of the ASME PoHcy Board, Codes, and Standards, considers the interdependence of design procedures, material selection, fabrication procedures, inspection, and test methods that affect the safety of boilers, pressure vessels, and nuclear-plant components, whose failures could endanger the operators or the pubHc (see Nuclearreactors). It does not cover other aspects of these topics that affect operation, maintenance, or nonha2ardous deterioration. 

Risk-Based Inspection. Inspection programs developed using risk analysis methods are becoming increasingly popular (15,16) (see Hazard ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT). In this approach, the frequency and type of in-service inspection (IS I) is determined by the probabiUstic risk assessment (PRA) of the inspection results. Here, the results might be a false acceptance of a part that will fail as well as the false rejection of a part that will not fail. Whether a plant or a consumer product, false acceptance of a defective part could lead to catastrophic failure and considerable cost. Also, the false rejection of parts may lead to unjustified, and sometimes exorbitant, costs of operation (2). Risk is defined as follows ... 

In the simplest terms, a fault-tree for risk analysis requires the following information probabiUty of detection of a particular anomaly for an NDE system, repair or replacement decision for an item judged defective, probabiUty of failure of the anomaly, cost of failure, cost of inspection, and cost of repair. Implementation of a risk-based inspection system should lead to an overall improvement in the inspection costs as well as in the safety in operation for a plant, component, or a system. Unless the database is well estabUshed, however, costs may fluctuate considerably. 

Water chemistry is important to the safe and reflable operation of a nuclear power plant. Improper conditions can lead to equipment and material failures which ia turn can lead to lengthy unscheduled shutdown periods for maintenance (qv) and repair operations. Water chemistry can also have an impact on the radiation levels duriag both power operations and shutdown periods. These affect the abiUty of personnel to perform plant functions. 

The development of computer capabiUties in hardware and software, related instmmentation and control, and telecommunication technology represent an opportunity for improvement in safety (see COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY). Plant operators can be provided with a variety of user-friendly diagnostic aids to assist in plant operations and incipient failure detection. Communications can be more rapid and dependable. The safety control systems can be made even more rehable and maintenance-free. Moreover, passive safety features to provide emergency cooling for both the reactor system and the containment building are being developed. 

The need for a pilot plant is a measure of the degree of uncertainty in developing a process from the research stage to a hiU commercial plant. A modification to a weU-known process may go directiy from basic research work to design of a commercial plant using this approach for a brand new process risks a significant failure. Hence, one or more intermediate size units are usually desirable to demonstrate process feasibiUty as well as to determine safe scale-up factors. 

Three types of computer control systems are commonly used for pilot-plant instmmentation. The first is a centralized system, usually based on a minicomputer or occasionally a mainframe. These systems have large storage capacities, substantial memories, and much associated equipment. They typically control all the pilot plants in an area or faciUty. Centralized systems are economical if a large number of units are involved but are becoming less common due to their high installation and maintenance costs as well as the limitation that any failure of the central system shuts down all pilot plants involved. 

Cooling System Corrosion Corrosion can be defined as the destmction of a metal by chemical or electrochemical reaction with its environment. In cooling systems, corrosion causes two basic problems. The first and most obvious is the failure of equipment with the resultant cost of replacement and plant downtime. The second is decreased plant efficiency to loss of heat transfer, the result of heat exchanger fouling caused by the accumulation of corrosion products. 

Difficulties with the Na—S system arise ia part from the ceramic nature of the alumiaa separator the specific P-alumiaa is expeasive to prepare and the material is brittie and quite fragile. Separator failure is the leading cause of early cell failure. Cell failure may also be related to performance problems caused by polarization at the sodium/soHd electrolyte iaterface. Lastiy, seal leakage can be a determiaant of cycle life. In spite of these problems, however, the safety and rehabiUty of the Na—S system has progressed to the poiat where pilot plant production of these batteries is anticipated for EV and aerospace apphcations. 

Eault tree analysis (ETA) is a widely used computer-aided tool for plant and process safety analysis (69). One of the primary strengths of the method is the systematic, logical development of the many contributing factors that might result ia an accident. This type of analysis requires that the analyst have a complete understanding of the system and plant operations and the various equipment failure modes. 

A significant problem area for initial SCR systems has been the continuous emission monitoring (CEM) systems. In power plants, all sites equipped with CEM systems report the highest failure frequency. The CEM systems are the most labor intensive component, requiring as much as hill-time attention from one technician. At one power plant CEM systems were responsible for 100% of 73 reported SCR system shutdowns (38). As CEM systems improve, these concerns may disappear. 

Heat for soldering is usually obtained from torches. The high conductivity of copper makes it necessary to use large flames for the larger sizes, and for this reason the location in which the joint will be made must be carefully considered. Soldered joints are most widely used in sizes 2 in and smaller for which heat requirements are less burdensome. Soldered joints should not be used in areas where plant fires are hkely because exposure to fires resiilts in rapid and complete failure of the joints. Properly made, the joints are completely impervious. The code permits the use of soldered joints only for Category D fluid service and then only if the system is not subject to severe cychc condions. 

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