Facility system safety analysis

Hathaway, W. T. and Markos, S. H. 1989. Passenger Carrying Submersibles System Safety Analysis. DOT-TSC-CG-89-2. Washington, DC U.S. Department of Transportation. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1998. NASA Facility System Safety Handbook. NASA-STD-8719.7, January 1998. Washington, DC National Aeronautics and Space Administration, pp. 5-7. 

If your plant or facility has hazardous operations (as identified in the system safety analysis), then you should set up a personnel certification program for conducting... 

The design of the incineration facility should include a provision, to the extent deemed necessary by the regulatory body, to limit the effects of the significant risks identified in the system safety analysis. These risks may include both natural events (e.g. earthquakes, tornadoes, floods) and man-made events (e.g. nearby explosions, impact of aircraft). 

System safety analysis techniques are applied to facilities and its operations. 

Since safety considerations are so important in any facility design, Chapter 14 has been devoted to safety analysis and safety system design. (Volume 1, Chapter 13 discusses the need to communicate about a facility design by means of flowsheets and presents general comments and several examples of project management. )... 

DOE Order 5480.23 specifies that hazard and accident analyses be included in safety analyses for nuclear facilities. Likewise, DOE Order 5481.IB, "Safety Analysis and Review System," requires hazard and accident analyses be included for non-nuclear facilities. Two nuclear SAR topics overlap with the PrHA. 

There are many methods of safety analysis reviews that are available and can be applied to a facility or project design to overcome human errors and the various failures of the process system. The methods may be either qualitative or quantitative in nature. 

Hazard Analysis—The determination of material, system, process, and plant characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences, followed by the assessment of hazardous situations associated with a process or activity. Largely qualitative techniques are used to pinpoint weaknesses in design or operation of the facility that could lead to accidents. The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) hazard analysis examines the complete spectrum of potential accidents that could expose members of the public, on-site woikers, facility workers, and the environment to hazardous materials. 

DOE 0 420.1 Facility Safety Requires fire hazard analysis and natural phenomena analysis for all facilities. For Hazard Category 2 or 3 nuclear facilities only, requires a criticality safety evaluation. Criticality Safety Analysis Fire Hazard Analysis Effects of natural phenomena hazards on facility systems, structures, or components (SSCs) included as part of safety analysis documented in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), Basis for Interim Operation (BIO), or Auditable Safety Analysis (ASA). 

The second phase of the program will be more concerned with achieving quantified improvements in the facility s safety and environmental results. This phase is likely to emphasize elements such as Incident Investigation and Process Hazards Analysis in order to identify weak spots in the management systems. 

Air cleanup systems should be provided in confinement venti I at ion exhaust systems to limit the release of radioactive or other hazardous material to the environment and to minimize the spread of contamination within the facility as determined by the safety analysis. 

DOE Order 5480.23, Chg. I, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, Paragraph 8.b.(3)(d), as amplified in paragraph 4.f.(3)(d)4 of Attachment 1 to the Order, requires a description of the facility and operations conducted in the facility, including design of principal structures, components, systems, engineered safety features, and processes. (DOE 1994a). 

To accommodate HCF experimental capabilities, a defined process for the preparation, review, and approval of experiments is established as an important element of facility safety. Experiment control is exercised through a system of administrative procedures that are applied to classify experiments into three broad categories (Class I, II, or III) in accordance with the RCSC charter. In addition, all experiments must be conducted in accordance with the approved Technical Safety Requirements, and potential consequences of conducting the experiment must be bounded by the safety analysis in Chapter 3 of this SAR. Proposed experiments that would exceed either of these constraints must be submitted to the SNL Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee (NFSC) and to DOE/AL for review and approval. 

Low-risk facilities are those with low energy levels and those with which the COE has a considerable amount of trouble-free experience, such as basic administrative buildings and housing. The system safety effort for these facilities may consist primarily of the PHL, with no additional analysis required. 

The HazOp study differs from the FMEA and ETBA in that some suggest that the best time to conduct a HazOp is when the design is fairly firm (Goldwaite 1987). Conventional system safety wisdom dictates that the system safety effort be as far upstream as practical, with a facility preliminary hazard analysis developed as part of the initial design effort and completed by the 35% stage. Also, a HazOp study tends to include human factors and operator errors whereas a traditional FMEA or ETBA normally examines hardware failures only. 

In addition to the hazardous conditions that develop during daily operations and are incorporated in the closed-loop hazard tracking system, the customer may require the contractor to perform a formal periodic risk assessment (usually annually, but it can be more frequent if the customer so desires or if operational activities dictate) of all facilities in which operations will occur. The risk assessment will also take into consideration the hazards associated with the permanent equipment and hardware assigned for use in the facility. The accident risk assessment then becomes a detailed safety analysis of a facility, including its systems and functions. 

In order to utilize the ETBA in the performance of the system safety analyses listed above, certain essential data are required for evaluation. For example, if the ETBA is to be performed on a specific manufacturing facility, then the analysis should begin with an examination of completed facility drawings. If the ETBA is concerned with a specific project, or a newly designed piece of manufacturing equipment, the project plans and schematics must be evaluated. It should be noted that the level of detail required is dependent on the analysis itself. Development of a preliminary hazard list will not require extensive detail and evaluation, whereas an ETBA in support of a subsystem hazard analysis will meticulously analyze the project to the component level and detailed drawings will, therefore, be required. 

As stated earlier, two types of fault trees will be constructed to demonstrate the use of this system safety analytical technique. The first, which will be referred to as a positive fault tree analysis, will identify the events necessary to achieve a top desired event of no accidents. The second, or negative fault tree, will be constructed to show those events or conditions that will lead to a top undesired event of a fire in a manufacturing facility. 

Once all what-if analysis questions have been asked and answered along with all completed HAZOP studies of system components, a final report should be written to document all findings and recommendations. In the chemical industry (in the United States), this report is normally referred to as a process hazard analysis. This report is required under both OSHA and EPA regulations for facilities that handle or contain certain chemical commodities at certain defined quantity thresholds. However, when HAZOP studies and what-if analyses are used in general industry application, documentation of the results can be included in a written report along with any other system safety analyses that may have been performed (as described in previous chapters). If the HAZOP and what-if exercises were conducted as standalone analyses, then a final written report should be... 

Some government organizations require or apply system safety methods for construction projects. A project may require selective use of methods. Organizations apply system safety in some construction projects. Included are the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Defense and its service agencies, the Federal Aviation Administration and others. Some projects may simply require use of preliminary hazard analysis that leads to a site safety plan for a project. Complex facilities that integrate specialized equipment into the project may require failure mode and effects analysis or even fault tree analysis. 

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