Accidents equipment failure

The British miner s comments reflect his ideological and economic position as a strong advocate for labor. But his comments provide a more nuanced view of these videos than we might expect. This miner raises questions about human factors (the role of management and the kinds of planning decisions that preceded the accident) equipment failures (the unexpected and awkward technical problems caused by the angle of the boom) and general conditions in the mine. 

Eault tree analysis (ETA) is a widely used computer-aided tool for plant and process safety analysis (69). One of the primary strengths of the method is the systematic, logical development of the many contributing factors that might result ia an accident. This type of analysis requires that the analyst have a complete understanding of the system and plant operations and the various equipment failure modes. 

ETA breaks down an accident iato its contributing equipment failures and human errors (70). The method therefore is a reverse-thinking technique, ie, the analyst begias with an accident or undesirable event that is to be avoided and identifies the immediate cause of that event. Each of the immediate causes is examined ia turn until the analyst has identified the basic causes of each event. The fault tree is a diagram that displays the logical iaterrelationships between these basic causes and the accident. 

The result of the ETA is a Hst of combiaations of equipment and human failures that ate sufficient to result ia the accident (71). These combiaations of failures are known as minimal cut sets. Each minimal cut set is the smallest set of equipment and human failures that are sufficient to cause the accident if all the failures ia that minimal set exist simultaneously. Thus a minimal cut set is logically equivalent to the undesired accident stated ia terms of equipment failures and human errors. 

The foUowiag symbols are used ia fault tree constmction to display the iaterrelationships between equipment failures and a specific accident ... 

For many years the usual procedure in plant design was to identify the hazards, by one of the systematic techniques described later or by waiting until an accident occurred, and then add on protec tive equipment to control future accidents or protect people from their consequences. This protective equipment is often complex and expensive and requires regular testing and maintenance. It often interferes with the smooth operation of the plant and is sometimes bypassed. Gradually the industry came to resize that, whenever possible, one should design user-friendly plants which can withstand human error and equipment failure without serious effects on safety (and output and emciency). When we handle flammable, explosive, toxic, or corrosive materials we can tolerate only very low failure rates, of people and equipment—rates which it may be impossible or impracticable to achieve consistently for long periods of time. 

There are a variety of ways to express absolute QRA results. Absolute frequency results are estimates of the statistical likelihood of an accident occurring. Table 3 contains examples of typical statements of absolute frequency estimates. These estimates for complex system failures are usually synthesized using basic equipment failure and operator error data. Depending upon the availability, specificity, and quality of failure data, the estimates may have considerable statistical uncertainty (e.g., factors of 10 or more because of uncertainties in the input data alone). When reporting single-point estimates or best estimates of the expected frequency of rare events (i.e., events not expected to occur within the operating life of a plant), analysts sometimes provide a measure of the sensitivity of the results arising from data uncertainties. 

Frequency Phase 1 Perform Qualitative Study, Typically Using HAZOP, FMEA, or What-if Analysis. To perform a qualitative study you should first (1) define the consequences of interest, (2) identify the initiating events and accident scenarios that could lead to the consequences of interest, and (3) identify the equipment failure modes and human errors that could contribute to the accident... 

Frequency Phase 3 Use Branch Point Estimates to Develop a Ere-quency Estimate for the Accident Scenarios. The analysis team may choose to assign frequency values for initiating events and probability values for the branch points of the event trees without drawing fault tree models. These estimates are based on discussions with operating personnel, review of industrial equipment failure databases, and review of human reliability studies. This allows the team to provide initial estimates of scenario frequency and avoids the effort of the detailed analysis (Frequency Phase 4). In many cases, characterizing a few dominant accident scenarios in a layer of protection analysis will provide adequate frequency information. 

A significant development of the study was the use of event trees to link the system fault trees to (lie accident initiators and the core damage states as described in Chapter 3. This was a response to the ditficulties encountered in performing the in-plant analysis by fault trees alone. Nathan Villalva and Winston Little proposed the application of decision trees, which was recognized by Saul Levine a.s providing the structure needed to link accident sequences to equipment failure. 

Human operator errors are not usually examined in a FMEA, but the effects of human error are indicated by the equipment failure mode. FMEAs rarely investigate damage or injury that could arise if the system or process operated successfully. Because FMEAs focus on single event failures, they are not efficient for identifying an exhaustive list of combinations of equipment failures iliat iead to accidents. 

The most conuiion cause of fire accidents in process plants is equipment failure. Tliis is primarily a result of poor equipment maintenance or poor equipment layout and design. Maintenance perfonned according to a detailed and well structured schedule will significantly reduce tlie occurrence of fire accidents. Tlie second largest cause of fire accidents is ignorance of tlie properties of a specific chemical or chemical process. Proper training of employees will increase tlieir knowledge of tlie properties of a specific chemical and chemical process and can prevent many of tliese chemical fire accidents. 

Most reported accidents with hydrogen cyanide involve operators inhaling or being splashed witli liquid hydrogen cyanide. Some of tliese accidents are due to equipment failure (blocked lines, frozen valves, etc.), and some arc due to operator error. 

Most equipment failures occur under abnonnal conditions, especially elevated pressures and temperatures. The design of equipment presents internal and external constraints. External limits may arise from physical laws, while internal limits may depend on tlie process and materials. In any case, if these limits are exceeded, tlie chance of an accident is greatly increased. 

The equipment used in a processing system is designed under internal and external constraints. Most equipment failures occur when tliese constraints me exceeded. Each piece of equipment lias its own set of constraints, wliich must be followed to avoid an accident. 

It should be noted tliat FMECA identifies single failure modes tliat eitlier directly result in or contribute significantly to important accidents. Human/operator errors are generally not examined in a FMECA however, tlie effects of a misoperation are usually described by an equipment failure mode. It should also be noted that FMECA is not efficient for identifying combinations of equipment failures tliat lead to accidents. 

A random variable is a real-valued function defined over tlie sample space S of a random experiment (Note tliat tliis application of probability tlieorem to plant and equipment failures, i.e., accidents, requires tliat tlie failure occurs randomly. 

The rapid growth and expansion of the chemical industry has been accompanied by a spontaneous rise in human, material, and property losses because of fires, explosions, hazardous and toxic spills, equipment failures, other accidents, and business interruptions. Concern over the potential consequences of catastrophic accidents, particularly at chemical and petrochemical plants, has sparked interest at both the industrial and regulatory levels in obtaining a better understanding of the subject of this book Health, Safety, and Accident Management (HS AM). The writing of this book was undertaken, in part, as a result of this growing concern. 

Viewed in this context, the Three-Mile Island (TMI) accident was the coup de grace for an already foundering industry. In spite of the fact that the hydrogen gas bubble that accumulated in Reactor 2 did not explode, although some contaminated gas escaped and that the commissions who investigated the accident faulted human error rather than equipment failure, TMI caused (as the New York Times... 

The comparison of the safety of equipment is not straightforward. It depends on several features of both process and equipment themselves. It can be evaluated from quantitative accident and failure data and from engineering practice and recommendations. Experience has been used for layout recommendations and for the development of safety analysis methods such as the Dow E F Index (Dow, 1987). Statistics contain details, causes and rates of failures of equipment and data on equipment involved in large losses. 

This safety audit is used for identifying inputs and material flows, processes and intermediates, and final products - but with special attention paid to human-material/process/equipment interactions that could result in (a) sudden and accidental releases/spills, (b) mechanical failure-based injuries, and (c) physical injuries - cuts, abrasions, and so on, as well as ergonomic hazards. Additional sources of adverse effects/safety problem areas are records/ knowledge of in-plant accidents/near misses, equipment failures, customer complaints, inadequate secondary prevention/safety procedures and equipment (including components that can be rendered non-operable upon unanticipated events), and inadequacies in suppliers of material and equipment or maintenance services. 

Ask any group of people experienced in chemical plant operations what causes most chemical process accidents, and you will get a variety of answers including operator error, equipment failure, poor design, act of God, and bad luck. However, in the opinion of representatives of many of the large chemical and oil companies in the United States, these answers are generally incorrect. The Center... 

As anticipated, there have been occasional equipment failures involving reactors, but the safety systems have been sufficiently redundant so that one or more have always worked. Even in the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the safety systems worked as designed. Much of the damage resulted from operator actions to override the safety systems. As concluded in the Reactor Safety Report, the limitations of the operator created and then seriously aggravated the Three Mile Island incident. Nevertheless, the features of the containment system prevented significant exposure to the plant personnel or any off-site individual, this despite failure of the barriers provided by the fuel cladding and the primary coolant system. 

Section 16.2 Causes of Accidents Section 16.3 Equipment Failure Section 16.4 Mechanical Operations... 

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